This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

THE FAMILY COURT AT BRISTOL	Claim No: BS14C00670

	2 Redcliff Street
	Bristol
	BS1 6GR

	Thursday, 18th December 2014 

BEFORE:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILDBLOOD

BRISTOL CITY COUNCIL
	APPLICANT

-v-

G & C (Re a child)
	RESPONDENTS

MR BAGGLEY appeared on behalf of the Applicant

MISS FARQUHAR and MISS BORKOWSKI appeared on behalf of the Respondents

MISS JOSEPH appeared on behalf of the Guardian

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JUDGMENT

Thursday, 18th December 2014 

JUDGE WILDBOOD QC:

1.	Introduction - These are public law proceedings brought by Bristol City Council in relation to a baby girl, who is nearly 5 months old.  The other parties to the proceedings are her mother, who is 19 years old, and is white British.  Her father, who is aged 30, and who is black African, and the child herself, who appears by her Guardian, Mr Alistair Crine. Although I am placing this judgment on the Bailii website in accordance with the transparency provisions I do not suggest that there is anything of particular note within it, save to the parties, adults and child directly involved.

2.	The paternal grandmother, who is aged 58, describes herself as British/Zambian mix, and has indefinite leave to remain in this country, puts herself forward as a carer of the child, with the support of the parents, but with the opposition from the local authority and the Guardian.  The grandmother and the child have never met, but her role in these proceedings is important as she is the only family member who is putting herself forward as a potential carer of the child.  She provides the only means by which the relationship between the child and her parents will be maintained.

3.	The case proceeded until closing speeches on the basis that all parties recognised that there are only two realistic options for this child: one, that she should live with her paternal grandmother under a special Guardianship order or child arrangements order or, two, that she should be placed for adoption with, as yet, unidentified long-term carers.  She cannot remain with her current foster parents.

4.	In closing speeches, for the first time, Miss Borkowski sought to suggest that if I did not currently accept a placement of the child with the grandmother I should consider whether I have enough information about the grandmother’s insight as to the arrangements that would need to be put in place if the child were to live with her.  If I considered that I did not, then I should adjourn the case, she submitted. I accept Miss Borkowski’s point that the court has a continuing responsibility to consider whether it has sufficient evidence to found the decision that it is invited to make, and where decisions of this enormity are placed before a court it must be particularly cautious to ensure that it has the necessary evidence.

5.	In fact, I have an abundance of evidence on that point, and, more importantly, into what would happen if the child were to be placed with the grandmother, and having considered that point do not regard it as either necessary or proportionate to adjourn this case.

6.	At a hearing on 1st December 2014 it was agreed that the threshold criteria for the purposes of section 31 of the Children Act 1989 were fulfilled.  The agreed criteria are set out at B5.  

7.	Re B - The case of Re B [2013] UKSC at 33 is, therefore, of fundamental importance in this case in choosing between the two available options.  This child should not be deprived to the right of an upbringing within her natural family unless, as a last resort, there are exceptional circumstances demonstrating that no other solution compatible with her welfare is available.

8.	Of the dicta in Re B the President, Sir James Mumby, said as follows in Re BS [2013] EWCA Civ 1146: 

“The language used in Re B is striking, different words and phrases are used, but the message is clear.  Orders contemplating non consensual adoption, that is care orders with a plan for adoption and placement orders and adoption orders, are a very extreme thing, a last resort, only to be made where nothing else will do, where no other course is possible in the child’s interests.  They are the most extreme option, a last resort when all else fails, to be made only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare; in short, where nothing else will do.”

9.	Later in this judgment I cite three decisions of the Court of Appeal that have further explained that jurisprudence, but I also remind myself of the dicta of the President in Re R (a child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, that Re BS did not change the law and that: 

“Nothing that was said in Re BS was intended to erode or otherwise place a gloss upon the statutory requirements of sub-section 1 of the 1989 Act and section 1 of the 2002 Act; on the contrary, the exaltation for courts to undertake a balancing exercise, which pits the pros and cons of each realistic option against the others was aimed precisely at discharging the court’s statutory duty under section 1.  In particular, before making a decision relating to a child’s welfare a court is required to have regard to, amongst other matters, the factors set out in the relevant welfare checklist.  The evaluation of options described in Re BS must be undertaken with those factors in full focus.”

10.	The parents – They say that they have recently resumed their relationship, despite the mother reporting to the police that the father attempted to rape her in September 2014, an allegation which she has now said was a lie.  Their relationship is, and always has been extremely volatile.  As the Guardian said at E87: “There has been a chronic pattern of tension, arguments and verbal or sometimes physical threats between the parents.”

11.	The parents have both known considerable hardship and disruption in the past, and now both of them show the consequent hallmarks.  They both accept that they cannot offer the child the care that she needs, and therefore they each support the suggestion that the paternal grandmother of the child should care for her.  

12.	The local authority and Guardian both recommend that the child should not be placed with the paternal grandmother but should be made subject to care and placement orders.

13.	Before a placement order could be made it is therefore necessary to consider whether the consent of the mother, as the only parent with parental responsibility, should be dispensed with under section 52.1(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  Although the father’s consent, or dispensing with it, is not a statutory requirement his wish that she should be placed with his mother is a factor of considerable importance.  If consistently with her welfare this child can be placed within her natural family, she should be.

14.	That being the position, I will only give a brief summary of why the parents are not able to care for the child themselves.  Those reasons are also relevant, of course, when considering whether the grandmother could act with sufficient protection of the child, if placed with her.  

15.	The father lives near to the grandmother.  The local authority and Guardian are of the opinion that it would be naïve to think that the parents, both of whom have been having contact with the child, would ever leave the grandmother to care for the child without embroiling her and the child in their unsettled and conflicted way of life.  

16.	Further, the grandmother has a middle child, who is currently detained in psychiatric hospital, either under section 37 or 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983.  In the past, that middle child has caused the grandmother considerable difficulties, and it is thought unlikely that he will desist from doing so when he is released from hospital, which may be in 2015.

17.	The mother has had an extremely damaging upbringing with the local authority being involved in her care since the age of 5; that is, in the year 2000.  As a child she suffered physical, sexual and emotional abuse.  In 2009, when aged 14, she was the subject of care proceedings and placed with foster carers.  Those placements were not successful, and at the age of 16 she was placed in secure accommodation but absconded frequently and engaged in damaging behaviour.  On one occasion she was arrested whilst engaging in sexual behaviour with three men, it is said.

