IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE	QBENF 97/1578/C
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE STEPHENSON (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge))

	Royal Courts of Justice
	Strand
	London W2A 2LL

	Friday, 31st July 1998

	B e f o r e

	LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
	LORD JUSTICE JUDGE
	LORD JUSTICE BUXTON

	ARMSTRONG & ORS	Respondents

	v.

	BRITISH COAL CORPORATION	Appellant

	           

	(Transcript of the Handed-Down Judgment of
	Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street
	London EC4A 2HD
	Tel: 0171 421 4040
	Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

MR RONALD WALKER QC, MR RICHARD METHUEN QC and MISS CATHERINE FOSTER appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

MR JOHN HENDY QC, MR CHRISTOPHER CARLING and MR IAN SCOTT appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

	J U D G M E N T
	(Draft for approval)

Lord Justice Judge:
	 This is an appeal by the defendants from the decision of His Honour Judge Stephenson, sitting as a judge of the High Court, Queen’s Bench Division,  dated 30th September 1997 that they were liable to seven plaintiffs for personal injuries loss and damage suffered in the course of their employment.  These plaintiffs were Cudlip, Stokoe, Martin, Lamb, Nullis, Carver and Wright. Claims by two other plaintiffs (Armstrong and Mushens) were rejected. Damages for each successful plaintiff were separately assessed.  Some of these awards are also challenged.

Liability

The nine plaintiffs were lead cases, representative of some twenty five thousand similar claims, brought against the defendants by employees alleging that in consequence of the defendants’ negligence they developed and suffered from the condition known as Vibratory White Finger (VWF).  The critical symptoms of this condition, in particular loss and impairment of sensation and movement in the fingers, are now well known.  The condition has two components, the first, vascular, and the second, more recently understood, sensorineural.  The symptoms are often very minor indeed, limited to either intermittent tingling or intermittent numbness, and  in the context of employees working in the mining industry,  facing constant and major physical danger, trivial.  In some cases however, the condition can become much more serious and involve permanent discomfort and disability in the digits of each hand.  The condition can occur naturally or arise from constitutional causes (CWF) which it does for about 4-5% of the overall population.  VWF is the manifestation of the condition brought about by work with powered hand tools through which forceful vibrations are transmitted to the hands and arms of the operator.  The effect of exposure to such equipment is cumulative, the greater the exposure to vibration the greater the consequent risk, and the potential risks are correspondingly diminished by reducing the extent of exposure. Provided the condition is recognised in its early minor form it will normally be cured by removing the employee in question from work with vibrating tools.  The judge accepted that 
	"It is an impossible task to assess exposure on an annual basis ......  It is clear that the sooner action is taken to reduce or stop vibration exposure the more likely the onset of VWF will be avoided or the symptoms cease to progress or even regress."

The critical question in the present appeal is the assessment of the degree of exposure, if any, which may, subject to appropriate precautions for the continuing safety of the employees, reasonably be permitted.  

In 1995 Judge Stephenson began the hearing of the lead cases by considering and deciding two preliminary issues.  Incorporating the answers he provided to the questions posed to him, in a judgment dated 15 January 1996, he decided that 

(a) by 1st January 1973 the defendants ought to have recognised that work with the tools complained of in the lead cases gave rise to a foreseeable risk of VWF;

(b) by 1st January 1975 the defendants ought to have recognised that effective precautions in the form of warnings, system and routine examination, could and should have been taken in respect of such work;

(c) by 1st January 1976 the defendants ought to have recognised that effective precautions in the form of job rotation could and should have been taken.

The defendants appealed against these conclusions.  During the course of the hearing they conceded that they never appreciated and did nothing to minimise or prevent the risk which they should have recognised by January 1973, and that they had not taken the precautions found should have been taken by January 1975 and  January 1976 respectively.  They were nevertheless anxious to underline that the adverse findings were not conclusive on the issue of liability.   Only one of the plaintiffs, Carver, had given evidence. Mr Richard Maxwell QC argued that he had failed to establish “prolonged and regular exposure to vibrating tools” which was thought at that time to be a “most significant feature in any relevant working history”, and further emphasised that the defendants were not prepared to admit that any of the plaintiffs actually suffered from VWF.   Mr John Hendy QC for the plaintiffs accepted that the decision in the preliminary issues did not constitute a finding binding for all purposes in the litigation that any individual plaintiff had indeed suffered from VWF.  He conceded that no assumptions could be made about the claims made by any individual plaintiff other than those which had been expressly or by implication decided by the preliminary issues.  The defendants were “entitled to advance any defence in each case where symptoms developed after January 1975, except ignorance of a foreseeable risk of VWF, and complete inaction.”

In deference to the concerns expressed by Mr Maxwell in the course of the argument I thought it right to indicate a number of areas, which, subject to the consequences of the decisions in the preliminary issues, remained open.  Accordingly at the end of my judgment in the Court of Appeal (with which Nourse and Waller LJJs agreed) I said 
	"The following questions remain open:
	
	(a) whether he (each plaintiff) suffered excessive exposure to vibrating tools and equipment
	
	(b) whether the defendants negligently failed to take effective precautions to prevent avoid or reduce such excessive exposure
	
	(c) whether he suffered occupational white finger in consequence of the defendants’ negligence.
	
	In each such case all questions of causation, the quantum of damages (if any) and limitation remain open for decision."

At the subsequent hearing before Judge Stephenson (under consideration in the present appeal) there was a great debate about the effect of this passage.  Although the refinement of argument to which these words - in reality the single word “excessive” in a forty-two page long judgment - gave rise may be a tribute to the ingenuity of counsel, the judge summarised their effect correctly when he said that he did not believe they meant “more than that it was for each plaintiff to prove his case”, or as he observed later, that each plaintiff had to show a breach of duty by the defendants.  At the same time nothing in those words could possibly be understood to undermine or reduce the crucial importance of the findings on the preliminary issues, nor was it appropriate to consider the issues left open without reflecting on the issues which had been conclusively decided.  Therefore in deciding whether each plaintiff had proved his case the judge was required to abide by the conclusions and logical consequences of his findings in the preliminary issues, and to consider all the evidence bearing on the issue of liability called before him both at the first and the subsequent hearings.  

Exposure Levels 

Judge Stephenson summarised the rival contentions.  Before him the plaintiffs “took up the position at the outset that the men were at risk and the defendants did not take steps ....... they should have done, so subject to proof of causation and limitation, they were entitled to succeed, whatever the vibration levels.  The defendants ....... took up a defensive position behind the state of knowledge in 1973 and defied the plaintiff to prove that exposure was excessive, and said that there was no liability .......”.  He rejected the argument that the plaintiffs had to establish “excessive exposure”, that is, exposure above an established safe limit.   He suggested that the defendants were arguing that “they were under no legal liability to take these steps because no-one knew what the lower limit was ......  They are saying it is up to the workforce, who did not know that there was a risk, to prove what it was, and until the plaintiffs do that, they are perfectly entitled to do nothing until further research, carried out without their assistance (although as the largest employer of users of vibrating tools they had been asked to help) established that they were at risk all the time.”  Although this summary did not quite accurately reflect the argument being advanced by the defendants the issues raised in the appeal are now too narrow for the point to require analysis.  

