IMPORTANT NOTICE
This judgment was delivered in private.  The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved.  All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with.  Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Case No: NE15C00007
IN THE FAMILY COURT 
SITTING AT NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF: G (CHILDREN)
The Law Courts
The Quayside
Newcastle-upon-Tyne
NE1 3LA
Monday, 30th January 2017

Before:

HER HONOUR JUDGE MOIR

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Re: G (Children)

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Transcribed from the Official Tape Recording by
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Counsel for the Local Authority: Miss Moulder
Counsel for the Paternal Grandmother: Mr Todd
Counsel for the Paternal Uncle: Mr McDermott
The Paternal Aunt appeared In Person
Counsel for the Children: Mr Donnelly

Hearing dates: 7th to 11th, 14th to 18th and 21st November 2017 and 30th January 2017 [?]
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JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
HER HONOUR JUDGE MOIR:
1.	I am concerned with the welfare of two children, A, who was born on 8th January of 2010, so now aged 7, and B, who was born on 27th July of 2011, so aged 5½.  There are question marks and unknowns in relation to their parentage.  What is known is that, prior to November 2014, when it seems they entered the UK illegally, they had lived their short lives in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Their entry into the UK is also surrounded by question marks, with which I shall deal more fully later in this judgment.  
2.	The children came into the care of PGM in November 2014 and shortly thereafter, on 24th November 2014, they were placed with foster carers with interim care orders being made on 22nd January of 2015.  Since May of 2015, the children have been placed separately because of A’s inappropriate behaviour towards B.  PGM, who I will at times call “paternal grandmother,” has throughout these proceedings been treated as paternal grandmother.  PU, who I will at times refer to as “paternal uncle,” has been treated as paternal uncle and PA in the same way as “paternal aunt.”  
3.	Both PGM and PU have been legally represented throughout these proceedings.  Unfortunately, PA could not obtain public funding and has represented herself.  She is an intelligent and articulate young lady and has represented herself well and courteously.  Neither PA nor PU have required interpreters, their English being excellent.  They have resided in the UK for a number of years.  PGM, although she also has lived here for some years, has not the same command of the English language and she has had the use of an interpreter throughout these proceedings.  It is appropriate for me to say how grateful this court is to the interpreter, who interpreted throughout the final hearing.  He was, it has been confirmed by PU and PA, accurate and I found him helpful and measured and he fulfilled his role in interpreting to the court admirably.  I would like my comments relayed to the interpreting service.
4.	The local authority seeks to place A with PA, initially under an interim care order until housing and other practicalities are sorted out and then to be placed with her under a special guardianship order.  The plan for B is a care and placement order, thus permanence outside the family.  The plans for the children advanced by the local authority have changed over time and, at one stage, it was proposed that B be placed with PU and his wife, Z.  That plan changed to one of adoption after May of 2016.  The placement of A with PA is agreed by the family members.  PU has continued to wish to care for B.  PGM seeks to care for both children if they cannot be placed with PA or PU.  
5.	There has been considerable delay in these proceedings, for which Miss Moulder has apologised on behalf of the local authority and which the local authority have addressed in a separate document.  The proceedings have been beset with problems and developments, which have not been assisted by the family members being evasive in relation to certain information and the local authority changing its plans on more than one occasion.  Further events occurred within the course of the proceedings, which needed consideration and investigation.  Unfortunately, there was also a period when the guardian was on sick leave, although in the scheme of things, her absence was not particularly significant in contributing to the delay.  
6.	It was clear that extensive information would have to be considered by the court and thus a time estimate of ten days was seen as appropriate, which indeed it was, and court time could not be found when it was considered in June of 2016 before November of 2016.  The case was listed to be heard on 7th November of 2016 and went ahead on that date.  The case proceeded and the court heard evidence in fact over eleven days.  Oral evidence was given by Dawn Hodgson, the initial social worker; Katie Galloway, the contact supervisor; Y, foster carer; Vanessa Hewitt, the present social worker; Ranjit Mann, instructed as an independent social worker; Dr Massey, instructed as an expert psychologist; Maddy Reed, the senior adoption officer in South Tyneside; PGM, paternal grandmother; Z, paternal uncle’s wife; PA, paternal aunt; PU, paternal uncle and Sandra Moffitt, the children’s guardian.  The court directed written submissions and the Christmas break intervened.  Unfortunately, the written submissions were also delayed by an IT malfunction on behalf of one of the advocates, which delayed the delivery of this judgment as judicial time had to be found for preparation and for that I apologise.  I am grateful to all the advocates for their careful exposition of the law applicable in this case.  There is no disagreement in respect of the law which this court has to apply.  
7.	The local authority bears the burden of proof.  The family members do not bear any burden to disprove facts and the court guards against any reversal of the burden of proof.  In Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, Lord Hoffman said:
“If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a ‘fact in issue’), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened.  There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1.  The fact either happened or it did not.  If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof.  If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened.  If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened.”
8.	The standard of proof is the balance of probability.  In Re A (A Child) [2015] EWFC 11, Sir James Munby, President, reiterated the fundamental principle that the local authority must prove the facts upon which it relies by evidence.  He states this as being the elementary proposition that findings of act must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation.  
9.	In Re A, the President further states that:
“The local authority, if its case is challenged on some factual point, must adduce proper evidence to establish what it seeks to prove.  Much material to be found in local authority case records or social work chronologies is hearsay, often second- or third-hand hearsay.  Hearsay evidence is, of course, admissible in family proceedings. But, and as the present case so vividly demonstrates, a local authority which is unwilling or unable to produce the witnesses who can speak of such matters first-hand, may find itself in great, or indeed insuperable, difficulties if a parent not merely puts the matter in issue but goes into the witness-box to deny it.”
10.	In this particular matter, I have heard directly from the social workers in relation to the vast majority of the material.  I have not heard from the social workers in relation to matters which occurred within the Gateshead area, but I will deal with the evidence in respect of which the Gateshead Local Authority were involved at a later stage in this judgment.
11.	In Re A, the President also stated that:
“The second fundamentally important point is the need to link the facts relied upon by the local authority with its case on threshold, the need to demonstrate why, as the local authority asserts, facts A + B + C justify the conclusion that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, significant harm of types X, Y or Z….  The local authority's evidence and submissions must set out the argument and explain explicitly why it is said that, in the particular case, the conclusion indeed follows from the facts.”
12.	I remind myself that it is not uncommon for witnesses to tell lies, both in the investigation of factual matters and background and also within the court hearing.  The court must give itself what has been called a Lucas direction, namely, to bear in mind that a witness might lie for a number of reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything.  R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 is a criminal case, but Lord Justice Ryder made it clear that it was just as appropriate in care proceedings as in criminal proceedings.  In addition, in a case where the court has determined that witnesses have not been truthful, Mr Justice Peter Smith, in EPI Environmental Technologies Inc & Anor v Symphony Plastic Technologies plc [2004] EWHC 2945 (Ch), said that:
“The court should take into account the following:
(a)	It is essential to evaluate a witness’s performance in the light of the entirety of his or her evidence.  Witnesses can make mistakes, but those mistakes do not necessarily affect other parts of their evidence.
(b)	Witnesses can regularly lie.  However, lies by themselves do not mean necessarily that the entirety of that witness’s evidence is rejected.  A witness may lie in a stupid attempt to bolster a case, but the actual case remains good irrespective of the lie.  A witness may lie because the case is a lie.  
(c)	It is essential that witnesses are challenged with the other side’s case.”