18.	A care order was made in relation to the mother shortly before her seventeenth birthday, and just after that birthday she moved into supported accommodation but returned frequently to her abusive home environment.  The local authority regards her as extremely vulnerable, suggestible and chaotic, and someone who has never engaged in the attempts to regulate and supervise her life.

19.	The mother has involved herself in self-harm, drugs, poor relationships and criminal behaviour.  Residential assessment of her within these proceedings broke down after seven weeks, and there is psychological evidence that the mother’s past is so damaging to her own emotional functioning that she would not be able to care for the child.  The local authority contends that given the way that the mother functions and her very clear past of not co-operating with the many professionals who have been involved with her it is unrealistic to think that she would be able to co-operate with an arrangement for the grandmother to care for the child through her minority.

20.	The father has a history of ill health and alcoholism.  His other child is a 7 year old boy, who lives with his mother, but is now subject to care proceedings also.  Children’s Services have been involved with him due to allegations of domestic violence between his parents, the father’s alcohol misuse and the neglectful care that the boy has experienced.  On 23rd April 2010 the father dropped him onto a concrete floor three times, it is said, whilst intoxicated, and was convicted of being drunk in charge of a child.

21.	The initial involvement of Children’s Services with that child ended when the boy’s mother stopped contact with the father.  Care proceedings were initiated this year, however, after an allegation that the boy’s mother assaulted him.  The local authority says that the father reported to the social worker, Miss Duncan, on 9th July 2014 that he had regularly had unsupervised contact with him overnight.  I have before me the social worker’s note of that meeting, which was produced shortly before closing speeches, but the issue of whether the father was having unsupervised contact is in dispute.  

22.	In evidence the father and the grandmother both said that there was only one occasion when the grandmother herself allowed the father to have unsupervised contact with his son.  There is insufficient evidence for me to resolve the contention of the local authority as to whether the father was having more substantial unsupervised contact with his son than that which was admitted during the course of evidence, and it would be for the Local Authority to prove that he was.  Again, the local authority contends that given the way the father functions, including the trouble that he has caused for the grandmother in the past, there is no realistic prospect of him co-operating with an arrangement that the grandmother should care for this child.

23.	There can be no doubt at all that there has been significant domestic violence in the relationship between these parents both prior to and during the mother’s pregnancy with this child.  The mother was remanded in custody in February 2014, for two months, in relation to an allegation that she had stabbed the father with a knife and had threatened his mother.  

24.	On 23rd April 2014 she was acquitted of affray, but was found guilty of possessing a bladed article and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, the custodial element of which she had already served on remand.  It is, therefore, evident that certain aspects of the allegations that had been made against her were not continued to the point of investigation within the criminal courts given the nature of the mother’s conviction, but the fact of the allegation itself is demonstrative of the nature of the volatility in the parents’ relationship.

25.	On 27th June 2014 the mother told the local authority that she had been living with the father, in breach of her licence conditions, and that, also, she and the father had remained in contact since her release from prison.

26.	On 16th July 2014 an incident occurred in which both parents alleged that the other had been violent.  The father alleged that the mother had made threats to harm his friends and had threatened to have him killed.  The mother alleged that the father had increased the level of his drinking.  The parents then said that they had ended their relationship, and the mother agreed that she would not permit the father or members of his family to visit her and the baby in hospital.  The father, it is said, visited and was present for the birth, and the maternal grandmother and her partner attempted to visit twice.  The mother has alleged that since September the father attempted to rape her, but, as I have said, has now said that that was a lie.

27.	Turning to these proceedings and the assessment of the parents, the proceedings were issued on the day after the child’s birth.  They came before the court when the child was only 2 days old, and an interim care order was made on the basis that the mother and child would move to the Orchard House Assessment Centre, in Taunton.  

28.	In August 2014 a psychological report was written by Dr Louise Robb.  She concluded that the mother was of borderline intellectual functioning.  She did not think that the mother’s cognitive functioning alone would impact significantly upon her ability to parent a child.  However, Dr Robb thought the mother’s past and emotional functioning do impact significantly upon her ability to do so.  She thought that the mother would need to make significant progress in her own emotional personal functioning before she would be able to parent a child adequately, and thought that she would need therapeutic intervention over the period of about two years to achieve that.

29.	By the beginning of September 2014 the placement at Orchard House had broken down. The mother had started there reasonably well but had become increasingly distracted when caring for the child, and was seen to be engaging repeatedly in emotional discussions by telephone with the father.  At the end of August 2014, when the mother had become increasingly neglectful of the child and seemingly depressed, the local authority had decided to recommend to the court that the mother and child should not remain there.  

30.	There was a court hearing on 3rd September, at which the mother opposed  separation, and, due to lack of time, the issue had to be adjourned to another day.  However, on 4th September 2014 the mother went into Taunton on her own and had contact with the father, contrary to the agreement governing the arrangements whilst the mother was at Orchard House.  The placement at Orchard House was terminated that day, and the mother and child were separated under the interim care order.  The separation was later ratified by the court.

31.	Therefore, the mother did not comply with the expectations of the placement at Orchard House, and both parents must have realised that if they acted as they did on 4th September they were creating a very significant risk that the child would be separated from them.  That, I find, is relevant when considering whether there is a realistic prospect of the mother or, indeed, the father complying with any agreement in relation to the placement of the child with the grandmother.

32.	On separation from the mother, the child went into foster care.  The mother has had contact twice a week, for one and a half hours under supervision, and the father has had contact for the same duration, once a week.  The mother has attended most of the contact that has been available to her.  The father has been less consistent in his attendance at his contact.

33.	The grandmother - As to the grandmother, there is an assessment of her by the local authority’s social worker, Sarah Penny, at C35 to C61, which is dated 4th November.  The conclusions of that assessment were that the grandmother could not provide adequately for her given her own unstable and impoverished circumstances, and also her perceived inability to manage the family boundaries and protect the child from harm.  On 25th November 2014 the grandmother informed the local authority that she did not accept that assessment, and that she continued to wish to care for the child.

34.	On 1st December 2014 I gave directions in the case at the Issues Resolution Hearing.  There was discussion about whether the grandmother wished to be separately represented.  It was thought highly unlikely that she would qualify for legal aid, and since the mother’s and father’s cases are entirely allied with hers it was considered by all of the parties that it was not necessary to join the grandmother as a party.  I raised that issue again at the start of this hearing, and received the same responses.  The grandmother, however, sat in court throughout his hearing.  Both counsel for the parents sensibly took her instructions frequently throughout the hearing and put forward her wish to care for the child as their own case.  She has filed a statement, which is at C86, and which responds to the local authority’s negative assessments of her.