By the time the appeal was opened by Mr Ronald Walker QC, who had taken over the conduct of the litigation from Mr Maxwell, the major issue on liability had been closely considered and reduced to sensible proportions.  The defendants were prepared to accept that they had correctly been held liable to the seven individual plaintiffs who were found to have been suffering from VWF consequent on their employment with the defendants and exposure to vibrating tools after January 1973.  The main issue which Mr Walker wished this Court to resolve was the basis of the judge’s conclusion on exposure on which the outcome of many of the other claims depends.  He conceded that in the light of their proved exposure to vibrating equipment after January 1973, arrangements should have been in place to rotate the jobs of all these seven plaintiffs, with the exception of Stokoe, and thus reduce their exposure, and that liability was also established in those cases, including Stokoe, where the judge had found that a warning would have led the individual plaintiff’s exposure to be reduced or avoided.  Nevertheless Mr Walker contended that further claims could not be sustained merely because the employee could point to some exposure beyond the level properly described as “de minimis”.  This was precisely the test held by the judge to be appropriate, and Mr Walker submitted that he was wrong.  

Before analysing the argument it is important to emphasise that the question under consideration is limited to possible liability to an employee based on the negligent failure to reduce exposure by rotation of jobs in the context of the system of warnings and medical surveillance which should have been operating simultaneously, and protecting employees from anything worse than trivial symptoms.

Each plaintiff alleged excessive exposure. Taking Cudlip as an example, the writ asserted that the plaintiff “was exposed excessively to vibratory tools”, and in the statement of claim the same allegation was made in marginally different language, “the plaintiff was persistently exposed to excessive vibration of a character and over periods likely to cause him injury”.  Thereafter particulars of “exposure to excessive vibration” were given.  This exposure was said to have caused VWF.  Very similar, if not virtually identical, allegations were made in the other cases.  Thus in Stokoe the allegation was “exposure to excessive occupational vibration”: in Martin it was alleged that the exposure was to “sustained occupational vibration”: in Lamb exposure was to “vibration as aforesaid”, meaning “considerable vibration”. In Nullis the claim was based on the consequence of having used “tools throughout the average shift and when he did overtime work which “vibrated continually whilst in use”.  In Carver the allegation was based on the defendant’s failure “to take any or any adequate steps to ensure that vibration from the use of such tools was within safe levels”, and Wright alleged that he was “exposed to continuous and considerable vibration”.   It was implicit in these allegations that for the plaintiff to succeed it was necessary for him to show that his level of exposure was greater than a prudent employer should have allowed.  This approach was correct.

Before Judge Stephenson Mr Maxwell contended that the defendants would have fulfilled their duty to take reasonable care for the safety of employees using vibratory tools by imposing a limit on their exposure in accordance with the only guidance available during the mid 1970s, the draft for the development for a British Standard, referred to throughout as DD43.  After hearing and considering a great deal of evidence about DD43, and its limitations, the judge concluded that the defendants “could not shelter behind” it, meaning that DD43 would not - and acting prudently the defendants would have appreciated did not - provide any sound or reliable guide to an appropriate level of exposure, not least because the defendants had not themselves carried out any epidemiological survey of their employees.  The standards of safety  set in DD43 were too low.  Mr Walker realistically accepted that for the purposes of this litigation he could not hope to persuade us to set aside the judge’s express findings about DD43.

Having rejected DD43 Judge Stephenson did not consider any alternative, permissible, level of exposure: this was consistent with his conclusion that any exposure which exceeded de minimis should have been reduced by rotation.  He said “I understand an argument that it might be verging of the absurd to insist on rotation of jobs when a man was only using a vibrating machine for half an hour per week, although in extreme cases it might be necessary.  We are, however, dealing with men who frequently use such machines, and if the defendants had conducted their survey they would have found that a substantial proportion of their workforce were at risk from VWF from such exposure.  They can only properly be exempted from attempting rotation where the exposure was minimal, or in lawyers’ terminology, de minimis”.  Faced with the rejection of DD43, and the de minimis conclusion adopted by the judge, Mr Walker was prepared to advance a different, lower level of exposure above which rotation should have been arranged, referred to before the judge, but not central to the defendants’ submissions because of the focus on DD43.

In 1986 the International Organisation for Standards produced standard guidelines for “the measurement and assessment of human exposure to hand-transmitted vibration” (ISO 5349).  This was followed in 1987 by BS 6842, the British Standard guide to “measurement and evaluation of human exposure to vibration transmitted to the hand”.  This replaced DD43, which was withdrawn.  It took account of work currently being carried out domestically and internationally.  It reflected a “consensus based upon data available from practical experience and laboratory experimentation in the field of human response to hand-transmitted vibration”, adding that it was difficult to propose “a firm standard regarding the evaluation of such vibration”.  Among the appendices was Table 5 to which I shall return in due course.

The research continued.  It did not of course include any epidemiological survey of their employees by the defendants, but the International Standards Organisation produced further guidelines (ISO 5349: 1989) and the British Standards Institution considered the problem in 1991 (BS 7482).  Eventually in 1994 the Health & Safety Executive produced a detailed booklet, “Hand-Arm Vibration”.  This booklet provided “guidance for those who have duties under the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 and other relevant legislation”.  It was intended “to be a framework document and source of reference for use by all those involved in identifying and controlling the risks of hand-arm vibration syndrome”.  It claimed that it was “fairly” comprehensive.  Crucially it referred back to Table 5 of the British Standards 6824 of 1987.  In the course of identifying “hazardous work and assessing risk” the booklet noted
	"Vibration ‘dose’ received by the worker over a typical working day depends on the duration of exposure as well as the vibration magnitude.  To allow different exposure patterns to be compared, they are adjusted or “normalised” to a standard reference period of 8 hours, however long the actual exposure period."  (paragraph 18)

	"Programmes of preventive measures and health surveillance are recommended where workers’ exposure regularly exceeds an A(8) of 2.8 m/s 2. (paragraph 21)” This was the reference to BS 6842: 1987.
	
	“A preventive programme should control the risk of injury if introduced where there is regular prolonged use of tools likely to be hazardous, or where it is known that vibration exposure will exceed the actual level in paragraph 21.." (paragraph 22).

	
Although the process of calculating any vibration “dose” is described in technical detail in the 1994 booklet, for present purposes it is necessary only to understand the elementary features which go to make up the relevant calculations.  

