THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 18817/06
by Majda PREŠERN
against Slovenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 23 November 2010 as a Committee composed of:
	Elisabet Fura, President,
	Boštjan M. Zupančič,
	Ineta Ziemele, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 March 2006,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1.  The applicant, Ms Majda Prešern, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1977 and lives in Žirovnica. She was represented before the Court by Ms M. Krainer, a lawyer practising in Radovljica. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.
A.  The circumstances of the case
2.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3.  On 8 July 2002 the applicant instituted civil proceedings with the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 800,000.00 Slovenian Tolars (approximately 3,300 euros) sustained at an open-air social event.
4.  On 14 January 2003 the first hearing was held.
5.  Between 15 May 2003 and 29 November 2004 six hearings were held.
On 27 November 2003 the court appointed a medical expert.
6.  On 29 November 2004 the Celje District Court delivered a judgment upholding the applicant’s request in part. The applicant and one of the defendants appealed.
7.  On 18 May 2006 the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) delivered a judgment. The judgment was served on the applicant on 17 August 2006.
B.  Relevant domestic law
8.  The Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (Zakon o varstvu pravice do sojenja brez nepotrebnega odlašanja, Official Gazette, No. 49/2006 – “the 2006 Act”) became operational on 1 January 2007.
9.  Section 25 lays down the following transitional rules in relation to the applications already pending before the Court:
Section 25 - Just satisfaction for damage sustained prior to implementation of this Act
“(1) In cases where a violation of the right to a trial without undue delay has already ceased and the party had filed a claim for just satisfaction with the international court before the date of implementation of this Act, the State Attorney’s Office shall offer the party a settlement on the amount of just satisfaction within four months after the date of receipt of the case referred by the international court for the settlement procedure. The party shall submit a settlement proposal to the State Attorney’s Office within two months of the date of receipt of the proposal of the State Attorney’s Office. The State Attorney’s Office shall decide on the proposal as soon as possible and within a period of four months at the latest.....
(2) If the proposal for settlement referred to in paragraph 1 of this section is not acceded to or the State Attorney’s Office and the party fail to negotiate an agreement within four months after the date on which the party filed its proposal, the party may bring an action before the competent court under this Act. The party may bring an action within six months after receiving the State Attorney’s Office reply that the party’s proposal referred to in the previous paragraph was not acceded to, or after the expiry of the period fixed in the previous paragraph for the State Attorney’s Office to decide to proceed with settlement. Irrespective of the type or amount of the claim, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act concerning small claims shall apply in proceedings before a court.”
COMPLAINTS	
10.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the excessive length of civil proceedings and under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard.
THE LAW
	ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
11.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
12.  The applicant also complained of the lack of an effective domestic remedy in respect of the excessive length of the proceedings. Article 13 reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
13.  Further to the notification of the case under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, the Government informed the Court that the State Attorney’s Office had refused to apply section 25 to the present case, stating that the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time had not been infringed. As a result, no settlement proposal was submitted to the applicant. The applicant contested the Government’s submissions.
14.  The Court recalls that the “reasonable” length of proceedings must be assessed in accordance with the circumstances of the case and the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the behaviour of the applicant and that of the competent authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). The Court reiterates that only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of non-compliance with the “reasonable time” requirement (see Humen v. Poland, no. 26614/95, § 66, judgment of 15 October 1999).
15.  The Court observes that the time to be taken in consideration in the present case started on 8 July 2002, the date when the domestic proceedings were instituted, and ended on 17 August 2006, the date when the second-instance judgment was served on the applicant. The proceedings therefore lasted four years and one month for two levels of jurisdiction.
In the Court’s view the proceedings, which concerned a request for compensation of damage, cannot be considered particularly complex. However, the question of determination of liability did require the examination of quite a few witnesses (see below in this paragraph). Furthermore, the applicant contributed to the duration of the proceedings by postponing one hearing, which added approximately two months to the overall delay. As to the conduct of the competent authorities, the Court observes that the first hearing was held six months after the lodging of the request and that the first-instance court, subsequently, held seven hearings, heard numerous witnesses and appointed one expert. The Court therefore finds that the domestic courts were dealing with the case swiftly enough and that the proceedings can therefore be considered to have been conducted without unnecessary delays.
16.  Having regard to all the material submitted to it and having regard to the Court’s case-law on the subject (see for example Takeva v. Bulgaria, no. 56023/00, 4 September 2006, Hornak v. Slovakia, no. 43527/04, 24 November 2009 and Koszegi v. Hungary, no. 73298/01, 25 March 2003) the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings can still be considered reasonable.
17.  The Court therefore finds that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
18.  As to the complaint regarding the lack of effective remedies the Court recalls that Article 13 requires the State to provide an effective legal remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief (see Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 98, 8 June 2006). Considering that the complaint about the excessive length of the proceedings is inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, the Court finds that the applicant did not have an arguable claim that his right to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 was violated. Therefore, this claim does not reveal any appearance of violation of this provision.
19.  Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible in the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
	Marialena Tsirli	Elisabet Fura
	Deputy Registrar	President