35.	The grandmother is a widow, her husband having died, sadly, in 2003, when the family members were visiting Zambia.  She now lives on her own.  She has three children by her late husband, the eldest being the father in these proceedings.  Following her husband’s death she suffered from ill health, which caused her significant disability from 2004 to 2010.  She says that she was mis-diagnosed as suffering from depression during that period, and that she was wrongly prescribed medication for depression.

36.	In 2008, it is suggested by the social worker that she was struck off the nursing register.  She was, apparently working whilst on sick leave, according to page C88, and also made some errors with medication, which, she says, occurred because she was so tired at the time as a result of un-diagnosed tuberculosis (see her statement at C88)  In 2010 it was discovered that she was suffering from latent tuberculosis, and, when that was treated her depression also lifted, she says.

37.	There are two letters from her GP.  They are at C97 and also at C120.  At C97 the doctor says: 

“The grandmother has been referred to a cardiologist due to some new findings on her echo cardiogram.  She was found to have a dilated left atrium, and it is important to seek clarification from her cardiologist whether this requires any additional medication and regular monitoring.  I also wanted to emphasise that mother is not on any regular medication for her heart condition at present, and her recent blood pressure reading was normal.”  

At C120 the doctor refers to her having problems with her heart and occasional chest pains.

38.	As to the cardiology appointment, the social worker, Miss Penny, accepted that the grandmother has an appointment with the cardiologist on 5th March, (see page C101), and given the delay involved in that appointment it is clear that her condition is not being treated as urgent, and there is no basis for suggesting that there is anything significantly wrong with the function of her heart.  The social worker also accepted that there is no evidence of the grandmother suffering from depression since 2010.  I do not consider that the issue of the grandmother’s health is relevant to this case.  

39.	There is no form of detailed health assessment of the grandmother.  Given the enormity of the decision that I am being asked to make, it could not possibly be right to take into account the circumstances of the grandmother’s health of which I have been informed.  Therefore, I conclude that that is an issue that does not affect the outcome of this case at all.

40.	The grandmother began to work for a nursing agency in or about 2010.  The social worker, Miss Penny, says at C116 and in her oral evidence that the nursing agency told her that the grandmother had been dismissed, but the grandmother denies that this is so, and expresses this at page C88.  The manager of agency has written an employer reference at C127, which she says at C129: “I found the grandmother challenging.  After much discussion with her, I did say that maybe a change of career would be the best option.”

41.	The local authority alleges that the grandmother was dismissed, having fallen asleep whilst on duty, and having denied that she had done so was then shown CCTV coverage that proved the charge against her.  The grandmother said, at C88, that she did doze off during her work, but left of her own choice.  She currently works as a support worker, as I understand it, in a residential unit for adults with learning disabilities.  Again, I do not think that the issues relating to the termination of work with the agency have any relevance at all to this case, nor have I heard sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion as to whether she was dismissed, or not.  

42.	Even if the grandmother was dismissed, dismissal from employment for the reasons that are suggested would not have any bearing at all on whether she could care adequately for her granddaughter.  I do not think that the local authority has made out any sort of case on the basis that proven dishonesty within employment has any bearing on the enormously important decision that I have to make in these proceedings.  First, the issue is not proven on evidence; secondly, even if it were to be proven, it would not be an issue that influenced the proportionate response in this case.

43.	The grandmother has very extensive debts, which are described at page 11 of the assessment of Miss Penny.  They lead Miss Penny to say that the grandmother is not financially stable and that this is causing her a great deal of stress.  Her financial difficulty has led her to be evicted from her home in the past, and she is currently subject to legal methods of debt recovery.  At C89 the grandmother says that she is seeking advice from the Citizens Advice Bureau, and has applied for a debt relief order.

44.	The Guardian describes the grandmother’s flat in this way: 

“It is comfortable, clean and tidy.  Her living room is a warm space with carpeted floor.  There are lots of family photographs.  Other rooms are partially carpeted with off-cuts.  I’m aware that she has only fairly recently moved into this flat.  There are two bedrooms, and she would have space for her daughter to live with them, in addition to a baby.  There is a secure entry system.”

	I agree that it is very unfortunate, and I am sure, a huge burden that the grandmother has this degree of indebtedness, which I am told was about £8,500 in total. However, I do not accept that that is of such significance that it affects whether she could care for her granddaughter.  There must be many people with that level of indebtedness, or more, who care for children perfectly well; for instance, bankruptcy does not mean that children are removed from the bankrupt.  I am simply not prepared even to say that this issue of indebtedness is in some way a ‘factor’, since that is meaningless and leads to the false mathematics of 0 + 0 = 1, or, as Lord Hailsham put it in an adoption case: “The ancient fallacy of the Sorites.”

45.	A very real issue, however, is that the grandmother is also very close to her two eldest adult children, the father and her middle child.  The grandmother’s response to the suggestion that she would not be able to maintain boundaries with the parents or with her middle child on his release from hospital,  is at C90, where she says: 

“I do believe that the father is a different person when he is not drinking.  I believe the father should be abstinent from alcohol.  I will absolutely accept and follow the view of the professionals as to any contact between the father and the child.  I understand that he currently has only supervised contact with the child, and I will understand if this remains the view of the professionals and the court.  I will prioritise the child’s care and welfare, and believe that the father would respect this and would not seek to have any contact with the child that was not agreed.  If the father did attend at my home, outside of the agreed times or arrangements, I would simply ask him to leave, and, if necessary, call the police to remove him.  However, the father rarely attends at my property and has only visited twice since I moved to my new property.”

46.	The father’s brother, that is the grandmother’s middle child is a man aged 23. He has three convictions for sexual touching from 2010, has a 2007 conviction for robbery, and was apparently excluded from college in 2009 as a result of allegations that he was sexually abusive to other students.  He is currently in low security psychiatric hospital, having been moved there from a medium security hospital in October.  It is not clear as to whether he is in hospital under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 or section 47 as a result of a direction of the Secretary of State, and for the purposes of this judgment it does not matter.  An order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 would be made at the time of sentencing.  The order under section 47 would be a direction of the Secretary of State for a person to be removed from prison to hospital. 

47.	The grandmother is plainly very close and protective towards her middle child, and this leads the local authority and Guardian to question her ability to offer the subject child within these proceedings sufficient protection from him once he is released back into the community.