The first figure is the average amount of time spent by the plaintiff using particular vibrating tools each day, and the second assessment is the vibration magnitude of these tools.  These figures enable the calculation of the level of exposure during the course of an eight hour working day to be completed. In effect therefore the judge was required to make a number of findings on the evidence available to him.  I do not underestimate the difficulties of doing so when the matters being investigated went back so many years and when many of the conclusions depended on the judge’s evaluation of the credibility of any particular plaintiff. 

After considering the latest research the 1994 booklet focused on a particular figure in Table 5 of BS 6842: 1987 as the level of exposure requiring action by reduction or rotation.  It was not to be regarded as completely “safe”.  If the figures were exceeded, or the use of hazardous tools was regular and prolonged, preventive measures and surveillance were recommended: if the figure were not exceeded then the warnings and surveillance identified by Judge Stephenson at the first hearing should have reduced any risk arising from the fact that the action level in BS 6842: 1987 was not “completely” safe.

Table 5 of BS 6842: 1987 sets out a series of frequency weighted vibration acceleration magnitudes expressed in metres per second squared and links those figures to the working day and working life of an individual using hand operated vibrating tools.  It is unnecessary to set Table 5 out in detail but reference may be made to it in bundle C at page 411or appendix A to BS 6842: 1987.
_________________________________________________________________

Table 5. Frequency weighted vibration acceleration magnitudes (m.s-2   r.m.s)
which may be expected to produce finger blanching in 10% of persons exposed
____________________________________________________________________

Daily		Life-time exposure
exposure
average	   6 months       1 year      2 years       4 years       8 years      16 years
____________________________________________________________________
8h                         44.8             22.4           11.2             5.6             2.8               1.4
_____________________________________________________________________

Therefore in summary if a man were regularly exposed to an acceleration magnitude of A8 2.8 ms2 there was a 10% chance that he would develop finger blanching within eight years.  Explaining the point in different language, 10% of such employees would be expected to do so.  A margin of error has to be allowed for all such figures, and the precise date of onset would inevitably be uncertain and vary from individual to individual.  Many individuals would not suffer any symptoms at all.  In its earliest manifestations at least, finger blanching causes no interference with work or social activity.  It is not a serious condition.  The 1994 booklet describes it as “a white discolouration of the fingers usually followed by a red flush”.  If discovered in reasonable time it should regress.  A proper warning system would have included reminders to employees in whom finger blanching developed at least to seek proper advice about it.  I shall return to the precise terms of an appropriate warning later in this judgment. 

Mr Hendy pointed out that whatever the value of Table 5 in general, the defendants were employees with special characteristics.  These included a vast workforce and huge resources.  They were also the largest users of vibrating tools.  However VWF is caused by physically handling vibrating tools.  Nothing in the evidence suggests that the resources or size of the workforce has any relevance.  Mr Hendy also argued that Table 5 was prepared in 1987 without the benefit of an epidemiological study made by the defendants.  On the other hand at one stage in the argument he acknowledged that by 1994 (that is the year when the Health & Safety Executive booklet was produced) standards would have been as stringent as if the absent epidemiological study had been completed.  He later understandably modified this concession, accepting only that in the absence of any other evidence the Health & Safety Executive booklet would have produced the same result whether or not an epidemiological survey had been carried out by the defendants.  Despite his skills Mr Hendy could not avoid the forensic problems created by an opponent pitching his own case as modestly and sensibly as Mr Walker.  DD43 having failed to attract the approval of Judge Stephenson, Mr Walker accepted that working conditions from 1973 onwards, and throughout the 1980s, could be judged by the standards laid down as late as 1994.  

Mr Hendy pointed out that Table 5 demonstrated that exposure at A8 1.4 ms2 would produce finger blanching in the same proportion (10%) of employees after sixteen years.   He relied on the well known fact that many employees of the defendants anticipated a life time of work in the industry.  Developing this argument Mr Hendy suggested that if any level above de minimis were appropriate then BS 6842: 1987 provided the appropriate level of exposure which was that symptoms did not “usually occur” with a frequency weighted acceleration below about A8 1 ms2   In effect this would mean that no employee could use any vibrating tool for very much longer than one minute per shift.  An employer is required to take reasonable care for the safety of his employees: that duty does not extend to ensuring working conditions which are wholly risk free, at any rate in relation to risks where the adverse consequences are not serious.  In any event the risk expectation based on acceleration magnitudes at A8 2.8 ms2  should amply have been covered by the introduction of warnings and surveillance after 1975.   And after reflection I have found it difficult to see how an exposure level of A8 1 ms2  would not of itself qualify as de minimis.  At this extremely limited rate of use one is bound to wonder how any industry could possibly survive.  I have found no direct evidence on the subject but I am prepared to infer that it would be wholly impracticable, whether or not the permissible daily exposure could be concentrated on one day each week so as to produce a total weekly exposure lasting 6 minutes.

The first question is whether Judge Stephenson was right to conclude that the defendants were liable to any plaintiff who suffered VWF from any post 1973 exposure which went beyond de minimis, and thus was incapable of reduction by rotation.  In my judgment his conclusion was wrong.  The error stems from                                                                                 approaching the findings that by January 1973 the defendants should have been aware of the risks of VWF, and thereafter have taken precautions to reduce that risk, as if it followed that the absence of precautions led to the conclusion that exposure at any level was negligent. The judge explained “they did owe a duty to all using such tools to take reasonable care for their safety, and I reject the argument that the plaintiffs have to establish ‘excessive exposure’ in the sense that exposure above an established safe limit has to be demonstrated”.  The defendants’ argument however is that - ignoring any other possible basis for liability - they were not to be held liable to any plaintiff whose exposure was limited to the levels which could reasonably be considered “safe” in the light of DD43, or BS 6842: 1987 as adopted by the Health & Safety Executive in 1994. 

Although it is commonplace that employers owe a duty of care at common law to provide safe plant and appliances for the use of their employees, the standard required of them is not absolute but reasonable care.  Thus in Paris v Stepney BC [1951] AC the plaintiffs’ claim succeeded, in essence, because he was known by his employers to have only one sound eye and they failed to provide him with appropriate goggles.  The claim did not succeed on the basis that goggles should have been provided for anyone working in the same process as the plaintiff although, obviously, being rendered blind in one eye is a very serious injury even for a man with two sound eyes.   Not every risk to safety can be eliminated.  Work underground at a coalface is dangerous, but liability does not automatically attach to every accident resulting in personal injury.  All this is trite law.  

