A2/2002/1868
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 1727
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE TURNER & MR JUSTICE PHILLIPS)
Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London

Thursday 31 October 2002
B e f o r e:

LORD  JUSTICE  JUDGE

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B E T W E E N:
NORMAN  MICHAEL  MANISON
Applicant/Claimant

and

(1)  THE  ATTORNEY  GENERAL
(2)	THE  LORD  CHANCELLOR
Respondents/Defendants
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(Computer Aided Transcription by
Smith Bernal, 190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone 020 7421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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THE APPLICANT appeared in person

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J U D G M E N T
Thursday 31 October 2002
LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: 
1.	In this case Mr Manison has appeared to explain some of the issues which arise from the papers. I should record at the outset that I have said to him that I understand the strong sense of grievance which he feels about everything that has happened to him in connection with litigation which goes back to 1980. 
2.	The matter before me is an application for permission to appeal two orders made in the High Court in 1989. The application is that the order of Phillips J be set aside and the order of Turner J be varied to set aside the order of Master Prebble dated 8 June 1988 on the grounds that it was wrong in law and/or unjust because he (Turner J) did not consider the procedural irregularities when deciding to strike out the writ and statement of claim against the Attorney General. 
3.	Those orders, which I shall come to in more detail in a moment, arose from litigation which began in 1980. A company called Croda Metal Treatments Ltd sought the price of goods sold and delivered to another company, Vital Automotive Protections Ltd, of which Mr Manison was the Managing Director. The action was successful. Judgment was given both against the company and against the applicant who was personally a party to the proceedings and had counterclaimed. That was on 21 May 1984 at Leeds. The text of Drake J's judgment can be found at page 122 of the bundle. In essence, he preferred the evidence called on behalf of the plaintiffs in that action to that of Mr Manison who was effectively the defendant. 
4.	An application to appeal against that judgment out of time was heard on 15 February 1985 by Slade LJ. He said that the application was quite hopeless in the context of the issue which is now before me, which is that documents before Drake J at the hearing were forged documents. Slade LJ said: 
“Mr Manison has formed the view that the pleadings which were actually before Mr Justice Drake at the trial, and when he came to give his judgment, were not in truth copies of the pleadings which had actually been filed by the parties, and that accordingly Mr Justice Drake was proceeding on an entirely false assumption as to the true issues in the action. .... having listened with care to what Mr Manison has had to say, I am bound to say that he has wholly failed to convince me that Mr Justice Drake did not have all the proper and relevant pleadings before him, even though they may not have been in the same bundles as those in which they had appeared on other earlier interlocutory proceedings.” 
	He went on to say that, in reality, the application for leave to appeal was quite hopeless. 
5.	The full court then dismissed the renewed application effectively on the same basis on 29 April 1985. The first judgment was given by Ackner LJ (as he then was). Browne-Wilkinson LJ (as he then was) agreed, as did Wood J. 
6.	Just over two years later, the present proceedings were begun on 9 September 1987, although in their initial form the defendant was the Lord Chancellor. It does not matter that in due course the Attorney General was made the defendant in the action. The pleadings in that action allege: 
“(2) On the 7th February 1984 before the Honourable Mr Justice Bristow .... the plaintiff herein put before the court a bundle of affidavits together with pleadings and the learned judge saw fit to forthwith make in his own hand and sign with his own signature an order that such affidavits be ordered to stand as pleadings and for the action to be set down for trial. A court associate was instructed by the learned judge to take the two sets of approved documents and to implement the handwritten order to put the said action down for trial. 
(3) During the said period between the 7th February and 15th May 1984 the said pleadings and affidavits ordered to stand as pleadings were replaced with forged documents which omitted references which were vital to the case of the plaintiff herein in the said action.... 
(4) The substitution of the said forgeries could only have resulted from acts, omissions or negligence of court officials acting upon the authority of the defendant ....” 
7.	On 8 June Master Prebble ordered that the writ and statement of claim be struck out under Orders 18 and 19, or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that they disclosed no cause of action and/or are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process. 
8.	Mr Manison, the applicant, appealed against the order to Turner J. Turner J ordered that the appeal should be dismissed: 
“Unless the plaintiff makes an affidavit exhibiting all relevant evidence within 14 days of today setting out all steps taken by him to obtain independent legal advice since 24/11/1988 and serve same Treasury Solicitor within such time.” 
9.	Mr Manison argues before me that, following that order by Turner J, he made huge efforts to obtain legal advice, and indeed that there is fresh evidence in the form of a letter (among other pieces of material) from Bristow J. 
10.	On 9 February 1989, the order made by Phillips J (as he then was) as recorded is: 
“.... the plaintiff's application to extend the time to re-instate his appeal against the Order herein of Master Prebble dated the 8th June 1988 .... be refused.” 
	Mr Manison says that that order as drawn up was incorrect, at least in the sense that it was incomplete, and failed to record that Phillips J had refused Mr Manison's application to direct him to solicitors who would be able to assist with the litigation. 