48.	In her statement, at C90, the grandmother says this: 

“My middle child has a number of difficulties.  He started to associate with a bad group of people, and his behaviour deteriorated.  I know and fully understand that he suffers from a mental disorder, and that as a result of this and his behaviours it would not be safe for him to be around the child unsupervised.  He is, of course, my son, and I will wish to continue supporting him, but I believe that I can do this without placing the child at risk.  I did not suggest that my middle child’s behaviours are culturally acceptable as an African man, but I did say that in Africa interactions between men and women are viewed differently.  That is not to say that I condone this.  When I stated that the middle child would not harm anybody, I simply meant that he would not have harmed anybody before his mental illness.  I would not allow my middle child to have unsupervised access to the child.”

49.	Since the writing of the assessment by the social worker further information has come to light.  It includes that there were nine reported incidents of domestic violence against the grandmother and her youngest child (a daughter) which were reported as having been perpetrated by the father or his brother between 2006 and 2011.

50.	The conclusion of the local authority’s assessment by Sarah Penny is that the grandmother cannot provide the child with a sufficiently safe environment for the child to be placed with her.  The assessment report focuses on a number of points, some of which I have already excluded as being irrelevant, but it also raises the local authority’s concerns about the ability of the grandmother to keep the child safe from the dynamics of the parents’ relationship and also from her middle child.

51.	In his report, the Guardian considered the position of the grandmother at some considerable length, and I have particularly noted the following parts of that report that I have read into the notes before me.  He said this:

“When I asked the grandmother about her financial position she accepted that she has significant debts, but visited the Citizens Advice Bureau on 12th November and has been given information on how to apply for a debt relief order.  If this is granted, I understand it is akin to bankruptcy and would discharge her obligation to creditors.  I did not challenge how far she had knowingly allowed benefits to be paid to her, to which she is not entitled, and how far these issues had arisen when she was unwell.  In some ways, I felt any dispute over her intentions in relation to benefits and debts was not as crucial, in the context of her capacity to look after a child throughout her childhood and into adulthood, as the reality that she has quite onerous financial liabilities on a low income. At this time the debts remain significant, and we cannot presume that a debt relief order will be granted.”

52.	As will be plain in relation to that passage, I place no significance on this issue, and insofar as it is relevant I depart from the views of the Guardian in relation to that. However, the Guardian continued: 

“The court has evidence that there were seven domestic incident reports relating to the grandmother and her sons between January 2008 and March 2011.  These involved arguments or fights between the father and the father’s brother, pushing and shoving involving the grandmother and her daughter in January 2008.  The grandmother acknowledges these events occurred as she was trying to set boundaries and manage her sons’ behaviour.  In relation to the father’s brother the court will be aware that he is detained under section 37 of the Mental Health Act, a hospital order, and that he was transferred from a medium secure unit to a low level of security at a health unit on 8th October 2014.  The grandmother says that he has a diagnosis of schizophrenia and that she normally visits him once a week or once a fortnight.  She hopes that he may be discharged to community accommodation in the next year if progress continues.  She would expect him to live independently.  She described a period: ‘When I was totally incapable.  Most of the time I was sleeping, passing out at home and at work, attributing this to the effect of antidepressants.’  She said that the father’s brother became involved with a group of young people, who were giving him drugs, which altered his behaviour.  She described him being very unwell at home, behaving oddly, urinating into bottles, cooking all the food in the house.  She said that the drugs confused him, and that it was said he was abusing girls in July 2010.  He was in prison.  She said the court found no case to answer.”  

This is contradicted by his mental health social worker at page 13 of the assessment by Sarah Penny.  

“He was convicted, but she was worried about his mental health.  She refused to take him home.  She felt the boys who gave him drugs would abuse him and make more allegations.  She felt that they had lied about his behaviour.  She claimed a crisis loan, and they took the money.  I asked the grandmother what she thought about the reported offences.  She said: ‘I was not there.  I don’t know whether he had assaulted or sexually touched girls.’  She confirmed that she expects him to live independently when he leaves hospital, and that although she will see him regularly she will not allow him to have unsupervised contact with the child.”

53.	In relation to the father: 

“The grandmother she said that he has changed from the time when she had to call the police often because of his behaviour.  She said that he rarely comes to her flat.  She said that her daughter has little time for the father and will not visit him at his accommodation.  I asked her what she could tell me about the relationship between the father and the mother.  She told me that the relationship had always been on and off.  She said that the mother said she loved the father and wanted to marry him.  She showed me a couple of text messages between herself and the mother on 23rd September.  The one from the mother said that she loved the father, and if the grandmother didn’t like it, she couldn’t stop her.  The grandmother replied: ‘Oh, my God, if you love my son why do you have to call the police, denting his name?  You’re a she devil.  You need a mental health assessment.’  This was two days after the mother had alleged that the father had attempted to rape her.  I had assumed that the grandmother would have been aware the mother had been in prison for several months following an incident involving a knife with her son earlier this year.  She was aware that the mother had threatened to kill her son, but seemed unaware that the mother had been in prison.  I was concerned that she may have a limited understanding of the volatility of the relationship between her son and the mother and the implications for any family member caring for their child.  When I asked her more directly about managing the parents in terms of visiting the child, if she were with her, she then said that she would stop the mother visiting her if the child was with her, and compared it to adoption, saying that the mother would not see the child then so why would she, if she was with me?  She said that she would treat the father the same way.  If she had any problem she would call the police.  The grandmother seemed to have a very concrete idea of how she would manage the situation.  The parents would be able to see the child, with their support workers, but would not be able to come to the flat.  If they came to the flat she would call the police.  When I questioned how easy it would be for her to manage the parents she said: ‘If they kill each other, it’s not my problem.  I wouldn’t get involved.’  I felt there was no real sense of how ongoing difficulties in the parents’ relationship might impact on the child throughout her childhood, and of how she would manage that so that the child could feel emotionally secure in her care.  The grandmother is very motivated to care for her granddaughter.  The grandmother has significant financial problems, which may or may not be resolved through her application for a debt relief order.  The grandmother has an abnormal echo cardiogram.  She is due to have further assessment of her heart health, and is currently receiving no treatment for this issue.  Given she is age 58, but feels very well, she may or may not be physically fit to care for the child throughout her childhood, and she will be aged 74 when the child reaches 16 years.”