Examining it in the particular context of the issues which arise in the present appeal, the judge found that from January 1975 the defendants were under a duty to their employees to give appropriate warnings about the risks of VWF created by the use of vibrating tools.  If the duty of employers like the defendants was to ensure that their employees were never exposed to any such risks, or any risks of which they were negligently left ignorant, a proper warning system could never be sufficient to satisfy their obligation to take reasonable care.   Yet it is sometimes the only practical course.  Moreover  the basic, almost standard precaution of warnings is not always required whenever there is a perceived risk to safety.  In the context of VWF caused by the use of vibrating tools, in White v Holbrook Precision Castings Limited [1985] IRLR 215 Lawton LJ considered the principle against which to test the problem about what, if anything, should be done by an employer “if he is offering a job to somebody in an occupation which does carry risk to health and safety”.  After considering the well know observation of Devlin J in Withers v Perry Chain Co Limited [1961] 1 WLR 1314 (where there was exposure to the risk of dermatitis) Lawton LJ continued  
	"Generally speaking, if a job has risks to health and safety which are not common knowledge but of which an employer knows or ought to know and against which he cannot guard by taking precautions, then he should tell anyone to whom he is offering the job what those risks are if, on the information available to him, knowledge of those risks would be likely to affect the decision of a sensible, level headed prospective employee about accepting the offer."

What he did not suggest was that the job in question should be discontinued, and on the basis of the factual findings made by the judge, the court rejected the submission that wherever there was a “slight risk, it was the duty of the employer to tell the prospective employee what the risk was”.	

The problem with the conclusion that any exposure beyond de minimis provided a sufficient basis for a finding of liability was that it did indeed apply to every such employee, whether his exposure level was just marginally or wildly in excess of de minimis.  Nothing in the evidence suggested that the use of vibrating tools after 1973 should have been banned.  The employees were not exposed to an injury of such magnitude that the risk should have been averted by virtually prohibiting the use of vibrating tools throughout the industry, or permitting only use which could properly be described as de minimis.  In reality, although every member of the workforce using vibrating tools was exposed to the risk, only a small proportion would have gone on to develop the condition.  In its early manifestations the consequent injury was not very serious, and adequate protection would have been provided by a proper warning and surveillance system.   In my judgment the judge did not sufficiently appreciate the consequence of his own findings that by 1975 an adequate system of warnings and surveillance should have been in place to warn staff who might develop symptoms about the appropriate ways to report, deal with and reduce them.  There is no logical reason and nothing in the evidence to explain why the exposure of every employee using vibrating tools, other than casually, should automatically have been reduced, whether by rotation or otherwise, or how the necessary reduction in the exposure levels of employees who use these tools (sometimes in cramped conditions) could be achieved without inevitably increasing the exposure levels of those brought in to replace them and finish their work.  De minimis exposure for all the defendants’ employees was neither practicable nor reasonable.

On the basis of Mr Walker’s concessions, all the plaintiffs whose cases are presently under consideration, except for Stokoe, established that the level of their exposure was excessive and should have been reduced by rotation.  That however does not mean that liability on this basis is established by any employee of the defendants who developed VWF and who can show that his exposure was more than the minimal.  

This conclusion leads to the consideration of the second question, whether it is appropriate to attempt to identify the level of exposure which should have been reduced by job rotation.  As already noted, the judge rejected DD43.  Despite Mr Hendy’s arguments, which I shall not repeat, assuming that the defendants had been alert to the risk of VWF, I am satisfied that standards higher than those advised in the 1994 booklet should not be imposed on them.  This conclusion is not intended to lay down any guidelines about appropriate levels of exposure in other employments.  All it means is that when considering the reasonable safety of those employees exposed to vibrating tools the 1994 booklet provides a standard which it would have been reasonable for the defendants as prudent employers to apply when considering the appropriate level of permissible exposure.  However after January 1976 any level of exposure in excess of that advised by the handbook required job rotation, in addition to warnings, surveillance and the other precautions identified at the first hearing.   

In reality this conclusion is likely to be of limited value to the defendants.  The individual plaintiff’s working history over a lifetime (which has been the basis for analysis to date) may demonstrate that to take an average exposure throughout the whole working life time may be misleading.  For example, Martin’s exposure throughout his working life from 1956 to 1988 was estimated at an average in excess of A8 2.8 m/s2.  Therefore his claim in relation to job rotation is not in issue in the appeal.  However his working history shows that he spent something like ten or eleven years working as a development worker from about 1973 or 1974 when his exposure was significantly higher than his average lifetime exposure.  He began to develop relevant symptoms towards the end of this period of exposure.  The precise details are unimportant to Martin’s case but where there is evidence of a higher level of exposure than A8 2.8 m/s2  directly connected with the onset of symptoms of VWF a claim based on negligent failure to organise job rotation should not fail merely because the individual plaintiff’s lifetime average exposure dropped below the A8 2.8 m/s2 level.  Consistently with reliance on the 1994 booklet Mr Walker did not appear to argue to the contrary.  In a passage quoted earlier the booklet itself explains that a “preventive programme” (which included job rotation) “should be introduced where it is known that vibration exposure will exceed the ‘action level’, A8 2.8 m/s2 “.  In other words job rotation should have formed part of a preventive programme where it was or should have been known that the vibration levels exceeded A8 2.8 m/s2 .  If they did so for any significant period of employment the fact that an individual employee’s lifetime average exposure fell below A8 2.8 m/s2  would not provide the defendants with an unanswerable defence to a claim based on negligent failure to reduce exposure.

Warning 

I can now turn to the judge’s conclusion about the nature of the warning which the defendants should have provided.  There was very little direct evidence: the judge had to form his own view.  He recognised that the warning should not be “alarmist”. Using DD43 for this purpose only, he suggested that an appropriate warning would be “some operators of vibratory tools may develop tingling, numbness and blanching of the fingers, the effects of which in some cases can lead to permanent loss of dexterity of the hand.  If you suffer from any of these symptoms, or think you may be suffering from them, report the matter immediately to management and medical staff”.  

Mr Walker submitted that this warning was too wide and that the reference to tingling and numbness was unnecessary.  Some tingling and numbness are almost inevitable after use of vibratory tools.  BS 6842: 1987 suggested that medical advice should be sought if there were “attacks of white or blue finger or long periods of tingling and/or numbness”.  The 1994 Booklet suggested that there should be “a system for workers to report any episodes of finger blanching (which should be investigated) and an adequate record keeping system of both medical examinations and any episodes of finger blanching”.  In other words the real focus for attention in the literature was finger blanching, which was consistent with the Taylor-Pelmear classification (set out below) that stage 1 of VWF was reached when there was blanching of one or more fingertips.  

The terms of any appropriate warning must be considered in the context of the practical realities of work in the coal industry.  A warning to avoid a problem after it has developed is usually too late.  However in the case of VWF, even after blanching has occurred there is no interference with work or social activities, at any rate while its remains at stage 1.  If caught then, the condition should improve without leaving long term problems.  Moreover in this industry, for many of the men who worked underground in great danger, the prospect of reporting a minor degree of tingling or a small amount of numbness at the end of a tough shift would be demeaning, and the same general approach would be taken by those working away from the immediate dangers underground but engaged in heavy exhausting activity.  That being so I doubt not only whether more than a tiny proportion of employees would heed a warning to report tingling or numbness, but also whether the colliery nurse or medical assistance would or could realistically have very much more to say than something like “watch it, and if you start getting any white finger, come and see me again”.