11.	In view of the lapse of time, so far as we have been able to discover, no note has been found of the reasons of either of the two decisions. Enquiries were made of the Treasury Solicitor. They produced a written response dated 16 September 2002 that the relevant file has been destroyed. Mr Manison is seeking permission to reopen those issues which were before Turner J and Phillips J. He says that those orders were intended to help guide him towards obtaining legal representation in a matter that he did not fully understand. To explain the dilemma at the time, he refers the court to the pleadings against the Attorney General. He then records: 
“My problem as it now appears is that I did not know how this was executed and why I was being refused legal help by solicitors or the police forces who had jurisdiction over what were on the face a criminal offence.” 
	He seeks in effect to reopen the issue canvassed before Drake J and the Court of Appeal, but his approach was, as he has told me, that he eventually after great effort was able to obtain a copy of the court file. That court file, he says, revealed at least some material to suggest that he had been the victim of criminality. As long ago as 5 July 1994 he received a letter from Sir Peter Bristow, who by then had retired, in which Sir Peter said:
“I have read the documents you enclosed. The order with the Leeds Registry stamp dated 29 February 1984 correctly follows my handwritten note of how the 7th February order should have been drawn. This was the last occasion on which I had any part in the interlocutory proceedings in the action. There is no question of me having given permission for any subsequent change to this order of 29 February, nor could it have been varied without me being notified. I am sorry you are dissatisfied with the outcome of the hearing before Drake J in the Leeds High Court in May 1984, but I fear there is nothing I can do to help you. My order of 7 February was properly drawn up and registered on 29 February 1984 and was evidently complied with because the action came on before Mr Justice Drake.” 
12.	Taking the material that he says became available to him from the court file together with the letter from Sir Peter Bristow, Mr Manison submitted to me that this gave him enough insight into “the full criminality of what had happened”, and on the basis of that material, in a separate suggestion, he pointed out that he now had evidence to show that he was a victim of an attempt to pervert the course of justice, which had been successful because he had failed in the proceedings before Drake J. Indeed one of his letters before me refers to Drake J “side-stepping” the order made by Bristow J. 
13.	When tackled about the delay since 1994, Mr Manison told me, and I was perfectly prepared to accept, that he had sought advice from many solicitors, without receiving from them any satisfactory service. The problem had been canvassed with two counsel. The second advice of counsel, Mr Bishop, is included in the bundle. It is adverse to the allegations currently made. That was received in July 1995, so itself is seven years old. Since then Mr Manison has been to the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors in 1997; he has been to the West Yorkshire Police, who were not prepared to take further proceedings; and he went to the Legal Services Ombudsman. He says that he has done everything he could to try and bring this matter back before the court. 
14.	I understand that Mr Manison has approached a very large number of different people -- professionals and organisations -- to try to demonstrate what he describes as “the criminality of what has happened”. I have endeavoured in discussions with him to see whether any justification can be advanced to allow the case to proceed by way of appeal from the orders of Turner J and Phillips J. I am afraid I am unable to do so. I do not think that the difficulties in getting legal advice that was supportive provide a sufficient basis for this purpose. 
15.	The case is now very old indeed. The issues in contention are even older and relate back to alleged wrongdoing in 1984. The Court of Appeal has already decided that there is no prospect of a successful appeal from Drake J. The present proceedings seek to reopen issues already decided, and to do so many, many years later. On the material before me I cannot properly make an order to allow the case to continue by extending time. Accordingly, the application must be refused. 
16.	THE APPLICANT: My Lord, is there anything in the law that allows a criminal complaint and the criminal evidence that I have put forward -- as all this case is documented, my Lord -- and what is happening, your judgment today, is restricting that evidence from being seen, my Lord. 
17.	LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: Mr Manison, I cannot advise you. You must understand that. You have been to a very large number of solicitors, as I have recorded in my judgment. You have been to the various people responsible for the solicitors' profession, you have been to the police. I really do not think that for me sitting here on my own to try and comment one way or another would be helpful. I am sorry, I am not trying to be discourteous, but I just do not think it would be right for me to do so. 
18.	THE APPLICANT: I appreciate what you are saying, my Lord. The only major aspect leading from your Lordship's judgment was that the Appeal Court gave a ruling and what you did not mention in your judgment, my Lord, was that the fresh evidence of Bristow J was of course something that was not considered by the Appeal Court in the case at first instance, and I believe that by refusing me a paper hearing and permission in this matter, this crime is being covered up, my Lord. 
19.	LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I understand what you say, but I have given my judgment and I do not think it would be right for me to make any further comment. 
20.	THE APPLICANT: But from this hearing, my Lord, I have no appeal? I have nothing more? This case is now functus as it were? 
21.	LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I am sorry, I would like to be able to help you about it, but you have been to solicitors, you have been to the police. If you get fresh evidence you are always entitled to make an application, but it was a very long time ago. 
22.	THE APPLICANT: The fresh evidence, my Lord, is -- 
23.	LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I am not going to say anything more, Mr Manison. It would not be right.