54.	Again, I interpose that in relation to the Guardian’s approach to the health of grandmother I do not share the concerns that he has in relation to her age, and do not think those are relevant to the determination that I have to make.  The Guardian continues, however, by saying: 

“The grandmother appears to minimise or deny her son’s abusive behaviour towards women.  In my view there is a risk that she will not be able to protect the child satisfactorily from behaviours associated with her son’s mental health difficulties.  In the past she was aware that the father was looking after his eldest child whilst under the influence of alcohol, when he dropped that child several times and was convicted of being drunk in charge of a child aged under 7 years.  The text message exchanged with the mother on 23rd September suggests that the grandmother saw herself as her son’s advocate, vis-à-vis the mother.  I have grave concerns about how she would be able to promote positive contact with the mother if she blames her for the problems in the relationship between her and the father.  I am concerned about the grandmother’s ability to give the child a positive sense of her mixed identity and a fair balanced view of the mother.  I am concerned that although the grandmother would say that she has support from her church and close friend, and that she expects her daughter to move to live with her in the near future, she would in reality be a very isolated single parent if she were to care for the child.  There is no evidence that she has close friends who have young children, and she would have to begin to establish a new support network which has a shared interest in caring for young children.  That is by no means impossible, but would, I expect, be difficult.”

55.	Again, I interpose in that quotation from the Guardian’s report to say that I differ from the Guardian in relation to the significance of that issue, as I will make plain.  The Guardian went on to say: 

“I have considered whether any other local authority services or support would reassure me and the court about the grandmother’s capacity to give the child a physically or emotionally secure childhood.  The child is now aged 5 months, and I do not think it is realistic to delay matters while the grandmother’s health and financial issues are clarified further.  The local authority would be able to provide a special Guardianship allowance.  The grandmother would have to give up work.  This would certainly not allow her to repay debts if she does not secure a debt relief order, and the local authority could not be expected to pay off those debts.  The local authority could certainly signpost and support the grandmother with appropriate ‘early years services’, but could not insist that the child is involved in pre-school groups if the grandmother chose not to engage.  The local authority could supervise some contact between the child and her parents initially, but that would not be sustainable on all but the most occasional basis throughout her childhood.  Arrangements would have to revert to being supervised by the grandmother herself, another family member or trusted friend, or using a child contact centre.  Some of the key concerns about the grandmother’s position relate to her personality and how she would manage relationships with family and professionals.  Sadly, I cannot see a way to provide support services which would assist in that respect without practically subverting her parental responsibility.”

56.	Oral evidence - I turn to the oral evidence.  I heard oral evidence from the social worker, Miss Penny, who carried out the assessment of the grandmother.  I also heard from Stephanie Duncan, the social worker with overall charge of the case on behalf of the local authority.  I heard evidence from the grandmother, mother, father and Guardian.  

57.	Miss Penny maintained her recommendations in her assessment of the grandmother that the child should not be placed with her.  She accepted that the grandmother is an active member of her church and has support and friendship from the church community.  She says that one can be confident that grandmother would develop additional support, in time, if the child were to be placed with her, and I agree.

58.	Miss Penny said that whatever illness that grandmother had had in the past, she was concerned that there might be a repeat of the depression which she suffered in the past.  She accepted that there had not been a full health assessment of the grandmother.  I have already expressed my opinion that grandmother’s health is not a relevant issue on the strength of the evidence that I have heard.

59.	She said that the grandmother’s home was adequate and there are carpet cuts on each of the floors.  The social worker said that she maintains her opinion that the mother’s indebtedness causes her huge instability, and that the grandmother is not managing her debt.  I think that undue weight was placed on this issue by the social worker.  But, of particular relevance, however, was the social worker’s evidence that the grandmother would sometimes say that she would not allow the father to have contact with the child, but on other occasions she would say that he could look after the child adequately.

60.	The grandmother told the social worker that he would be safe around the child if he was not drinking, she said.  Also, the grandmother had been responsible for supervising the father’s contact with the older child of the father, and on one occasion, the father had unsupervised time with the child in circumstances that are described in more detail.

61.	Also of particular relevance, said the social worker, is the fact that the grandmother told the social worker that the middle child was innocent of the allegations that were made against him.  The grandmother had said to the social worker that the middle child would never harm anybody, she said.  That, of course, would be plainly incorrect for the grandmother to say.  The social worker thought that the grandmother would have great difficulty in protecting the child from her own middle chid, and that orders or undertakings would not be sufficiently protective of this child.

62.	The social worker also recognised the positive aspects of the care that the grandmother would offer.  The grandmother offers the child a place in her natural family, with contact with the rest of her family.  She offers the child emotional warmth and an upbringing that is consistent with her own cultural background.  The grandmother’s daughter is capable and successful.  She has been at university, and is in full-time employment, and has written on behalf of the grandmother at page C109.  The grandmother is highly motivated and committed to her family, the social worker accepted.  Those are all very important factors.

63.	Miss Duncan, the current social worker, gave brief evidence.  She accepted that the chances of finding an adoptive placement that entirely matched the child’s cultural background were slim.

64.	The grandmother gave evidence this morning, and stressed that she is the only one in the family who could care for the child.  She expressed her pride in the success of her daughter, and she is right to do so, and emphasised the struggles that she has had since her husband, very sadly, died.  She said that with her nursing background she could look after anybody.  She stressed the extent of support that exists for her within her local community and church, and I am quite sure that the church would motivate itself to support the grandmother in her endeavours if she were to care for the child.

65.	As to her middle child, she said that she thought that she herself had been at risk when he was in her home.  She said how ill he had been.  She said that she does accept that he sexually abused girls, and that he is a risk to the child in these proceedings, and said that he is schizophrenic.  She said that there is no way she would allow her middle child to spend time with this child unless she was there.  If he was behaving in an unusual way, she would not allow him to be in contact with the child.  She denied that she has told Miss Penny that he is not a risk.  That comes from page C52 on the basis of the evidence that I have heard, and having seen the grandmother I accept that she did tell Miss Penny that, and has not maintained the strength of opinion that was expressed in the witness box about the degree of risk that the middle child could pose.

66.	The grandmother, I have to say, gave very unsatisfactory evidence, indeed, as to whether she knew of her middle child’s convictions before she spoke to Miss Penny.  Her answers ranged from saying that she did know of the convictions, that she did not know about them, and that she could not remember what she said to Miss Penny about this.  The very clear impression that she gave is that she does not acknowledge the extent of the difficulties that arise from her middle child.