To be valuable warnings must be practical and useful, that is, they should be couched in terms which carry weight with the person or persons to whom they are given.  Accordingly I have concluded that a sensible warning in the context of VWF in the coal industry would have been to the effect
	"If you are working with vibrating tools and you notice that you are getting some whitening or discolouration of any of your fingers then in your own interests you should report this as quickly as possible.  If you do nothing you could end up with some very nasty problems in both hands."

Conclusion 

In the result all these appeals on liability will be dismissed, although Stokoe’s claim succeeds on the more limited basis that he was not given any warning of the risks when symptoms began in 1985, and would immediately have sought and paid attention to medical advice.  It is established by the findings in relation to Stokoe that he would have ceased to use vibratory tools.  It may be doubted whether that would have been true of many of the defendants’ employees. Without in any way impugning the findings made in Stokoe’s case, the general question whether robust men would have been prepared to give up well paid work to avoid the risk of VWF, at any rate in the earlier of its stages, is clearly one which should be approached by the court with great care.   For those who would not have heeded the warnings, the critical questions requiring resolution are likely to be whether their exposure  was excessive and caused VWF.

Quantum 
The adverse effects of VWF range from intermittent tingling or intermittent numbness which can be readily cured to permanent painful problems with both hands resulting in reduced manual dexterity and consequent interference with work patterns as well as the ordinary enjoyment of life.

The symptoms are now assessed by reference to classifications, the Taylor-Pelmear classification by stages, and since 1986, the Stockholm workshop scales which classify a vascular and a sensorineural component.  These classifications are:
TAYLOR-PELMEAR 
STAGE 	CONDITION OF DIGITS  	WORK/SOCIAL INTERFERENCE
0		No blanching				None
OT		Intermittent tingling			None
ON		Intermittent numbness		None
OTN		Tingling and numbness		None
1		Blanching of one or more		None
		fingertips, with or without
		tingling and numbness

2		Blanching of one or more		Slight interference with home and
		fingers with numbness		social activities, no interference
		usually confined to winter		with work

3		Extensive blanching,		Definite interference with work, at 
		frequent episodes in			home and with social/recreational
		summer and winter			activities

4		Extensive blanching most		Occupational change to avoid further
		fingers, frequent episodes		vibration exposure because of severity
		in summer and winter,		of signs and symptoms
		finger ulcerations

THE STOCKHOLM WORKSHOP SCALES 

VASCULAR COMPONENT 

STAGE 	GRADE 			DESCRIPTION 

0						No attacks

IV		Mild 				Occasional attacks affecting only the tips of
						one or more fingers

2V		Moderate			Occasional attacks affecting distal and 
						middle (rarely also proximal) phalanges of
						one or more fingers

3V		Severe				Frequent attacks affecting all phalanges of
						most fingers

4V		Very Severe			As in stage 3 with trophic changes in the 
						fingertips

SENSORINEURAL COMPONENT

STAGE 		DESCRIPTION 

OSN			Vibration-exposed but no symptoms

ISN			Intermittent numbness with or without tingling

2SN			Intermittent or persistent numbness, reduced sensory perception

3SN			Intermittent or persistent numbness, reduced tactile
			discrimination and/or manipulative dexterity

Note:	The staging is made separately for each hand.  The grade of disorder is indicated by the stage and number of affected fingers on both hands.

The effect of blanching, white discolouration of the fingers, has already been given.  Tingling speaks for itself, so does numbness, although the 1994 booklet notes that numbness may occur in association with finger blanching or independently, and that if it occurs apart from finger blanching it is “of prime interest as this may indicate neurological involvement”, a feature identified in the Stockholm Workshop Scales.

These classifications provide a valuable starting point in the assessment of damages, the valuation of each claim ultimately depending on the judge’s view of the true extent of the symptoms and their impact on the life of each individual plaintiff.  The fact that the classifications themselves refer to the “fingers”, or the “digits”, and indeed that the name of the condition itself is Vibratory White Finger,  may divert attention from the fact that in a severe case this injury should properly be regarded as damaging the hand or hands rather than being confined to the fingers.  

The appeals in the lead cases have highlighted four particular features which are likely to arise in many of the other claims.  These are the level of general damages in VWF cases, the appropriate discounts (if any) to allow for non-negligent exposure before 1975, and for continuing exposure after that date below the level which could be criticised as negligent, that is, post 1975 fault free exposure, an issue raised during the hearing of the appeal itself.   In addition the allowance made in some of the claims for the disadvantage of the plaintiff on the open labour market has been examined.  The defendants have left open whether claims for additional expenditure or loss of amenity causing loss in subsequent cases ought properly to be included but no point of principle has arisen and we were not invited to interfere with the assessments made by Judge Stephenson.

General Damages

Mr Walker submitted that the best indication of the appropriate level of damages was to be found in the guidelines published by the Judicial Studies Board (3rd Edition, 1996). To counter the possibility that we might attach excessive weight to this publication, our attention was drawn to the observation of Staughton LJ in Arafa v Potter [1994] PIQR 73, regularly deployed when the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines are inconvenient to one or other party:
	"We have been referred to the guidelines of the Judicial Studies Board.  They are not in themselves law; they form a slim handy volume which anyone can slip into their briefcases on their way to the County Court or travelling on Circuit.  But the law is to be found elsewhere in rather greater bulk.  In this Court we ought to look to the sources rather than the summary produced by the Judicial Studies Board."

To the extent that this observation implied that the guidelines were in some way superficial, or that the Court of Appeal should disdain to consider them when reflecting on the appropriate figure for general damages then, in accordance with Lord Woolf MR in his foreword to the 3rd edition, I disagree.  If the observation merely intended to convey that the Judicial Studies Board lacked authority to formulate levels of damages, or to underline that the guidelines prepared in this publication did not bind the Court of Appeal, Staughton LJ was obviously right.  The Judicial Studies Board has no such authority.

The value of the work is that it represents a close analysis of the relevant material by a group of experienced practitioners.  In doing so 
	"It has not confined itself to consideration of reported cases, but has, as it did for previous editions, considered many decisions and settlements which have been drawn to the attention of its members by judges and professional colleagues.  It seems that those who are responsible for the reporting of cases in law reports and journals have tended, for quite understandable reasons, to concentrate on the exceptional cases, so that reference only to those sources may produce a somewhat distorted picture."

The Working Party goes on the acknowledge the assistance received from 
	"The very large number of judges, practitioners and others working in the field of personal injury litigation who have taken the trouble to offer comment, criticism and encouragement."

The value of such an analysis for practitioners advising their clients, and for judges assessing damages when the parties have been unable to agree them, is obvious.  One inherent limitation is highlighted by the observations of the Working Party itself.  When the relevant material is limited the guidelines provided by the Working Party are inevitably based on less secure foundations than they are in those cases where the injury is commonplace.  In the particular area of VWF the number of known cases is, in relative terms, very small indeed.  We have been provided with a compendium of the known decisions on this topic.

