C/2002/1076/A 
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 1151
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) 
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(Lord Justice Latham and Mr Justice Forbes)
The Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2

Friday 12th July, 2002 
B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE LAWS 
 
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 (1) PHILLIP CARL JAMES RYAN 
First Appellant/Applicant 
(2) HEATHER HULME
(3) HUGO BRETT HENDERSON 
Appellants 

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JOHN EDWARD REES 
Respondent 
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 (Computer-aided transcript of the Palantype Notes
of Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
190 Fleet Street  London EC4A 2AG
Tel:  020 7404 1400
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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THE FIRST APPELLANT/APPLICANT appeared on his own behalf  

THE RESPONDENT did not appear and was not represented  
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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE LAWS: This case has been referred to me for reconsideration under Part 52.16(6) of the Civil Procedure Rules, following a decision by Master Venne that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's application for permission to appeal against an order of the Divisional Court (constituted by Latham LJ and Forbes J) which was made on 19th June 2001. 
2.	I can explain the relevant facts quite briefly. Mr Ryan and certain co-appellants were convicted of a number of licensing offences in the Magistrates' Court on 22nd February 2000. As was their right they appealed to the Crown Court against conviction. Before hearing the appeal, however, in the applicant's case the court decided that it was necessary to entertain a preliminary issue as to whether or not Mr Ryan was the holder of a certain justices on-licence after 15th May 1998. There seems to have been some confusion on this point perhaps because on 15th May 1998 His Honour Judge Evans, sitting at the Swansea Crown Court, dismissed Mr Ryan's appeal against the licensing justices' decision to revoke his licence on 15th December 1997.
3.	However, in the period between these two dates during which the licence was still in force pending the appeal, the licence had come up for renewal and been renewed by the licensing justices on 9th February 1998. So this state of affairs gave rise to the preliminary issue which had to be resolved in order to see whether the applicant had a good appeal against his conviction in the Magistrates' Court.
4.	The preliminary issue was heard by His Honour Judge Morton, also at the Swansea County Court, on 20th December 2000. Judge Morton found that on the proper construction of the Licensing Act 1964 the renewed licence had been revoked on 15th May 1998. That issue then went by way of case stated to the Divisional Court, and the Divisional Court took the same view of it as had Judge Morton.
5.	The jurisdiction point in the case arises as follows. Having been convicted in the Magistrates' Court the applicant's appeal to the Crown Court was as of right under section 108(1)(b) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980. His appeal by case stated to the Divisional Court against His Honour Judge Morton's decision on the preliminary issue was subject to the provisions of section 28 and 28A of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Subsection (4) of section 28A provides:
“Except as provided by the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (right of appeal to House of Lords in criminal case), a decision of the High Court under this section is final ...”
6.	It is, I fear, inescapable that section 28A(4) applies to this case and therefore inescapable that this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain Mr Ryan's application for permission to appeal. Master Venne was accordingly quite right and I have no option but to dismiss the application.
7.	I should add two things. First of all, Mr Ryan has addressed me personally this morning and done so with great courtesy and moderation. Secondly, I feel some sympathy for him because he has clearly been led to think that the distinct issue that had to be decided in relation to the preliminary point could, so to speak, be hived off from the criminal proceedings and treated as a separate civil matter. That is not right. His appeal to the Divisional Court by way of case stated was only itself possible by virtue of the route I have mentioned under section 28 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Even if it were possible in some way to categorise the preliminary point in question as civil rather than criminal, still section 28A(4) applied to the case and, as I have said, for that reason there is no right of appeal.
ORDER: Application dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
(Order not part of approved judgment)