13.	In this case, as I have indicted, the court heard evidence over a period of eleven days.  Apart from PA, the parties were represented by experienced counsel.  The issues arising in the case were subject to careful and directed cross-examination.  The factual matters were investigated and the family members were given every opportunity to provide answers to questions which were raised by the local authority case.  I bear in mind that these proceedings have taken place over a lengthy period of time and that often witnesses may face difficulties in recollection, particularly lay witnesses who do not have the benefit of being able to consult case records or notes of meetings.  In Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (The Children: Fact Finding) [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam), Mr Justice Peter Jackson said:
“A faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account.  The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others.  As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process that might inelegantly be described as ‘story-creep’ may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith.”
14.	I bear in mind that it is not easy for lay witnesses and sometimes for professional witnesses, but in particular lay witnesses, to recollect each and every matter upon which they are questioned in the course of a hearing.  I also bear in mind the wise words of Lady Justice Macur in the case of Re M [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 where she said:
“It seems advisable to me that any judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box and to expressly indicate that they have done so.”
15.	I recognise how alien a courtroom is to someone in PGM’s position or indeed PU or PA’s position and how anxious the family are about these proceedings and their outcome and the experience of giving evidence in relation to matters which are so important for them is extremely difficult in an environment with which they are not familiar.  I do bear these matters in mind when assessing the evidence which I have heard.  All the evidence which I have heard is important and the court must indeed take into account all the evidence before it and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence.  As Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President, observed in Re U (L) (A Child), Re B (L) (A Child) (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof) [2004] EWCA Civ 567, the court invariably surveys a wide canvass and in Re T (Abuse: Standard of Proof) [2004] 2 FLR 838 she added:
“Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments.  A judge in these difficult cases has to have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.”
The evidence of the family is valuable and must be considered carefully alongside the professional and expert opinion.  
16.	The local authority seek care and placement orders.  The article 8 rights of the children and family are engaged.  The overarching principle remains as explained by Lady Justice Hale in Re C & B (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 FLR 611, where she stated:
“Intervention in the family may be appropriate, but the aim should be to reunite the family when the circumstances enable that, and the effort should be devoted towards that end.  Cutting off all contact and the relationship between the child or children and their family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child.”
17.	The welfare of these children, A and B, is the paramount concern of this court and, in considering their welfare, I must look at and consider both the Children Act 1989 and, in particular in B’s case, the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  I must consider, in particular, that under the Adoption and Children Act it is the welfare of B throughout her life which is the paramount concern of this court.  I must consider all those matters set out at s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 and s.1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  
18.	Under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the court may not make a placement order unless either the parents consent or their consent is dispensed with under that Act.  Under the Act, consent can be dispensed with if the welfare of the child requires it.  In this particular case, the parents are not involved in these proceedings, since, despite all reasonable enquiries by the local authority to locate the parents, to find both their fathers and to contact F1 by letter and indeed via Facebook, the parents cannot be traced.  PGM, PU and PA have all told the court that they have had no contact with F2, who has been deemed to be the putative father of B for some years.  The local authority invites the court to dispense with the consent of B’s parents on the additional ground that they cannot be found, although the local authority accept that it is only the welfare ground which has been set out in the application for the placement order.  
19.	The court must consider whether the order which the local authority seeks is both necessary and proportionate and in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, Baroness Hale said that:
“The test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to a child’s welfare, in short, when nothing else will do.”  
20.	In many cases and particularly where the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so, it will be necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions.  At paragraph 77 of that case, Lord Neuberger said that making a child subject to a care order with a plan of adoption should be a last resort where no other course was possible in her interests.  I also remind myself of those matters set out by Mr Donnelly on behalf of the guardian in which he assists the court by referring to a number of recent judgments which have been given in recent times setting out the approach to be taken by the court in cases where the local authority’s plan is one of adoption.  In Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, the court gave clear and firm guidance in cases involving adoption and reflected the words of the Supreme Court in Re B, to which I have already referred.  
21.	The court must have regard to the welfare checklist in both the Children Act and the Adoption and Children Act and I remind myself that it is the welfare of these children which is my paramount concern and, in the case of B, I look at her interests and welfare throughout her life.  I remind myself that, although the child’s interests in an adoption case are paramount, the court must never lose sight of the fact that those interests include being brought up by the natural family, ideally by the natural parents or at least one of them, unless the overriding requirements of the child’s welfare render that not possible.  Adoption is a very extreme thing and a last resort.  The court’s assessment of the parents’ ability to discharge their responsibilities towards the child must take into account the assistance and support which the authorities would offer.  In this case, in referring to parents, of course I refer to members of the family.  Therefore, before making an adoption order, the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities or others providing the requisite assistance and support which would enable the child to be safely cared for within that child’s family.  
22.	The court must always seek to take the least interventionist approach and it is the obligation of the local authority to make work any order which the court deems appropriate.  The court must address all the options which are realistically possible and there needs to be a global holistic evaluation by the court, taking into account all the positives and negatives of each option which may be advanced.  
23.	The DNA evidence in this case is complex and does not confirm that B is a relative of any of the adults in the family or indeed a relative of A, but throughout this case she has been treated as a member of the M-G family since her arrival in the United Kingdom and it seems that B and A were brought up together at least for some of the time when they were in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  I consider that in applying the legal principles by which I am bound that I should approach the task on the basis that A and B together and separately have been treated as members of the family and of a family who desperately want to provide care for each of them.  The cultural issues and different approaches to parenting have a relevance in respect of these children and I remind myself of the words of Mr Justice Hedley in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 where he set out that:
“Society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent.  It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it.  It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability.  These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting.  In any event, it simply could not be done.”
24.	I turn then to the factual background to this case.  PGM came to the UK in 2004 from the Democratic Republic of Congo with two of her five children, X and PU.  PA had come to the UK in 2002.  PGM had not met the children with whom I am concerned before they arrived in the UK.  She told the independent social worker that her son, F2, had always said that B is his child and F1’s partner had said that F2 is the father.  Therefore, she believed that B was her granddaughter.  A’s father, she told the independent social worker, was F1 and she believed therefore that he was her grandson.  Initially, PGM stated to the social worker that both children were the children of her son, F1.  She clearly knew at the time that she said that that it was incorrect.  
25.	PGM told the independent social worker that she last saw her sons face to face in 2002.  She said there was much political unrest and bullying and killings in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  She said her sons had contacted her a year after she arrived in the UK.  She said her last contact with her sons had been seven months prior to A and B arriving in the UK, which would place that last indirect contact in early 2014.  PGM denied that she has had any contact with her sons since early 2014.  She believed that F1 had taken over the care of the two children when F2 had to leave the country without B to find work.  PA returned to the Congo in 2012 and 2013.  She said the last time she saw F1 was in 2013, which was the last direct contact which she had with him.  However, she remained in, in direct contact with him until mid-2014.  
26.	The DNA testing is complex and confusing.  PGM was aware of the importance of establishing the relationships of her children so that DNA testing carried out could be seen in the family context.  PGM maintained for some time that PGF was the father of her five children and, indeed, she said she raised all of the children to believe they had one father, namely, PGF.  In cross-examination, PGM confirmed that she knew that it was important to know if the children were related to each other and how they were related to each other and the rest of the family.  She agreed that she knew that it was important to know if PU and PA were related as full siblings.  In response to the question that, “It was important for you to be truthful as to who the father of PU and PA was,” PGM said in evidence before me, “I didn’t see any importance in this.  In my culture, when you marry someone, that person agrees to look after the children.”  She maintained that she had not lied to Dawn Hodgson in respect of who the father of PA and PU actually was.  She said, “Dawn simply asked me how many children I have and I said five and I said the father of the children was PGF.”  PGM did not accept that Dawn Hodgson had asked her about each child and the father of each child.  She maintained that she had not been asked about the father of each individual child until after the DNA testing had been made available.  