67.	As to the father, she said that if he becomes violent, as he can, it can be a problem.  She would allow him to come to her home to see the child only with a support worker and as ordered by the court.  She said that her son is not himself when in drink, and that, therefore, professional support would be necessary if he came to her home given how he has behaved in the past on occasions.  She said that she saw that he came to the house, to her current flat, only twice since she moved there.  He said somewhat differently, and initially he said that he came to see her about once a month.

68.	She said that on the occasion that she left the father on his own with his older child, she had gone to the shops.  She had received a text message on 12th June from the boy’s mother, which included the following: “for almost three weeks [the father] has not seen the older child.  Can you or the father make arrangements?”  The grandmother said that she interpreted that text message as meaning that the father could see the older child on his own, and she said it was after that that she left the father on his own with the older child.  I am afraid I am not satisfied with that answer.

69.	The grandmother went on to say that she did not know until Monday of this week that the father had been convicted of being drunk in charge of his oldest child.  She said that in 2010 the mother of the child told her that the father had dropped the child, whilst drunk, but she did not know that he had been convicted of an offence arising from that.  I am afraid I do not accept that evidence either.  I think she did know of his conviction.  

70.	She said that she had called the police before due to the father’s behaviour, and she that she would do so in the future.  She said that he is a risk to the child.  “He does not know what he’s doing when he’s drunk”, she said.  She said that he is still drinking, and that she believed that he was admitted to hospital in August 2014 because he was so ill due to his drinking.  She said that the father had been told that he would kill himself if he continued drinking, but that he still does drink.  She said that the father is very, very attached to his children, and is very fond of them.

71.	The combination of that evidence leaves me with very real doubts, indeed, that the father would be able to control himself, and his access to the grandmother’s home and to his child if the child were to be living in the grandmother’s home.  One has to only picture the father, in drink, knowing that his child, to whom he is very attached and of whom he is very fond, is living about a mile away, to picture how unrealistic it would be to expect him to control his actions and maintain his distance.  My opinion is very plain.  It simply would not happen.

72.	As to the mother, the grandmother said, she would not allow the mother to come to her home alone, and she thought that the mother also posed a risk to the child.  I accept that the grandmother has not seen the full array of papers in this case and does not have the benefit of reading the full extent of the mother’s background.  However, I am also perfectly satisfied that this grandmother has a very good understanding of how this mother can behave.  The grandmother expresses a very full knowledge of some of the actions of the mother in relation to the father and has expressed opinions in the clearest possible terms, for instance, in the text message, where she called the mother a “she devil”, so the grandmother is sufficiently aware of the way in which the mother can behave to form a view.

73.	The explanation that the grandmother gave of the text message, the “she devil” text message, as one might call it, included an account of very frequent contact that was occurring at the time between her and the father.  She went to use the father’s computer on Saturday, spoke to the father about work that he was due to start on Monday, tried repeatedly to speak to him on the phone, and on Tuesday heard from him that he had been accused of attempted rape of the mother, and then sent the “she devil” text.

74.	She said in evidence that I found to be delivered in a very guarded and unreliable way that she speaks to the father twice or three times a week.  I have to say I was left with a very clear impression that the frequency of their telephone contact was certainly no less than that, and probably more.  The grandmother said she did not think that calling the mother a “she devil” might make things worse.  Nor did she think that she was at risk of becoming embroiled in the discord that would exist between these parents.  I do not accept that as being remotely realistic.  

75.	She said that she had told the father that, if he continues with the mother, the mother could find people who would kill him.  She said that the mother had previously arranged for people to go to the father’s house to take his computer and his television, and was capable of arranging for people to kill him.  The grandmother then went on to say that she loves the mother.  In my opinion her evidence gave very clear forewarning of the intense difficulties in the future between the mother and the grandmother if the child were to be placed with the grandmother.  

76.	The grandmother says that the mother loves the child, but would be happy for the grandmother to look after her.  The mother also said the same.  I found that evidence to be unreliable and, I am afraid, completely unrealistic.  I was left in no doubt at all that if this child lived with the grandmother, the child would be brought up in an environment where she was exposed to the intense and frequent conflict between the grandmother and the parents.  

77.	I see no prospect whatsoever of this family acting co-operatively in the medium or long term to further or protect the welfare of the child.  The child would become the focal point of the conflict with the family.  As the grandmother’s evidence developed it became very clear, indeed, that an arrangement by which the child was placed with the grandmother would be highly likely to break down within a very short period.  I could not begin to rely on the parents’ assertions that they would tolerate it in anything beyond the immediate future, and given the difficulties that the parents have I think their emotional difficulties would override any commitment that they might express to support the arrangement.

78.	The mother came to give evidence because I had expressed my profound concerns about how the family dynamics would work if the child were to be placed with the grandmother.  I wanted to hear evidence from the mother and from the father on that point, but the mother said that she is happy for the child to be cared for by the grandmother.  She would want to have contact with the child and would agree to what the grandmother said, such as six times a year.  If she was told not to go to the grandmother’s house, she would agree to it, she said.  She said that she has a place of her own but stays with the father about four or five times a week.

79.	She said that there are quite a few arguments between them.  She said that she had made a rape allegation against the father, but she accepted that that was a lie.  The police are still investigating the allegation of rape, she said, but she is going to tell them on 30th December that it is a lie.  At present, she has not done so.  The very fact that matters can get to that point, where the mother makes a false allegation of rape against the father, which is pursued by the police for three months, is a signal to the extent of the volatility of the parents, who are, of course, now engaged in a relationship between each other, and, indeed, spend four or five nights of the week together.

80.	The mother said that the grandmother is ‘good’.  She said that she knew about the text message in which the grandmother said she is a “she devil” and needs a mental health assessment, but said those arose in specific circumstances.  I do not accept that is so.  I cannot see any way in which the volatility of the relationship between the parents would not impact upon the grandmother’s relationship with the mother, as it has done very clearly in the past.  The grandmother has said, for instance, that the mother would be capable of finding people to kill the father, and it cannot be said that that founds the basis of a good relationship between grandmother and mother.

81.	I do not think that the mother gave reliable evidence about what would happen if the child was placed with the grandmother.  Given her past, I think it highly unlikely that she would co-operate with any arrangement whereby the grandmother was caring for her child in the long term.

82.	The father gave evidence by speaking quickly and with many internal contradictions in what he said.  He said that he goes to his mother’s place about once a month, but said that his mother could be right when she says that he has been to her current home twice since she moved in or about August.  He said that his relationship with his mother is good, but then said it is not, and he makes his own decisions and she makes her own decisions.  He said they speak to each other on the phone maybe two or three times a week.

