B1/2000/3438

Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 564
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM LEEDS COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Charlesworth)
								Royal Courts of Justice
								Strand
								London WC2

								Friday, 30th March 2001
B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE THORPE

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IN THE MATTER OF J (A CHILD)

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2AG
Tel: 0171 421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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The Applicant appeared in person.

The Respondent did not appear and was not represented.

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J U D G M E N T
Friday, 30th March 2001 
1.	LORD JUSTICE THORPE: Miss J applies for permission to appeal a judgment of His Honour Judge Charlesworth sitting in the Leeds County Court last autumn. At that stage Miss J was represented, I think, by a solicitor and counsel, although I could be wrong about that. It seems that she has been unable to get legal aid for the purposes of this application. 
2.	The order made by the judge placed Miss J's daughter J, born on 20th March 2000, into the care of the local authority, and he went on to make a freeing order. The care plan was for adoption. In order to make that freeing order he found that the consent of both parents should be dispensed with on the ground that it was being unreasonably withheld. 
3.	The only record I have of judgment is a note taken by the legal assistant for the local authority. But I am afraid the note really renders this application difficult, if not impossible, for it shows that the local authority's care plan was fully supported by the guardian. It further shows that both parents conceded the threshold criteria; and although a care order was not conceded, it was not opposed. 
4.	Really the parents' case was that, before the court proceeded to any conclusion about adoption, there should be a further assessment and that such an assessment should be ordered; alternatively, that there should be some sort of interim care order until there had been further developments. The judge, in the exercise of his discretion, rejected that submission. At the trial it seems that he regarded the father as being potentially the more promising carer, if J was to be brought up by one parent only; but, in the end, he rejected the father as an option, saying that his lack of candour was an insupportable obstacle. He said that there was no purpose in any further assessments. That could not lead to any different conclusion. He said that J needed a decision as soon as possible to give her the best chance of a secure alternative family. He said that a care order must be made and that adoption would promote J's welfare. 
5.	The judge went on to consider whether it was open to him to make a freeing order. He concluded that it was and that any reasonable parent would consent to that disposal. In relation to contact post adoption, or, perhaps, even contact post trial, he said he was content for that to be at the discretion of the local authority, since nothing should hinder J's adoption. He said, if the parents could accept and support the placement, then there might be open adoption, but that was possibly unrealistic. 
6.	In the event, Miss J says, and I fully accept, that despite the fact that she has made real progress and established a home of her own, she has not actually had contact to her daughter. She says, and I accept, that prior to the judgment the contact between her and her daughter was good quality contact and was accepted by the local authority as such. But, as I have sought to explain to Miss J, my only function is to review the judgment to decide whether or not there is any sufficient demonstrated error or irregularity to justify the grant of permission to appeal. I can find no such error or irregularity: the application for permission must be dismissed. 
7.	It is very sad in these cases where a child moves into another family and the natural mother, who sincerely believes she has much to offer, is simply discarded. But, as I have tried to explain to Miss J, it does very often happen and, since the court is bound to always do what is best for the child, it very often happens that what the court has to do for the child is at the same time unfair to a parent. From Miss J's point of view it can only seem unfair that she is not having continuing contact with her baby; but if the local authority were faced with a choice -- and I don't know whether they were: this is pure speculation -- between a family ready, willing and able to take J on condition that there would be no contact and no other available family, then inevitably, for J's sake, they would have to endorse the option of closed adoption. 
8.	There is nothing that I can do for Miss J. I have had to say to her that probably the only thing left for her to do is to make sure, with the aid of her local solicitors, that no stone has been left unturned since the judgment of the court below. 
9.	For those reasons this application is dismissed. 
Order: Application dismissed.