27.	Miss Hodgson confirmed in evidence before me that she had asked PGM about the family relationships and not just on one occasion.  Dawn Hodgson was clear in her oral evidence and in her written evidence that a discussion took place on 9th December 2014 when she completed a genogram and PGM was asked very clearly, going through each child, about the father of each child.  At that time, PGM was also clear in her response that PGF was the father of all her children and seemed quite offended that she, Dawn Hodgson, thought the children may have different fathers.  Dawn Hodgson then emphasised the necessity of knowing about the father of PGM’s children because of the DNA results.  
28.	PA told Dawn Hodgson following the information being provided that PGM’s children had three different fathers, that she had been told by her mother when she was 12 that her father and PU’s father were different men and that the children had three fathers.  When Dawn Hodgson assumed responsibility for the case, PGM told her that A and B were siblings.  Later, she denied that she had ever said that and that she had always said they were cousins and that B was F2’s child.  Later, according to Dawn Hodgson, PGM told her that she had lied to her children about the identity of their fathers because her children were not aware of the true situation.  This explanation seems doubtful when PA originally informed Dawn Hodgson that she had known since she was 12.  PA in evidence denied that she had known or said she had known at 12.  PU confirmed to Dawn Hodgson that he was not aware of the difference in paternity.  
29.	The DNA results seem to confirm the relationships as follows and I am grateful to Miss Moulder for setting out the position as clearly as possible within her written submissions. “The court is invited to have regard to the information provided within the DNA testing and the information given surrounding that testing, namely, that first-degree relatives are parents, children and siblings.  Second-degree relatives are half-siblings, aunts, uncles and grandparents.  Third degree relatives include cousins, great aunts and uncles, half-aunts and uncles and great-grandparents.”  Even accounting for the differing accounts of the identity of the fathers of F2 and F1, the position Miss Moulder sets out seems to be as follows:
(a)	PGM is the mother of both PU and PA.
(b)	A and B are unlikely to be second-degree relatives, but are not excluded as being third degree relatives, namely, cousins.
(c)	PU and PA are likely to be half-siblings as opposed to full siblings.
(d)	PGM is likely to be a second degree relative of A, e.g. grandmother, but could be a third degree relative.
(e)	PU may be a half-uncle of A, i.e. a third degree relative, but the test was inconclusive.
(f)	PA may be a half-aunt of A, third degree relative, but the test was inconclusive.
(g)	The tests were inconclusive as to whether PGM is B’s grandmother or other second-degree relative and were inconclusive as to whether PU and PA are uncle and aunt of B, second-degree relatives.  All tests in respect of B being a third degree relative of the adults were inconclusive.
(h)	The DNA tests are consistent with the family structure now described by PGM, but no statistical value can be put on many of the putative relationships.  
30.	The explanation provided by PGM as to why she was not forthcoming about the paternity of her own children I find troubling.  She said she did not want her children to know.  She told her children that their father was PGF.  She said that after the DNA tests, PA and PU sat her down and said, “Now you need to tell us the truth.”  She told me in court that it was very hard for her.  She said in evidence that she did not lie because she knew the father of her children was PGF, that in her culture if a man was with a woman, he took on her children as his own and therefore he was their father.  She said of course she knew who the father of each of her children was, there were three different fathers, but that she told her children their father was PGF.  She said she never told her children about their true paternity.  
31.	PA gave a different account when she was talking to the social worker and she reverted to her mother’s account when she gave evidence in court after her mother had given her evidence.  PGM did not tell anyone involved in these proceedings about the paternity of her own children until 5th March 2015.  I do not accept that she was unaware of the importance of being truthful about it.  She was well aware that the local authority were keen to know about the circumstances of A and B and about their parentage.  PGM is not unintelligent.  She knew that her children having different fathers could be relevant and yet chose to wait until after the DNA testing to be open and honest with the local authority and indeed with her own children, or at least PU.  However, it also seems to be significant that she was willing to put her own feelings as to not wanting her past to be known not only to the social worker dealing with A and B, but to be kept from her own children.  Therefore, certainly PU had grown up to his late twenties unaware that he had a different father to his siblings.  It demonstrates a lack of understanding on the part of PGM of the emotional needs of a child.  
32.	PGM denied that she had said F1 was the father of A and B, despite it being set out in her written statement in March of 2015.  She told me that there must have been a misunderstanding because what she said was F1 was looking after the children while F2 went away to look for work.  In fact what she said within her statement, and I read from C59 at paragraph 37, is:
“It is for the same reason as at paragraph 9 of my statement that I initially said F1 was the father of A and B.  F1 had assumed responsibility for both children when F2 went away to work.  In my culture and upbringing, B would see F1 as a father in F2’s absence and as a family that is how we would also view the relationship.”
I do not find that the untruths articulated by PGM are explained by cultural views and norms as PGM was aware of what was requested of her by way of information and why those requests were made and she chose not to be truthful or assist the local authority or indeed A or B to make sense of their circumstances and background.  
33.	Mr Todd rightly submits that not too much should be made of, as he calls it, the unorthodox DNA results.  I emphasise that it is not doubted that PGM is very much committed to the children and wants them to remain in the family.  Further, the court recognises that the family structure in African countries may include children of extended family members or even with no blood ties.  That is not a problem or criticism.  The criticism is that PGM was effectively willing to lie to her own children to protect her own feelings and willing to lie to the social workers and the court about what she knew of A and B to either make her claim to care for them stronger or for some other reason.  It is not believable that she thought she was not lying when she said PGF was the father of all her children.  
34.	I will return to culture issues again later in this judgment.  However, it is important that I deal with the issue of language and comprehension on the part of PGM at this juncture.  Of course, PA and PU speak English exceptionally well, both, I think, having been to school in the UK and both having been at university in the UK.  PGM’s first language is Lingala, her second language is French and her English is limited.  It is accepted by Mr Todd on behalf of PGM that the interpretation at the final hearing was accurate and thorough.  Mr Todd submits that the court must be cautious to simply conclude that, as the interpretation at the final hearing may have been accurate and thorough, and in Lingala, therefore the language difficulties have not played some significant part in the [local foot?] involvement in this family and the assessment of PGM.  It is further submitted that PGM still presented as confused and unable to fully comprehend some of the questions she was asked.  “It is a huge step, we would submit, to accede to any suggestion that she was in some way manipulative in terms of her answers.”  Evidential proof of these and other matters must be clear on evidence and not suspicion, as is developed further below.  The court is asked to conclude the most likely explanation is confusion through language and culture.”
35.	The local authority, I am satisfied, tried very hard to obtain suitable interpreters.  The assessment by Mr Mann was carried out with the assistance of a French interpreter.  Mr Mann referred within his assessment to there being considerable difficulties in communicating subtleties and nuances in questions.  He also said that his assessment raised significant concerns about past communication between professionals and the family, what was said and how it was interpreted and understood.  He described PGM as polite and hospitable, although vague about the needs of the assessment and often reticent in her responses.  This description is given against the background of his awareness of the language difficulties and, indeed, I must view all the evidence against that background.  
36.	I have had the benefit of very careful and accurate interpretation throughout the final hearing and during the giving of evidence by PGM.  Sadly, PGM continued to be less than open and honest in her responses and there was an obvious reluctance to deal with difficult questions.  I do not accept that she misunderstood the questions being put to her in cross-examination.  They were carefully phrased and repeated when necessary.  She contradicted matters set out in her own written statements.  I do bear in mind that she was giving evidence through an interpreter, which inevitably means the evidence is less flowing.  