83.	He said he would keep to any arrangement that was imposed in relation to his contact with the child.  Only once, he said, had he had unsupervised contact with his older child, and he suggested he keeps to the rules.  He said he is entitled to be seeing his child, and he said it would be okay for him to be seeing the child with someone else there.  It would be okay if he had to see the child six times a year, but did not answer the question: “Why only six times a year?”.

84.	In relation to his conviction for being in charge of his eldest child, whilst drunk, he said that was an allegation and there was no evidence he had been guilty of it.  He thought that he had just been given a caution initially.  When shown a record of his conviction he said he did not understand what all this police business meant, and questioned how anyone could have said that he had behaved in the way alleged.  He said that he really did not think that it was true.  He wasn’t drunk, and he would not drop his child.

85.	He said he had absolutely no idea why his contact with the child would have to be regulated or confined if the child was living with the grandmother, and it was perfectly obvious from his evidence that that was the case.  He said the only reason he could think of was the age of this child.  When asked what risk he might pose to the child he said, eventually: “Because she is a baby”, and then went on to say: “I am the child’s dad.  How can I be a risk to her?”  

86.	He said that he has supervised contact because of the relationship issues, and maybe because of his drunken behaviour, but it was perfectly apparent that he had no understanding at all as to why it was being said that he might pose a risk to the child.  The problem that that creates is obviously enormous for the proposal of the grandmother, because if he does not understand what risk he might pose to the child there would be absolutely no reason at all why he should not see the child that he loves and wants to be involved with regularly.

87.	He went on to say that he had bumped into the mother by chance in Taunton on the day when the Orchard House assessment was ended.  That, again, I regret to say, was simply untrue.  There is a very clear account of what happened at E103.

88.	The Guardian gave evidence, and said that the main factors in the care are the safeguarding issues for the child, and I agree.  He said: “We have to look at the child’s stability and security throughout her life.”  He is concerned about the stability of a placement with the grandmother given the influence of the parents and also of the middle child.  He did not base his views on any form of assessment of whether the grandmother had told the truth about the past on issues such as employment or health.

89.	He said that he was firmly recommending that the child is more likely to find stability and security in an adoptive placement rather than with her grandmother.  He acknowledged the strength of the grandmother’s wish to care for the child, the cultural and familial continuity that she could provide, the importance of maintaining the family tie, if possible, and the qualities of the grandmother’s daughter.  He foresaw that the grandmother is likely to want to support her middle child in the community, and thought that this would create difficulties in the future if she were caring for the child.

90.	Law - I now turn to the law that I have to apply.  I have repeatedly placed judgments on bailii as I am required to do, in which I have set out my understanding of the law.  I will set it out again in this judgment, but do so in fairly short form:

(1) I must apply the relevant statutory and Convention provisions, and must do so in accordance with the guidance given by the higher courts. (See EH v Greenwich Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 344); 

(2) Where the threshold criteria are fulfilled, as they are here, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and section 1 of the Children Act 1989 when deciding whether to make a care order; 

(3) In relation to the placement application I must consider the terms of section 52.1(b) and section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  The welfare checklists in the two Acts are not the same.  Article 8, of course, is also further and significantly engaged in relation to the placement application; 

(4) The court must conduct a global, holistic approach to welfare issues, weighing up the various available options before it.  The court must avoid a linear analysis of those options because that can lead to the piecemeal elimination of the least interventionist solutions, leaving the most interventionist solution of a placement order as the only remaining solution. (See Re G (a child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965); 

(5) Further, where care and placement applications are made it is better for the court to conduct a combined welfare analysis of the applications rather than considering the care application first and separately from the placement application; otherwise, if the less interventionist care order is made on a care plan for adoption, it may lead to a placement order being made without sufficient consideration being given for the welfare checklist under the 2002 Act, and also without there being the necessary holistic analysis of the real options before the court; here those options are adoption or supported placement with the grandmother; 

(6) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states as follows: (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondents; (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; 

(7) Care orders amount to very significant invasions of the Rights encapsulated in that Article.  Placement orders amount to an even more significant invasion of that right than care orders.  For such orders to be justified they must be satisfy the provisions of Article 8.2, and therefore must be (a) in accordance with the law; (b) necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms (that is the welfare) of others, (here, the child); (c) proportionate; 

(8) Welfare issues must be based on the totality of information available to the court and in relation to them, unlike threshold issues, it is necessary to conduct a contemporary evaluation of what is best for the child concerned; 

(9) By section 1.1 of the 1989 Act the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration when considering the making of orders under that Act following the satisfaction of the threshold criteria.  Section 1.3 of the Act contains the welfare checklist.  I will not set out that checklist because much of it is duplicated in the 2002 Act, and I intend to conduct my welfare analysis by applying the checklist in the 2002 Act. 

(10) As to the 2002 Act, children may not be placed for adoption under placement orders without the consent of the parents unless the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.  The core statutory provisions in relation to placement orders are therefore section 52.1 for the purposes of this judgment, although there are, of course, many other provisions in the Act relating to such orders; 

(11) The case of Re P (children – adoption and parental consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535 provides useful guidance in relation to application orders.  The main and relevant principles for these purposes are set out in paragraphs 119 to 154 of the judgment of Wall LJ.  Those principles are summarised in the case of EH v Greenwich.  I mention two: “(1) That in considering the provisions of section 52 I must consider section 1.4 of the 2002 Act; (2) The word ‘requires’ in section 52 is plainly chosen as best conveying the essence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence; that is, it implies an imperative rather than something that merely optional or desirable.  Ryder LJ summarised the position in the case of Re R [2013] EWCA Civ 101; 

(12) The relevant parts of section 1 of the 2002 Act provides as follows: (1) This section applies where a court of adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child; (2) The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare throughout his life; (3) The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that in general any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare; (4) The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters amongst others: (a) the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding; (b) the child’s particular needs; (c) the likely effect on the child throughout his life of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person; (d) the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant; (e) any harm within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f) the relationship which the child has with relatives and with any person in relation to him the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including: (1) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so; (2) the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives or of any such person to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop and otherwise to meet the child’s needs; (3) the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives or of any such person regarding the child; (6) the court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child’s case whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989, and the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.  I will not refer to sub-section (7).

