C/2001/2787
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 619
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE                                    
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
                                    Royal Courts of Justice
                                  Strand
                                  London WC2
 
                                  Tuesday, 16th April 2002
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE THORPE

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UDAY RATRA
Applicant

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SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
Defendant
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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
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The Applicant appeared in person.
The Defendant did not attend and was unrepresented

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J U D G M E N T
Tuesday, 16th April 2002
1.	LORD JUSTICE THORPE: This is Mr Ratra's application for permission to appeal the order of the Divisional Court given on 3rd December 2001. Before the Divisional Court was Mr Ratra's appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal which had dismissed a series of complaints made by Mr Ratra against a number of different members of the Law Society. The complaints arose out of professional work that each had done individually on Mr Ratra's instructions, either in defending him in the course of proceedings in the criminal jurisdiction, or in representing him in dispute which he had with the British Museum.
2.	It is unnecessary to go into any of the detail of that history. Suffice it to note that the reasoning of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was set out in a letter of 6th August 2001, in which the Tribunal found:
“... in respect of each of these matters that there is no prima facie case.
The Tribunal also notes that you have recently made a great many applications to this Tribunal in respect of a large number of solicitors.”
3.	The judgment of the Divisional Court was given by Kennedy LJ, with whom Harrison and Hallett JJ agreed. In his careful judgment Kennedy LJ set out the facts in considerable detail. Having recited the terms of the Disciplinary Tribunal's conclusion, Kennedy LJ said this: 
“Given that material, and one is bound to say that lack of material, and given the multiplicity of complaints, we find it impossible to say that the reaction of the Tribunal was one with which this court should interfere.” 
4.	Mr Ratra complains that the Tribunal fell into error in dismissing his case on the grounds that there had been a great many applications in respect of a large number of solicitors. He says that he was entitled to have each complaint fully investigated on its independent merits. That is to a degree true. But I do not think that the reasoning of the Tribunal indicates any erroneous approach. As Kennedy LJ said:
“But the Tribunal is entitled, as Mr Ratra acknowledges, to form a view not only in relation to each individual allegation, but also in relation to the multiplicity of allegations, and if there are a lot of them to take the view that there may or may not be any substance in any one of them.” 
5.	Mr Ratra also complains that the tipstaff and one of his assistants attended court on 3rd December 2001. That does not seem to me to justify the involvement of this court without any evidence to suggest that the arrangement was in some way indicative of predisposition or bias. It may have been a purely administrative arrangement as to which the court must always retain an unfettered discretion.
6.	Mr Ratra also says that the judgment of 3rd December insufficiently recognises his rights under Article 6 and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I cannot accept that submission. There is every evidence that Mr Ratra received a full and fair hearing in the Divisional Court on that day.
7.	In the end, I have to ask myself the simple question, has Mr Ratra demonstrated sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of permission? I am absolutely clear, in my judgment, that he has not, and I have no hesitation at all in deciding that this is not business for the Court of Appeal and that the application for permission should be dismissed. I so order.
(Application dismissed; no order for costs).