37.	I appreciate, as the independent social worker set out, that from a cultural perspective, it is likely that the family will be suspicious of authority, likely to find any assessment process very intrusive and to be afraid of gossip and damage to their reputation within their own community.  The independent social worker also set out within his assessment:
“Nevertheless, whilst PU appears more open and flexible, in contrast, PGM appears vague, reticent and resistant to openly sharing information, which does not bode well for the future.  Thus, there have been considerable difficulties in obtaining information from PGM and her reluctance to work openly with social services has both delayed progressing this matter to develop a full picture of the background and needs of these children and in assessing what the local authority can offer to them in respect of meeting those needs and it also raises concern as to her ability to be open in the future.”  
38.	Her reticence and obfuscation in giving evidence I am satisfied arose because of her realisation that she had been untruthful and uncooperative previously.  In relation to simple matters and questions, for example, she was asked, “Is Dawn Hodgson wrong when she says you would not disclose details of the past?” the response was “Dawn didn’t ask me such a question.  She did ask me many questions, but not about my past.”  Dawn Hodgson was clear in evidence that she had asked about PGM’s past and, indeed, it would be a standard area of questioning for any social worker seeking to find out the background about children with whom she was concerned.  
39.	PGM’s reluctance in respect of attending English classes is well documented in the papers.  The case summary for the further case management hearing on 1st March set out the local authority position in full and I read from that case summary at A20:
“The local authority has already offered to provide one-to-one parenting support to PGM.  Miss Julie Cahill, social work assistant and contact supervisor, has been identified to carry out this work, which is to begin next week.  PGM has agreed to engage, but does not accept that it is required, nor does she accept its purpose.  It is hoped that PGM will engage with work intended to support her.  She has never parented young children in the UK and it is considered that parenting work offered will be of benefit to her.  The local authority has identified a resource to enable PGM to undertake English lessons.  It is a resource which, as has been explained to PGM, is entirely independent of the local authority and based at the Children’s Centre A in South Shields.  Classes are weekly on Thursday mornings and Miss Cahill, who is known to PGM, has offered to attend the first class with PGM to introduce her and to assist and support her.  
PGM has declined to attend English lessons.  The local authority is bemused by her refusal.  On the one hand, PGM has stated that she does not require the services of an interpreter during meetings and during contact.  On the other hand, it is said on her behalf that her understanding of English is poor.  She has been in the country for a number of years.  She puts herself forward to care for two young children and intends to live with them in the UK.  They will attend English schools and will become integrated in the local and wider English speaking community.  They will become integrated into English culture.  It is surely obvious beyond any doubt that improvement in PGM’s English language skills will greatly assist her both generally and as a carer of the children.  The benefits to the children are equally and blindingly obvious.  
The local authority cannot and does not seek to force or pressurise PGM to accept any support and assistance which she does not wish to accept.  The offer of English classes remains open.  PGM may attend at any time and, if she requires assistance or support, she need only ask.  Support and assistance is a two-way street.  The local authority can only offer it, but PGM declines to accept it.  That is a matter for her.  The local authority wishes to make it clear again that, if PGM identifies any area on which she believes she would benefit from support and assistance, it would consider her request.  The offer of support and assistance as set out above remains open indefinitely, as does the willingness to consider any support and assistance identified by PGM.”  
This is a clear exposition of the attitude of the local authority in relation to providing support and assistance to PGM.  
40.	PGM’s response in evidence I have noted.  She was asked when being cross-examined, “Do you remember the local authority wanting you to take some English lessons?”  “Yes and I did not deny it.  Julie came and took me to the class and that was it.”  “Julie took you twice?”  “Yes.”  “The local authority wanted you to continue those classes after those two times.”  “I did not deny attending classes.  I don’t know why she stopped or maybe Dawn didn’t tell me anything about it.”  “You knew that the local authority wanted you to continue.”  “They did not talk to me about it.”  “Did you want to continue the English classes?”  “Yes, I did cope better with everything they tell me to do.”  “So why not continue?”  “I did not stop, but the person coming to pick me up stopped coming.”  “Did you raise with Dawn Hodgson or anyone why no one was taking you?”  “No, I did not, but we kept on talking about other things with Dawn Hodgson.”  “Why not ask them if you wanted to continue?”  “Because each time I called at the office, I would be told Dawn was not in the office and what I realised when the DNA test came out meant it was a different thing.”  “Would it have been helpful to continue English classes?”  “Yes, of course.  Not only English classes, but everything because I’ve been cooperative with everything Dawn has been telling me.  I do not remember the name where the English classes were.”  “You knew it was in the town centre.”  “Yes.”  “You have lived there since 2009 or 2010.”  “Yes.”  “You knew how to get to the place the English classes were taking place.”  “Yes, I knew, but each time we went Julie would have to say something.  Julie takes me and talks to some people there and they say, ‘Look, PGM is waiting for you outside.’”  “It is an easy journey by public transport.”  “The point is I was not explained clearly these English courses were going ahead.  I would only know if Julie took me and spoke and then said she would wait.”  “There is a bus.  You could have got there very easily by yourself.”  “I was told they will help me with everything, including transport.”  “Is it right Julie offered to take you to the first and second classes and then expected you to go by yourself?”  “No, that is not true, because I wasn’t explained how things go on.  I did not even know why they stopped.”  “When first offered, you refused to attend them.”  “No, I did not decline.”  
41.	I find that this exchange within the course of PGM’s evidence to be revealing.  PGM is intelligent.  She is fully able to understand the importance of increasing her command of English.  She was aware the local authority were keen to help her.  She was able to make known views and requirements to the local authority.  She was able to communicate and attend at the local authority offices.  She was aware that the local authority were keen to help her and yet she did not attend the course after the first two occasions.  She knew where the classes were, what time they took place and they were easily accessible from her home.  She, I am satisfied, chose not to attend, despite being aware of the assistance they could provide in caring for A and B.  
42.	There is one further matter in relation to interpreters which I need to mention.  There has been difficulty getting Lingala interpreters and, unsurprisingly, those who speak Lingala locally are known to the family.  I do fully appreciate that there was a reluctance to have someone in the community interpreting within PGM’s involvement with the local authority or within appointments or court hearings.  Indeed, the court and local authority would not approve someone known to the family as interpreters.  It does create some concern that, on 23rd December 2014 when Z attended to interpret, she did not immediately identify herself and denied knowing or being related to the family.  However, this interchange was in the early stages of the local authority involvement with PU and Z and I do not place much weight upon it.  I am much more concerned about Z’s knowledge of how the children came to be in the UK.  
43.	The account of how the children came into the UK comes from PGM and is supported by PU, PA and Z, who say they are aware of what occurred because of their own involvement and what they have been told by PGM.  Z stated that the first time that she saw the children was when they were in hospital in the North East, in Newcastle.  The account given by PGM is that she received a phone call from an unknown person telling her that she was in London and to do whatever she, PGM, could to get to London.  This phone call, it is said, was received in the morning when PGM was at her home in South Shields.  PGM said in evidence that she was only told that there was a present for her.  She said she tried to suggest someone else could collect it, but the lady said it was a gift for her and that her name had been clearly mentioned.  PGM said in cross-examination that she asked what the gift was and was told to stop asking questions and to just come and see the gift the lady had been given for her.  PGM said she did not consider it suspicious or strange as it was something that happened all the time when African things were sent over from the Democratic Republic of Congo, things which could not be obtained in the United Kingdom.  PGM said that she did not consider it suspicious because she was told that she would be glad when she saw the gift.