91.	Next, it is of fundamental importance that there is discipline in the approach to welfare issues in care and placement proceedings.  The court is not a court of social engineering.  The court does not decide welfare issues by considering whether on an individual judge’s analysis a child might be considered to be better off in care or adoption.  Nor does the court apply a test of whether a child will receive optimal care with a given parent since there will be many parents who would fail that test; thus, the court must not approach a case such as this by asking whether on balance the given child will be better off with adopters or with the grandmother.

92.	Next, the dicta that I have already set out from Re BS must be applied, so, too, must the well known passages from the judgment of Lord Neuberger in paragraphs 77 and 78 of Re B, which I will not read.  

93.	Finally, although care proceedings are quasi inquisitorial, as was said in Re W [2013] EWCA Cas Civ 1227: “It is for the local authority to justify its applications and to substantiate its proposed care measures upon evidence.” (See P, C & S (United Kingdom) [2002] 2FLR 631.

94.	I also wish to cite paragraphs 35 and 36 of the judgment of Ryder LJ in CM v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council [2014] EWCA Civ 1479.  He said this at paragraph 35: 

“This court has on two recent occasions highlighted the way in which the proportionality evaluation is being misconstrued by practitioners.  In each case practitioners were reminded to use the concept that was described by the Supreme Court in Re B.  M & H (a child), LJ Macur, at paragraph 8 said: ‘I note that the terminology frequently deployed in arguments to this court, and no doubt to those at first instance, omit a significant element of the test (one or two inaudible words) by both the Supreme Court and this court which qualifies the literal interpretation of nothing else will do; that is, the orders are to be made in only in exceptional circumstances and when motivated by the overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s best interests.’  In Re M (a child – long term foster care) [2014] EWCA Civ 406 Black LJ said: ‘What is necessary is a complex question requiring an evaluation of all the circumstances.’  As Lord Neuberger said at paragraph 77 of Re B, speaking of a care order, which in that case will be very likely to result in the child being adopted, it seems to me inherent in section 1.1 of the Children Act 1989 that a care order should be the last resort because the interests of the child self-evidently require her relationship with her natural parents to be maintained unless no other course was possible in her interest.’”

95.	I emphasise the last phrase of that passage, “in her interest”, because it is an important reminder that what has to be determined is not simply whether any other course is possible, but whether there is another course which is possible and in the child’s interests.  

96.	The advantage of a placement with the grandmother: If the child grows up in the primary care of her grandmother it will mean that she retains her natural and important connections with her natural family.  This will help her understand her cultural and family origins.  It will also mean that she will be able to maintain some degree of contact with her natural parents.  Her grandmother would love her and do her best for her.  The grandmother’s own daughter has developed into a successful and intelligent adult.  The grandmother is a religious woman, with the support of her church.

97.	The only competing option for the child is placement for adoption, and that would mean that the child’s connections with her natural family were severed.  It would also mean that she might very well not be found a placement that was a cultural match to her.  In future years she would know that she had been separated from the family that loved her, and, indeed, wanted to care for her, and that can act as an emotional magnet to adopted people in later life.  As I said to Miss Farquhar in closing speeches, there is a reason for the words that were written above the cave of the Delphic Oracle, which I cited in speeches.

98.	Adoption has life-long consequences, and it is sometimes only in later life that adopted people feel the call of their natural origins -  an example being, as I said in speeches, that increasingly I am receiving requests from people who wish to view their own adoption files, and, indeed, the files of relatives who have been adopted in earlier generations.

99.	The disadvantages of a placement with the grandmother: I think it is, I am afraid, simply unrealistic to think that the grandmother would be able to control the behaviour of the parents, the parents having had contact with the child, and the child having lived with the mother for the first two months of her life.  I think it is inconceivable that the parents would leave the grandmother in peace to care for the child.  Neither parent has co-operated with professionals or important arrangements for children in the past.  I consider that there is a high probability that the parents would introduce the chaos of their lives into the lives of the grandmother and child.  That would lead to the child growing up in a very unstable and conflicted environment.

100.	Further, I consider there is a very real risk that the grandmother would not be able to regulate the involvement of her middle child with this child once he is released.  I think that would expose this child to the obvious risks that the grandmother’s middle child represents in the light of his past criminality and his mental health difficulties.

101.	The advantages of adoption would be that the child was placed with adopters, or, indeed, an adopter, who had been carefully selected and who would be able to provide her with security and stability that would be denied to her in the care of the grandmother.  Adoption would mean that she would not experience the conflicts of her natural family and the chaos that the parents would, in all probability, introduce into her life.  At her age, there is every reason to think that an adoptive placement would be successful, the incidence of adoption breakdown where children are placed for adoption at this age of this child being very low.

102.	I turn, therefore, to the welfare checklist analysis.  For the reasons that I have given I do not consider that the grandmother can meet the particular needs of this child for emotional stability and security.  I agree with the Guardian.  I do not accept that any other further assessment or services could remedy that.  Nor do I consider, given the history of the parents and their particular difficulties, that injunctions could possibly protect the child from the conflict within the family.  

103.	The effect of this child becoming an adopted child will be that she will lose her relationships with the family that love her and want to care for her.  It would also be that she will live with a carefully selected carer, or carers, that will offer her security and stability that she would not know within her natural family.  Adoption would be a major change in her natural circumstances, to revert to the welfare checklist in 1989 Act, but it would be a change that would be beneficial to her; the only alternative to adoption, that is placement with the grandmother, would not.  

104.	She is of an age where there is a high probability that adoption will be successful.  Her cultural background may not be entirely matched, but a lot of care is taken to ensure that matches are as close as possible.  The most important, thing, however, will be the emotional match between this child and her life-long carers.  To be placed in the care of her grandmother there is a very real risk that she would suffer the emotional harm brought about by the chaotic behaviour of her parents and the grandmother’s middle child.  The grandmother’s youngest child is not in the same emotional position as this child, since this child has these parents.

105.	The child has no existing emotional relationship with the grandmother since they have not met, but she has familial ties with the grandmother that are of great importance.  If the child could have been placed with her, consistently with her welfare, I would have ordered that to happen.  I regret to say, because I realise how painful this will be for the grandmother, that this is not the case.  I do not consider that the grandmother has the capability to care for this child in the circumstances that I have heard, and, therefore, I conclude that the welfare of this child throughout her life demands that she be placed for adoption.

106.	That being so, I am left in no doubt that the welfare of the child requires the consent of the mother to her being placed for adoption has to be dispensed with.  I consider, further, that placing her welfare throughout her life as the paramount consideration, care and placement orders are both necessary and proportionate, and, therefore, must be made. 

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