The text of the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines reads	
	“Cases of Vibration White Finger
	This is a particular form of Raynaud’s phenomenon caused by prolonged exposure to vibration.
	
	(i)   Extensive blanching of most fingers with 
	       episodes in summer and winter of such
	       severity as to necessitate changing occup-
	       ation to avoid further exposure to vibration.		£4,000 to £6,000

	(ii)  Blanching of one or more fingers with numbness.
	       Usually occurring only in winter and causing 
	       slight interference with home and social activities.		   £2,000

	(iii) Blanching of one or more fingertips, with or 
	        without tingling and numbness.		              	            £900”

It is immediately clear that the guidelines are based on the Taylor-Pelmear classification and indeed at the highest or most severe case, summarised in (i), reflects an amalgamation of Taylor-Pelmear stages 3 and 4.

As far as counsel can discover, damages for VWF has never been considered in the Court of Appeal.  The Judicial Studies Board analysis appears to have been based substantially (with an appropriate update) on the assessment made by Kilner Brown J in Heal v Garringtons Limited at Birmingham in 1982.  However the defendants in that case, Garringtons Limited, did not contend for this approach in McFaul v Garringtons Limited (the name given to a group of fifteen cases) tried by Hodgson J in November 1984, where, after a concession by leading counsel that the award made to Mr Heal was “too low”, general damages were assessed at significantly higher levels than they were in Heal, no doubt in part also because Hodgson J was in a position to examine the symptoms and problems of a variety of injured plaintiffs and more fully to appreciate the practical consequences of VWF.

Before Heal there had been two decisions in 1979, Musto v Saunders Safety Valve Co 

(May 1979, unreported) and Murphy v HMA representing the Forestry Commission 

(May 1979, unreported).  Thereafter the relevant decisions include Sheppard v Firth Brown Limited (a group of plaintiffs, where damages were assessed by McCulloch J in April 1985) Knight v Ford Motor Company Limited  (September 1991) Bowman v Harland & Wolf Plc (Carswell J, in Northern Ireland, examining another group, in October 1991) Butler v Liverpool City Council (October 1992) Bir v Dunn AL & Co (June 1993) Condra v Norcross Plc (July 1993) McNamara v Liverpool City Council (March 1996) Glorman v Ford Motor Company Limited (May 1996).

Two further decisions since Judge Stephenson gave his judgment in the present case are Cotton v Bruhl (UK) Limited (March 1998) and Hall & Others (six plaintiffs in all) v British Gas Plc (April 1998).

While recognising the difficulties inherent in comparing a large number of different plaintiffs and their individual manifestations, these decisions have led me to conclude that at first instance there has been a general tendency to produce assessments of general damages for VWF resulting in more generous awards than the figures reflected in the JSB Guidelines.  Indeed it is not insignificant that in the most recent case, Hall, both parties agreed that the JSB Guidelines were indeed “too low”.

I agree with them.  In my judgment the approach to general damages typified by Heal, and reflected in the JSB Guidelines, does not sufficiently acknowledge the severity of the disability resulting from VWF, particularly at scale 4 in the Taylor-Pelmear classification and 3V and 4V or 3SN in the Stockholm Workshop scales.  By these  stages what may reasonably be regarded at the outset as minor inconvenience (no doubt irritating and mildly troublesome) now involves a degree of significant permanent disability.  The fact that the symptoms can arise constitutionally does not mean that they lack significance where it is established that they have been induced by conditions at work.

It would nowadays be sensible to approach the assessment of general damages by considering both the Taylor-Pelmear and the Stockholm Workshop classifications in relation to each hand as the fairest way of producing a broad indication of the relevant degrees of injury and disability, and then reflecting on their overall impact on the individual plaintiff.   This was the approach adopted by Judge Stephenson.

For present purposes I can see no advantage in rehearsing the evidence or the judge’s findings about the condition of each plaintiff in fresh language.  In the passages which now follow I have largely, and gratefully, adopted his description of the essential facts.  In each case, where relevant, he discounted for what was described as “pre 1975 damage”, that is, non negligent exposure before 1975.  For the purposes of considering the appropriate levels of general damages for VWF, the important assessment is the figure reached before any such discount is made.  Neither side advanced any argument about the figures calculated by the judge as a fair representation for the “pre 1975” discount. 

Disadvantage on the Open Labour Market 

Before dealing with the individual cases it will be convenient to comment generally on the awards under this head.   The principles are well known and need no repetition.  The judge began his assessment by noting that in communities where mining was a major source of local employment, even a fit miner, made redundant for any reason, would be likely to have difficulties on the open labour market.  The contraction of the coal industry was likely to create unemployment problems among miners anyway and  miners who were victims of contraction in their industry would be joining a long job queue.  The judge also acknowledged that any former miner suffering from a prescribed disease such as VWF would be less immediately attractive than an individual who did not, and that it would normally be unwise for him to seek employment which might expose him to work with vibrating tools.  To these general features it is perhaps useful to add a virtually self evident suggestion that employees with the most severe symptoms of VWF are more likely to run into difficulties in the open labour market than plaintiffs suffering from minor symptoms at the lower end of the range.   Finally the question whether VWF in fact plays any significant feature in an individual plaintiff’s disadvantage on the labour market requires close examination where the individual plaintiff additionally suffers from other more serious disability, whether arising for constitutional reasons or consequent on the general risks inherent in the mining industry.  If so VWF at the less severe levels may not add anything significant to the real causes of the plaintiff’s problem with future employment. 

I shall now deal with the claims by the individual plaintiffs, taking them in order of severity, and beginning with the worst case.

Wright was born in October 1942.  He gave up work with the defendants when he was 46.  His problems with VWF began in 1975.  The Taylor-Pelmear assessment was scale 3: on the Stockholm scales the levels were assessed at 3R5/3L5 and 2SN.   The consequences are serious, and this should properly be regarded as a bad case of VWF.

All the digits on both hands are involved.  When exposed to a drop in temperature all eight fingers whiten down to the metacarpophalangeal joint and both thumbs become white down to a line between the interphalageal joint and the metacarpophalangeal joint.  All ten digits became white and numb, then as circulation returns, significant, sometimes excruciating, pain develops.   

It is essential for him to keep his hands warm, so outdoor activity is difficult.  He needs help with the garden, where once he had grown his own vegetables to exhibition standard.  He can only fish in winter, and even when he does so his manual dexterity is reduced, and he has to beware any sudden drop in temperature.  When walking his dog in winter there is a risk of pain developing in his hands.  

After he ceased work for the defendants he tried a number of different jobs, and largely through his own determination he managed to remain in regular employment, although there were two periods when he was unemployed.  However as a practical  example of the difficulties which he faced, when he was trying to run his own fruit and vegetable business he used to take a filled hot water bottle to work with him to try and keep his hands warm.  Eventually he gave up this work.  