44.	Apparently, the rendezvous was to be at Victoria Bus Station and the lady said she could wait until about 5.00 or 6.00.  No information was given as to what would happen to the gift if PGM was unable to meet the deadline imposed.  PGM said that she could not get to Victoria in time by public transport and so she asked PU for a lift.  PGM told me that she told PU the same as she had just recounted in court.  She said they could not phone back to the number of the person who had phoned because there was no number on the telephone.  PGM said that she told PA before she got into PU’s car what was happening.  She then told me that she was in the car when she told PA.  PGM told me no one in the family thought it was strange because they know that any African acquaintance could be told there is something from Africa, African clothes or food, and no one gets excited about it.  
45.	PGM said that the children were picked up from the lady in Victoria on 20th November 2014.  PU dropped her off and she took the bus from where she was dropped to Victoria.  There was a lady at Victoria calling her name.  She said, “Let’s go so I can give you the gift.”  PGM told me in evidence:
“We went to McDonalds.  When we are now in McDonalds I saw in the right hand corner two children there.  She said, ‘Look, PGM, these are your present.’”  
She was asked, “Did you recognise the children?”  
“Yes, I did recognise their faces as I speak to their family in Africa and I communicate on Skype twice.  I had not met them, but I’d seen them on Skype and I’d seen a picture.  I know I am their grandmother.  They didn’t have any belongings, but that woman had a file.”  
She was asked, “Did you ask for the passport or travel documents?”  PGM responded that:
“She didn’t want me to ask her any questions.  I said, ‘Where did you get these children?’  She said, ‘My mission is accomplished so no more questions.’  I agreed to take the two children.  I got on the bus and went to PA’s house.  It was, I can remember, on the Thursday night when we got to PA’s house.  She said, ‘We need to find clothes’ and we went to get clothes.  They had the clothes they were wearing.  They were dressed in trousers, shoes, shirt and jacket.  It was nearly 6.00pm when I got to PA’s house, then I began to talk to PA and she recognised the children.  On Friday, me, PA and the children went to the office in Croydon, the Home Office, and I was asked, ‘Who are these children’ and I said, ‘I’m their grandmother.’  I was asked my status.  I said, ‘I am a British citizen.’  They said, ‘Take the children and go with them to Newcastle.’”  
46.	Apparently, PGM and the children travelled back to Newcastle on the Monday by train and they went to the immigration office on Tuesday morning to ask about refugees.  PGM said on the way back they had met a Congolese man who she asked what to do and he said she could take the children to Sunderland, so on Wednesday morning she took them to a centre in Sunderland.  She said she was told it was a police matter, which she did not accept because she was their grandmother, and when they got home, she got in touch with social services, who said they would come the next day.  However, at about 9.30pm, she received a phone call and could hear the woman she had met in Sunderland who asked if she was okay and was she with the children.  She said half an hour later at 10.00pm social services and the police arrived.  She gave them the same account, but the police took the children from her.  
47.	PGM told the guardian’s advocate, Mr Donnelly, when she was questioned that she had asked A how they came to be in the UK.  She said, “They simply told me they came with one woman and many other people and that was the end.  I did ask them, ‘Where is your father?’ and they just lifted their hands.”  
48.	Mr Todd submits:
“PGM has offered the only explanation or narrative she can for the children being in this country.  It may seem unusual to the court or other professionals in the case to travel such a distance from the North East to London to collect a gift.  However, this has to be viewed within the culture of the Congolese immigrant community.  PGM told the court in evidence that prized items, such as African food, dried fish and African clothes, are often brought back from the African continent by people not necessarily known to the recipients.  PGM has told the court this is quite a normal phenomenon so therefore from her perspective it was not such a bizarre thing to do to travel down.”
He goes on to say:
“Any evidence that points against that narrative does not relate to her.  A significant amount has been made of this issue.  Notwithstanding the police very quickly concluding that this was not a criminal investigation, it took the local authority several more months to reach this conclusion.  Furthermore, the mistrust of the family’s account about how the children came to be with them remains overshadowed by suspicion.  The local authority have produced limited evidence to contradict this.”
49.	It is of course the position that the local authority are in a difficult position in producing evidence to contradict the account by PGM and it may be that the other evidence is from other sources.  However, it is very relevant in determining the truthfulness or otherwise of PGM’s account.  I do not view PGM’s account as explicable by reason of culture.  It may be that gifts are sent with people arriving from the Congo, but the recounted insistence that the gift could only be given to PGM, who was 300 miles away and had to be in London before 6.00pm, makes it more than usual.  What would have happened if she had not been there by 6.00pm?  It seems that this question on PGM’s account was never posed.  If it was clothes or food, why could it not be picked up by someone else and why would there be the secrecy of no names being exchanged?  Why would PGM be kept totally unaware of the nature of the gift?  There are many unanswered questions in regard to PGM’s account.  I do find it bizarre and incredible.  
50.	There is a photograph of B and W, PA’s son, on paternal aunt’s Facebook page, labelled at 2.00am to 3.00am on 11th November 2014 and headed up with, “PA changed her profile picture.”  This photograph is dated nine days before the children are said to have arrived in the UK.  PA agreed in evidence that W and B had met for the first time after the children arrived in the UK and thus the photograph must have been taken while the children were in the UK.  It would seem to point to the fact that A and B had arrived in the UK before 20th November.  Indeed, that they must have been in the UK on or before 11th November.  PA made a statement to deal with the Facebook entries on 12th June of 2015.  She stated:
“With regard to the picture of B and my son that was uploaded to my Facebook, the only explanation that I can provide is that it must have been either one of my cousins or friends that uploaded it.  However, I can confirm that the picture is of B and my son, W.  With regard to the location of the picture, the only explanation I have is that we visited a couple of friends and relatives.  The picture could have been taken in either of their houses by a relative or friend who then uploaded it onto my Facebook.  I can say with certainty that the picture was not taken in my house because I have never had a tan leather sofa.  
With regard to the date that the photograph was uploaded on my Facebook being 11th November 2014, this has come as a shock to me as A and B did not come into my mother’s care until 20th November 2014.  There is logical explanation for the picture to get uploaded on 11th November 2014.  Having done some research on Facebook, I realise that this is a common error on behalf of Facebook as many people complain about the time and date being wrong on their uploaded photos.  Facebook Help Community Forum addresses this problem.”
She includes a screenshot in respect of the Facebook Community Forum.  
51.	In oral evidence, PA told me that it is her Facebook account, but she does not use it, other people do.  She said the photograph was not taken by her and it was not taken on that date.  She said she did not know how to explain the date and that it was untrue that she met A and B at the airport with Z and V and that she could not account for why A had given that account.  
52.	Dawn Hodgson’s written evidence at C71 in the bundle described PA as:
“…being asked about it for the first time.  I then produced a screenshot of the picture of B holding PA’s baby son, W.  This image was uploaded to Facebook in the early hours of the morning of 11th November 2014, nine days prior to the children being handed over to PGM.  I asked PA to confirm the children in the photograph and she identified them as B and W.  I asked whether the image was from PA’s Facebook account and she confirmed this.  I then asked whether PA could explain how the photograph had been uploaded on 11th November.  She was observed to hesitate for around 30 seconds and then said she could not provide any explanation.  I then asked whether this photograph had been taken at her home address.  The children could be seen sitting on a tan leather settee.  PA said she could not remember taking the photograph.  I asked whether the settee in the picture was one in her home.  She spent some time looking at the photograph before saying that the settee was not hers and saying that her settee is black.”  
53.	A gave a spontaneous account of how he and B arrived in the UK to his foster carer on 10th November 2015, which the foster carer recorded within her diary.  She wrote:
“On the way home from school, A was watching an aeroplane and we began talking about his flight here.  He told me he came over with a mum and dad, but not his.  He didn’t know them.  He said he met PA and PU’s mam at the airport and went to her house.  I asked if he meant PGM and he said no.  Through deduction, we got to him meaning PU’s partner and baby and PA met them at the airport.”
54.	On behalf of PGM and PU, the court is reminded to be very careful in relation to an account given by A and, in particular, the fact that initially he said that he came over with a mum and a dad and that he met PA and PU’s mam at the airport and that it was only by deduction that the foster carer got to him meaning PU’s partner and baby and PA.  I do bear in mind the difficulties in relation to this.  Y told me that she can always tell when A is telling lies because “his eyes go wide and you can see guilt in his face.”  I do not place any reliance on Y’s claim to know when A is truthful or without more accept the truth of A’s account.  However, taking the improbability of PGM’s account, the evidence of the Facebook entry and PA’s displayed discomfort about it when first challenged with the Facebook entry and then her inability in evidence to explain the Facebook entry and taking A’s unprompted recollection, I find that A’s account is more likely than the improbable and bizarre account given by PGM.  It is understandable that, initially, the family were reluctant to provide a truthful explanation as to how A and B came into the UK.  They may well have had a fear of the immigration authorities, which may well have been deep-seated and it must have been difficult for them to approach the authorities both in Croydon and Sunderland in relation to the children and they are to be given credit for so doing.  However, as time has gone on, the continuing failure to assist the local authority or the court in regard to the children’s history has become detrimental to the children.  
55.	PGM maintained in evidence that the explanation she would provide to the children in due course about how they came to be in the United Kingdom would continue to be limited to the account which she had given to social services and the court.  If, as I find, A’s account is more likely to be correct and PGM insists on providing an account which does not accord with his recollection, it will be confusing and damaging for him.  It is also recognised by the court that it is very difficult for PA and PU to depart from their mother’s account of matters and therefore label her publicly as untruthful, but in so maintaining their support in relation to her account, they are placing their relationship with her and her welfare above that of the children.  I appreciate how difficult it is for them and I appreciate their loyalty to their mother, but the court cannot ignore the fact that this loyalty has prevented them from being open and honest with the local authority about matters which are important as far as the emotional needs of these children are concerned.  
56.	It is admitted by all the family members that A and B had lived in the Democratic Republic of Congo all their lives prior to their arrival in the United Kingdom in November 2014.  PU agreed that they were full integrated into the society and environment of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  PA had visited the children there and she did not dissent from this proposition.  She has expressed no concerns about the day-to-day lives of the children there and both she and PGM had contact with them via telephone and Skype.  The children arrived without any passports or documentation.  They were brought into the country illegally.  It stretches credibility to believe that the family members in the United Kingdom had no idea that they were to arrive in the United Kingdom and it seems that the plan had been for PGM to look after them.  I reject her account of her ignorance of any plan and her surprise at the children’s arrival, as well as her account, which I find untruthful, as to the means by which they came into her care.  These children were uprooted from their known environment, travelled, it seems, with strangers, to be handed over to and looked after by someone they had never met, or it may be that they were cared for by PA before PGM travelled to London to collect them.  It is unclear, but whatever the detail of the journey, they would have been confused, scared and anxious about the chain of events. 
57.	Further, in relation to Facebook, there are entries copied in the bundle of Facebook entries on 11th November entitled “F1.”  PA in evidence denied that she had been in touch with F1 on 11th November 2014.  She could not account for the exchange, except to say her friends and cousins were using the account.  There is a picture of B, which she could not explain.  The Facebook entries include a reference to F1 as mon frère.  PA said, “You call everyone brother or sister in the Congo.”  While I accept that the latter may well be true, it is just too much of a coincidence that there is an exchange between PA’s brother, F1, on her account with pictures of B of which she is totally unaware and that it was posted by her friends or cousins without any knowledge on her behalf.  It seems that she has not confronted any of the cousins about it or, if she has, she did not tell the court. 
58.	The interpreter assisted by translating one of the entries, which reads, “It is the child of F1.”  PA seemed to struggle when asked to translate this entry.  I am satisfied that the family, that is PGM, PU, PA and Z, have not been honest or forthcoming about what they really know about these children.  Not only has it hindered investigation and therefore planning for the future of these children, but if as PGM says she will maintain the untruthful account she has given, it will contribute to confusion, particularly for A who will have a recollection of the events surrounding his arrival in the United Kingdom.  These children need to know the truth about their history.  There is doubt about whether B is a true relative and they both have little knowledge of their parentage.  They deserve to be given a truthful account by those adults who know something of their background about their arrival in the United Kingdom.
59.	The local authority were regrettably slow in sorting out arrangements for contact for A and B.  Once the police powers of protection had been invoked, the children were placed in foster care and then admitted to Hospital A because of concerns that the children were displaying symptoms which could have been linked to the Ebola virus.  It was right that the local authority was vigilant in this way.  What, however, was not right was that it took them until 16th March 2015 to organise regular contact.  There were concerns about trafficking, which such concerns were relatively swiftly dismissed.  PGM’s reluctance to provide any information about her background history could not have helped the local authority, but contact should have been arranged more quickly for these children who had experienced so much change in their lives.
60.	A further issue arose in the placement of the children together in foster care.  The local authority submits that the evidence is overwhelming that A had been sexually inappropriate with B.  The foster carer reported that, from the start, A was reluctant to let B speak on her own behalf and that A would target B physically and they would have to be separated.  There was no sexualised behaviour reported until 6th May of 2015.  Both children gave an account of A going into B’s bedroom and touching her on the head and between her legs.  B said A kissed her and pointed to her lips.  Thereafter, there were further concerns about inappropriate sexual behaviour and a decision was taken to place B in a separate placement to A.  There were also concerns about behaviour of A where he would take a knife and stab Barbie dolls and make gestures to cut their throats.  
61.	A detailed account of what A said occurred between him and B and in relation to A’s sexualised behaviour and experiences is set out at C132 within the bundle and contained in the foster carer’s statement:
“I asked when he had been into B’s bedroom and how many times.  A said again raising his hands and fingers in the air and signing lots of times.  I asked if B was awake.  A said, ‘No, she is asleep.  I get into B’s bed, touch her bum.’  He pointed to the back and front of his bottom.  He said his tail is hard in his bed.  He would refer to his penis as his tail.  I asked if he had done this before to B and he replied, ‘Yes, in the Congo.’  I asked, ‘Did you touch her in the Congo?’ and A replied, ‘Yes, I touched bum in B’s room in the Congo.’  He then went on to say that a man in the name of U and a lady, both young people, told him to stop this.  A went on to say that a man in the name of U went into his bedroom and touched his bum, pointing to his back bum, and said, ‘It hurt,’ but he didn’t cry.”
The foster carer went on to say that when A had been moved, B seemed to come out of herself and presented as a much happier child.  
62.	I find that A has touched B in a sexually inappropriate manner.  PGM did not accept that this behaviour has occurred.  Moreover, in her discussions with the social worker on 25th July 2015, she was angry and said that, in her tradition, sexual abuse does not occur.  She said B would say yes to everything and that she is attention seeking.  She said it was a bunch of lies and that they would work this out as a family.  At page C142, at 4.40, it is recorded within the parenting assessment prepared by Dawn Hodgson that PGM said that she strongly does not believe the allegations of sexual harm.  She said the foster carer also said bad reports about A and that the foster carer had made up the allegations of sexual harm to get her own way.  PGM said she wanted photographs to prove sexual harm.  