His condition is permanent.  

Judge Stephenson assessed general damages at £14,000.  He reduced the figure by £4,000 to allow for pre 1975 damage.

This plaintiff has suffered steady deterioration in the condition of both hands.  He is now and will be permanently significantly disabled, at risk of and liable to significant pain, sometimes severe, for the rest of his life.  For such a serious case of VWF £14,000 for general damages was an entirely appropriate assessment.  

The judge also awarded £10,000 for Wright’s disadvantage on the open labour market.  The award has been criticised.  The attack begins by pointing out that the judge rejected any claim for loss of earnings to the date of trial.  However as the short narrative indicated Wright has been unable to remain in the same work, and there were two periods when he was unemployed.  He is now working as a security guard.  He has a number of other disabilities.  However the judge concluded, and I agree with him, that the degree of this plaintiff’s VWF would undoubtedly make it more difficult for him to find a new job if he were to lose the present one, and that his condition would preclude virtually any work which involved outdoor activity.  Although the plaintiff is working as a security guard at present the risks which he faces in the open labour market properly attracted an award.  The judge’s assessment is not open to criticism.  

Martin was born in August 1935.  He spent his entire life in the coal industry, taking redundancy in March 1988, having been “through the wars” in the pits.  He first became aware of problems with his hands in the early 1980s.  

The Taylor-Pelmear assessment was scale 3: he was assessed at 3R5/3L5 and 3SN on the Stockholm Scales.  

Martin suffers from a number of additional problems, largely with his chest, and also with his knee.  VWF causes problems with ordinary life, and manual dexterity.  He regularly wears gloves both in summer and winter.  His condition is permanent.  

Judge Stephenson assessed general damages at £10,000.  He reduced the figure by £750 to allow for pre 1975 damage.  In my judgment this was an appropriate assessment.

An immediate comparison between Wright and Martin appears to show that on the basis of the scales Martin’s injuries were marginally more severe.  For example on the sensorineural component of the condition he was assessed at 3SN rather than 2SN.  However it is clear that Wright’s condition was and is worse than Martin’s, who is an older man.  In other words the different level of awards reflects a painstaking assessment of the overall impact of VWF on these two individuals.  

Lamb was born in October 1936.  He worked in the coal industry for 14years from 1971 or 1972.  He returned to pit work in 1976, ending his employment in 1985.  Symptoms developed during the 1980s, although the precise date is a little uncertain.  

The Taylor-Pelmear assessment was scale 2: he was assessed at 2R4/2L4 and 2SN on the Stockholm scale although the four fingers on each hand were affected to different degrees.  In addition there is a complication in his hands due to arthritic change unconnected with his employment with the defendants, and he has a variety of other problems.  

The combined consequences of arthritis and VWF are significant. VWF affects him on cold days in the summer and approximately twice a day during the winter.  He has difficulty changing plugs and doing other electrical jobs or work involving manual dexterity.  Thus he has an attachment to his trouser zip.   He was a keen angler who has had to give up because of the effect of cold on his hands and difficulty putting maggots on the hooks.  He agreed that most of the time he could keep his hands warm, and that they felt normal enough.

Judge Stephenson assessed general damages at £8,000.  The pre 1975 deduction was £500.  One slight complication with analysing the full extent of these damages is that in his judgment the Taylor-Pelmear scale was recorded at scale 3 and the relevant Stockholm scale were 3R4/3L4 and 2SN.  We were told that these were typing errors. The further complication was the impact of constitutional arthritic change on these VWF damaged hands.  However Mr Walker sensibly suggested that his argument for a reduction in damages stood or fell with the outcome of the appeal in Martin.

At the scales noted in the judgment the award was within the appropriate range:  at the corrected levels the figure for general damages was at the top of the appropriate bracket but not so excessive as to justify interference.  

Stokoe was born in 1954.  He is now 44.  He started work in the coal industry when he was 20.  VWF symptoms started to develop when he was 31.  He was borderline between 2 and 3 on the Taylor-Pelmear scale and the Stockholm Vascular Scale which applied to four fingers in each hand, and borderline 3SN/3SN on the Stockholm Sensoneurological Scale.  Neither thumb was affected.  His manual dexterity is damaged.  He cannot do intricate work about the house, finding difficulty changing plugs and so on, or decorating or car maintenance, and his interest in making model aeroplanes and railways, requiring the use of sharp knives, is, he believes, no longer practicable for safety reasons.  He uses gloves to keep his hands warm.  In summary he is not totally disabled but he has already suffered from unpleasant symptoms for some years, and although still only 44 years old, his condition is permanent.  

Judge Stephenson assessed general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity at £8,000.  There was no “pre 1975 deduction”.  The long period for which this condition has been and must continue to be endured lead me to conclude that the award was appropriate on the basis on which liability was established.  

General damages must be reconsidered on the basis that negligence was established only on the basis of the failure to warn.  The judge was very clear in his findings about the impact of a warning on Stokoe, underlining that, given his personality, he would have noted warnings and would have given up work “immediately the symptoms arose”.  

At one stage in his judgment in the context of warnings, the judge said, 
	"Thus on any view ..... the defendants are liable in respect of deterioration from stage 1 to borderline stage 2 to stage 3 after 1985."

On this basis Mr Walker suggested that general damages should be assessed on the basis only of the worsening of Stokoe’s condition after the warning should have been given and to which he would have responded by avoiding exposure.  In effect there would have been no liability until the symptoms manifested themselves, and therefore general damages were therefore subject to a discount for fault free exposure in just the same way as those plaintiffs who were working before the defendants prior to 1975.  This submission was said to be reinforced by the judge’s finding that Stokoe’s claim should succeed because he (Stokoe) would have or had given up work immediately he developed symptoms which he knew were attributable to VWF.

Mr Walker’s difficulty is that the whole purpose of the warning (even in the more limited form suggested in this judgment) is that it should be directed to the moment when the employee becomes aware of finger blanching, which is early enough in the progress of VWF to arrest it, and by avoiding further exposure to vibrating tools, produce a recovery.  Until that time the symptoms would normally be too insignificant to attract more than a very limited, token, award.  It would be unrealistic to return the case of Stokoe for further findings to be made in the light of the defendants’ successful contention that he was not subject to fault exposure, but only to a failure properly to warn.  In subsequent cases the factual issues will no doubt be more clearly identified and resolved.  

Having examined the evidence I am not satisfied that the award of general damages should be reduced on the basis that Stokoe’s claim for excessive exposure has failed.  This figure therefore remains unaffected by the absence of proper warning in his particular case.