63.	When seen by the independent social worker, Mr Mann, in July 2015, she told him, as set out at E78:
“Asked about her understanding of A’s reported behaviour, PGM stated that she understood he had been putting his hands on different parts of B’s body.  “Why would they say that?  It is difficult for each child not to go into the other’s room.”  She stated that she understood the foster carer would watch the children at night and had observed A touching B.  She reiterated that A may be scared and want to sleep with his sister.  ‘Why make this into a big problem?  They are saying A done this and that.  They make a big problem about sexuality and separating the children, which I do not want.  Who can they play with?’  PGM stated that the day these concerns had emerged, A had been distressed and had informed her that he was living by himself, which made her cry, and he was also crying as he can’t be with B.  ‘It is his sister.  They are looking for problems.  A big problem has been made.  It is not sexual.’”
64.	She said to the independent social worker that she was pretty certain that the children had not been physically or sexually abused as they seem to have been well looked after.  She stated that there were no signs of physical abuse and she was confident that the church in the Congo had clothed and protected A in their care, adding that she could tell they had been well looked after prior to their arrival in the UK.  This account begs the question as to how she knew that the church had protected A or that A had been in the care of the church.  PGM stated that the foster carer and the social worker had started problems regarding sexualised behaviour in order to separate the children.  She said, “They are looking for big problems, such as sexuality, to separate the children for the long-term.”  PU recognised the likely possibility of the children experiencing trauma in the Congo when speaking to Mr Mann, but did not believe the children had been sexually abused at the time of the assessment.  I recognise that because the courts and social services have experienced, sadly, far too much experience of children being sexually abused, it does not have the same shocking effect for them as it does upon family members and it is more accepted by the courts to occur than family members to whom it is a very alien concept.
65.	Mr Mann concluded in respect of PGM’s ability to meet the children’s emotional needs:
“However, PGM currently does not understand or fully accept child protection concerns.  There is a high degree of denial or minimisation of the concerns and limited insight into potential harm and its impact on the children.  The children’s attachment to PGM is very limited given there has been no direct contact between her and the children prior to their arrival in the UK.  Family dynamics remain complex.  Currently, there also appears to be significant issues in respect of PGM’s understanding of the children’s emotional needs.  She is not able to articulate her understanding or ability to respond sensitively and with empathy to the children’s transition and any experience of trauma or how she would manage their emotions.  The children’s attachments appear to have been severely disrupted, but PGM is not able to articulate any clear strategies in dealing with potentially challenging behaviour displayed by the children either now or in the future.  It is unclear how she has processed her losses in her life and consequently how she would address the children’s experience of loss.  It remains unclear how she would enable the children to express negative emotions or to help draw these needs out or for them to confide in her in a trusting relationship.  There is no evidence of her being willing to think and talk about difficult and painful things and no real curiosity regarding abuse and neglect.  She does not identify any parenting challenges she has experienced or is likely to experience in caring for the children.  She does not identify any safe care arrangements that need to be in place to ensure the children are safe and protected.  There is no sense of her parenting approach adapting to meet the needs of these children.  There remains a resistance to cooperate genuinely and openly with professionals.”
Mr Mann confirmed these views that he had concluded within the assessment when he gave evidence before me.  
66.	Dr Massey set out PGM’s view of the sexualised behaviour as expressed to her during the course of her assessment at E70:
“With regards to the allegations of sexualised behaviours, PGM said that she cannot believe it.  She stated that she was angry that the allegations had been made and was upset that small children had been asked these types of questions.  Her explanation and understanding of these reports were that, in the DRC, the family are likely to all sleep in one bed in one room.  As such, people are rarely alone.  She believes the children will have been frightened to sleep in a bed on their own in a place that they are unfamiliar with and, as such, A has gone into B’s room to seek comfort from her as he has been scared.  She was unable to conceive the idea that he would inappropriately sexually interfere with B and believed that people are looking for problems.  She stated that she did not think A would know anything about sex and, as such, the concept that he would sexually abuse someone was not believable.  She commented that she thought it was not true.”
67.	Over twelve months later in oral evidence, PGM was reluctant to accept that there was a possibility A had been sexually abused.  Her responses when asked were, “I do not know.  I was not there.  I know children say things that are not correct.”  When asked if she accepted that A had touched B in a sexually inappropriate way, she said, “I was not there.  It did not happen in my house.”  She then went on to say it was not explained to her what had happened.  She then said, “I was astonished and after it was explained to me I said possibly it can happen.”  She denied that she has said the foster carer was lying or that she had said the foster carer had made it up to get her own way.  She said she had not said that the foster carer had lied.  Rather, she was asking for proof.  PGM denied that she had told Mr Mann that they were looking for big problems, such as sexuality, to separate the children.  She said she did not say that.  She said the interpreter was a French speaker and “I don’t know if I misunderstood.”  She denied saying “no” or “not true” when it was discussed with her.  She said, “Maybe in my way of being shocked and astonished they were simply writing down no.”  She continued to vacillate about what she was saying and was asked, “What conclusion do you draw from the fact that both A and B are saying that the same thing happened?”  Her response was, “I would say it is true, but I would also insist on saying that this girl always makes wrong allegations about A.”  
68.		In oral evidence, she denied that when Victoria Hewitt talked to her about sexual abuse in 2016 that she just said, “No, no, no, it didn’t happen.”  When Miss Moulder in cross-examination tried to pin PGM down as to what she was saying in her oral evidence, Miss Moulder referred PGM to her most recent statement, which is dated 1st November of 2016, at C321, paragraph 15:
“I know one of the main reasons why the local authority assessment of me was negative was because of my position in failing to accept the allegations of sexual harm against A whilst living in the Democratic Republic of Congo and his behaviour towards B whilst in foster placement together.  I do agree that this is something I have found very challenging.  The information only came to light when the children had been living in foster care for several months.  Sexual abuse of children as young as A and B is not something that I have ever come across before.  I could not take in that the behaviours that were being reported could have anything to do with A having been subject to any abuse of this type.  The assessments, including the independent social work assessments, were completed before the detailed statement of the foster carer was made available to me.  I accept that, having seen this, the behaviours referred to are worrying.  I do still find it difficult to comprehend that children of their age could have been sexually harmed or harmed each other, but understand social services’ reasoning why the children would need to be put in separate placements and the time that they spent together monitored carefully to ensure the children are protected.  I would be willing to work with the local authority around this and accept guidance from them about the way forward.  I accept that I need to learn a lot more about these things and I am prepared to engage and cooperate in such work now.”
69.	Miss Moulder having referred PGM to this statement, asked PGM, “Standing there, do you accept A sexually abused B?”  PGM’s response was, “I was not there.”  Sadly, the professional view, including the view of the guardian and the independent social worker, is that, while PGM undoubtedly loves the children and there are a number of positives in respect of PGM’s potential care of the children, the professional view is that PGM is not in a position on her own or with support to meet the needs of the children.  She has shown over two years an inability to be truthful, to trust or work with professionals.  When support has been offered, she has not accepted it, for example, the English classes, and when offered parenting classes, which might have helped with regard to the emotional needs of these children and how to help these children who had been abused, she was adamant that she had brought up five children and she did not need parenting classes.  She was adamant that the family could work it out and they did not need additional support.  Now, however, she is resolute in her assertion that she was not offered parenting classes.  I find it unlikely that PGM would accept any support from social services or indeed inform the local authority if there were problems.  
70.	The position with regard to PA and PU is very different.  While I find that PA has colluded with her mother and brother in not being honest about how the children came into the country and has effectively towed the party line in giving evidence about the DNA testing, she has kept her distance.  There was a period of time between November and June when she did not attend contact, but it is recognised that she is a single mother with financial responsibilities and constraints and that she lives in London.  Otherwise, she has been committed in respect of these children.  She has also been unrepresented throughout, which must have made it more difficult for her.  However, she did not attempt, in the same way as her mother or brother, to obfuscate or avoid difficult questions.  The assessment of her and her ability to offer a good home to A have been positive.  There is a good relationship between PA and A and between A and W.  It is agreed that she should care for A.  