Unfortunately, ignoring VWF altogether, Stokoe suffers from a large number of other problems, including deafness.  His domestic problems need no recitation in this judgment.  They contribute to the general picture of a very unhappy lethargic individual.  An award of £10,000 was made to reflect Stokoe’s handicap on the labour market.  The judge rejected any claim for loss of earnings to date on the basis that the plaintiff “gave up a job, made unimpressive attempts for another, then came to the conclusion .........  that he could not work, a conclusion which had nothing to do with VWF, and is now in an employment market which was perforce joined by a large number of the defendants’ ex-employees seeking work.   He is suggesting he could do work which, in setting up the business anyway, he would need to do”.  He went on: “the only way in which loss could be attributable to VWF is in the sense that the plaintiff, as a man with a serious hearing loss, has not, since he was ruled fit for employment, been able to look for a fitters job with vibrating tools”.  The judge turned to the question of his deafness, noting that Stokoe had “lost much of his urge for employment anyway”, adding “that his deafness would make for difficulties independently of VWF”.

In summary therefore, the judge found that Stokoe did not really want to work.  He then went on to add that he thought it “unlikely” that this would persist indefinitely,  a finding with which I am not prepared to interfere,  but which is somewhat surprising as the plaintiff has not wanted to work since 1989.  More important, in considering whether there was any realistic basis for a claim for loss of disadvantage on the employment market, the consequence of liability on the sole basis of lack of warning means that Stokoe should be treated as someone who would not have worked in any subsequent job involving vibrating tools.  The judge seems to have regarded this feature as providing support for the claim, but if Stokoe would not allow himself to work with vibrating tools anyway, the defendants’ negligence would not have contributed to the problem.

After analysing the evidence I have been driven to the conclusion that this head of damage is speculative.  

Cudlip was born in January 1948.  He worked in the coal industry for varying periods, returning to employment at a pit in 1977, and eventually leaving work through redundancy in September 1989.  The assessment in this case was complicated by other conditions but, more important, by the judge’s finding that the plaintiff was not credible in a number of significant respects.  

Cudlip was found to be at stage 2 and fairly low on stage 2 taking the Taylor-Pelmear staging as “literally” as the judge could.  On the Stockholm scales he was put at 2L2/2R3 and at ISN respectively.

Judge Stephenson assessed general damages for pain suffering and loss of amenity at £6,500 - £6,750 and reduced the figure for pre 1975 damage by £500 - £750.  The judge eventually assessed general damages at £6,000, although for present purposes I am concentrating on the award at £6,500 - £6,750.  

Of all the cases where general damages were appealed, this caused me the greatest difficulty.  Because there were so many difficulties with credibility, and the precise analysis of the true impact of VWF, I was driven to conclude that the assessment reflected a greater degree of sympathy for the impact of VWF on Cudlip than emerges from the papers.  In those circumstances it would not be right to interfere with the judge’s assessment, although I should add that if he had considered £5,000 appropriate I would similarly have been disinclined to interfere.

An award of £2,500 reflected Cudlip’s handicap on the labour market.  

The scale of disability is not significant.  The judge rejected any claim for part or continuing loss of earnings.  It is now over eight years since Cudlip became redundant.  Despite the condition of his hands, and indeed a very much more significant problem with his back, he was, despite his attempts to conceal the fact, in regular work.

The award was described by the judge himself as on the “low side”.  It was made on the basis that if Cudlip lost his work his VWF would make him a “less attractive proposition” to a potential employer and that he would be further back in the “job queue”.

Without minimising it, Cudlip’s condition is not severe.  The problem with his back is much more significant.  He is in regular work.  Nothing suggests that his employment is at risk.  His claim under this head was speculative.  The award should be set aside. 

Nullis was born in September 1955.  He worked for the defendants between 1978 and 1993.  He developed VWF by 1985.  In the result it was not a bad case of VWF.  The damage is confined to his left, dominant hand on Taylor-Pelmear stage 2: the Stockholm Scale assessment is ORO 2L4 and 1 ISN.  

The plaintiff’s symptoms are blanching and numbness in the damaged fingers when exposed to cold, together with irritation and intermittent but not disabling pain.  Manual dexterity is reduced.  He has trouble handling small objects like coins or dealing with his stamp collection, and handling glasses in the public house he now runs.  He can manage the cellar work and decorating the outside walls.  He has given up gardening.   He does his best to avoid letting his hands become cold.  His symptoms are permanent.  

Judge Stephenson awarded him £5,000 for general damages for pain suffering and loss of amenity.  There was no further deduction.  For a man of 42 years, who has already suffered from symptoms of VWF since 1985, and whose condition is permanent, this award, while at the top of the appropriate bracket, is not excessive. 

The appeal against the award to Carver was not pursued on the basis that it raised questions so individual to him that it could provide no assistance in the resolution of the general issues.

Post 1975 Fault Free Exposure 

During the course of the argument Mr Walker invited us to consider that a further discount should be made for post 1975 fault free exposure.  In summary he submitted that as the effects of exposure were cumulative the defendants should not be liable to the extent of the contribution made to the plaintiffs’ condition by levels of exposure which were not in themselves negligent.  Although the question of fault free exposure before 1975 had been considered and resolved, not only in principle, but in relation to each plaintiff who worked for the defendants before 1975, this point - the impact of simultaneous negligent and fault free exposure after 1975 - only arose half way through the argument.  At one stage, no doubt because nothing that had happened before the judge suggested that this issue was significant, and moreover was not referred to in the notice of appeal, or the abundant skeleton argument, or even in the subsequent letter to the court from Mr Walker after he had taken over responsibility for the defendants’ appeal and had decided to reduce the issues to be argued, (1st July 1998) Mr Hendy was prepared to accept that in principle such a deduction would be appropriate.  When given the opportunity to reflect more closely on the point and to produce a written submission on the topic, Mr Hendy sought leave to withdraw the concession.  In my judgment his application was entirely justified and should be granted.  

At one stage during the hearing, in the belief that we should try to reduce the number of outstanding issues to be resolved in these cases, I was in favour of trying to decide the practical application of the principle apparently accepted by both sides.  Even so, I anticipated some considerable difficulty with applying any principle to the relevant work and medical history of each plaintiff.  Even before Mr Hendy sought to withdraw his concession I started to change my mind.  In reality the exercise on which we would have been embarking would have been to act as a court of first instance, trying factual issues as well as deciding legal principles, on the basis of short written submissions.  This would have been unsatisfactory, and if the decision had been adverse to any plaintiff on this point he would have suffered an understandable sense of grievance.

In these circumstances the less said on the subject by this Court the better.  The point remains open.

Buxton LJ:

I agree.

Simon Brown LJ:

I also agree.
 
		ORDER:  Appeal allowed in respect of Cudlip and Stokoe, all other appeals dismissed; award of damages and interest in respect of Cudlip to be reduced to £7,887.40 and in respect of Stokoe to £19,359.97; costs of appeal to be paid by appellants; legal aid taxation of costs of Stokoe, Cudlip, Lamb and Wright.
		(Order not part of approved judgment)