71.	However, because the local authority have taken this view about PA and A, it does not necessarily render irrelevant the concerns which exist and have been considered in relation to PGM and PU.  Mr McDermott, at paragraph 3.8 of his submissions, sets out:
“The concern of the local authority, of course, with regard to how the children came into the UK is unfairly elevated in the plan for B in view of the fact that the suggestion of complicity is levelled also at PA and perhaps more so, yet the local authority plan is that A is placed in her care.  The court should therefore be slow to attach too great a significance in terms of denying B a placement with PU and Z based on this reason.  It is of note that even the local authority in their evidence are of the view that there may be reasons why, even if the family are implicated in the arrival of the children, such as fear of the persons who have trafficked the children into the country.”
72.	The court has to look at the entirety of the evidence and does not take one piece of evidence either in isolation from others or elevate it importance unless its importance demands such consideration.  In considering PU’s position, the court must carefully weigh the pros and cons of placement of B with him, just as it has done in recommending placement of A with PA.  There are matters in respect of placement of B in the household of PU and Z which pieces of evidence in respect of that placement are not replicated in PA’s household.  One would not expect the households and thus the placements to offer exactly the same positives and negatives and therefore each must be considered separately.  Of course, there are positives and negatives which are relevant across both households.  There are advantages of placement of B with PU as there are of placement of A with PA.  It is a family placement.  
73.		Mr Donnelly on behalf of the guardian sets it out thus:
“The advantages of a family placement are:
(a)	B would be placed within her family and able to maintain relationships with family members, the most important relationship being with her brother, A, and adult family members, PGM, PU, including his partner and children, and PA.  There can be no doubt that B is much loved by A and her adult family members and that their love is reciprocated.
(b)	Such a placement is consistent with B and the family’s article 8 rights and would allow B to maintain a sense of identity, including, importantly, her culture.
(c)	If B were placed with PGM or PU, it would allow on-going contact with other adult family members and A.  The importance of those relationships cannot be underestimated.  
(d)	Such placement is likely to be consistent with B’s wishes and feelings.
(e)	PGM has previously met the basic needs of her children and PU is able to meet the needs of his own children.  As such, both are likely to be able to meet B’s basic needs now and in the future.
	I find that this is a careful exposition of the advantages of a family placement.
74.	On 2nd December 2015, the local authority served positive special guardian reports in respect of PA as carer for A and PU and his partner as carers for B.  The plans were agreed by PGM, but the guardian requested significant further information before she would express agreement to the plan that the local authority proposed. Thereafter the guardian was on extended sick leave for some time.  
75.	On 23rd May 2016, an incident occurred whereby it was alleged that PU hit A during contact.  This has always been denied by PU.  The local authority then changed its care plan to adoption for both children separately.  On 16th July, Vanessa Hewitt took over as the allocated social worker and the plans for the children were, as they must be, reviewed.  Following upon review, the plan for A changed to placement with PA, but the plan for B remained one of adoption.  It is apparent that the local authority have struggled with the appropriate plans to meet the overall welfare of these children.  
76.	Following upon the concerns when A and B were placed together in foster care and Dr Massey’s very clear view that the children needed separate placements, the local authority maintained the plan that the children should be placed separately and they concluded that there was no realistic option for B but adoption.  PU and Z remained clear that they wished to care for B and PGM’s position also remained that she wished to care for the children if for any reason they were not placed in PA or PU’s care.  
77.	In respect of the alleged incident on 23rd May 2016, criminal proceedings were brought and PU was acquitted.  A made no disclosure to the police when they visited and spoke to A some weeks after the event and there has never been any evidence or allegation that PU has used physical violence on his own children or any other child.  I heard evidence from Katie Galloway, who was the contact supervisor.  She made a note of the incident on the day it occurred shortly after it occurred.  She provided a police statement, a Children Act statement and she gave evidence in the criminal trial, as well as in this hearing.  She told this court:
“The session was drawing to an end.  PU said it was time to leave and he went to support A.  A was crying, kicking his legs and waving his arm.  PU asked him to stop.  PU said to A, ‘Stop this now or I will beat you.’  He said it in a raised voice and was very firm.  A continued to kick his legs and wave his arm.  PU repeated the same thing in shouty tones.  A continued and he was smacked.  I was approximately ten feet away.  I was looking.  I was facing the family.  A was to the left side to me.  PU had his back to me.  PU raised his right hand and brought it down on A’s legs.  There was a very loud slapping sound.  A stopped and PU put on his shoes.  A was crying, with his arms crossed against his chest and we left the contact.  B had her back to A and PU, with PGM at the same sort of distance.  PGM had a clear view of the room, but was helping B with her coat.”
78.	Katie Galloway agreed in oral evidence that before 23rd May there had been two incidents when A was very upset about putting on his shoes and that PU had dealt appropriately with A on each occasion.  She agreed that A loved coming to see PU and would jump on him.  She accepted that she had left the room very briefly.  She agreed that she did not see the slap, but heard it and saw PU raise his hand above his shoulder.  She denied that she had misconstrued what she had seen and heard.  She said it was the sound which made it suggest that it was using a lot of force and pushing would not have made that sound.  She was clear in oral evidence in what she saw.  Katie Galloway told the foster carer what she believed she had seen and she contacted her manager from Y’s house.  Her manager told her to ask the foster carer to check when getting A ready for bed if there was any mark.  Katie Galloway accepted in questioning from Mr Todd that PGM possibly had a better view than she did.  PGM states nothing occurred.  Y gave evidence that A told her, ‘It really hurt me, nan,” on the day afterwards.  The foster carer made a note that evening.  Y said that she had begun the conversation saying she was aware something not nice had happened at contact and that she just wanted to see his leg was not hurt.  
79.	A gave an account to Dawn Hodgson, unprompted, on 25th May 2016 when she visited A.  She said:
“I asked who he played football with and he said B.  I asked whether there was a winner and A said that B had won.  I asked A whether he was happy or sad about B winning and he said he was sad.  I asked what he did and he said he was naughty.  I asked what happened next and A said PU smacked him.  I asked A how PU smacked him and A mimicked a smack to the top of his leg.  I asked whether this was a gentle smack and A said, ‘No, a hard smack.’  I asked A whether this hurt and he said, ‘It hurt when it happened, but not now.’  I asked A whether he could show me where he was smacked and he rolled his trouser leg up and showed me the top of his leg.  I could not observe any bruising or marks to that area of his body.  I asked A what he thought of what had happened and he said that PU was naughty for doing that.  I asked about future contacts and whether A wanted to see PU and he confirmed that he did.”
Dawn Hodgson confirmed in her oral evidence before me that this account was an accurate account of her discussion with A.  He demonstrated to Y what had occurred.  PGM was very clear in cross-examination that PU had not hit A.  She told Dawn Hodgson that the incident did not happen and that Miss Galloway was jealous of her family, the implication being that Miss Galloway was telling lies.  
80.	I am satisfied that Katie Galloway was telling the truth.  She was a balanced witness with no reason to lie.  She was clear she was not mistaken and gave reasons why she not mistaken.  She heard the slap.  It is not just the evidence of Katie Galloway, however.  Thereafter, A gave two separate accounts to two different people that his uncle had hit him.  The evidence is he had a good relationship with PU so one must question why he would lie about his uncle.  He said “it hurt,” giving a description of how it felt.  It is more difficult for children to make up descriptions of feelings.  A has not been consistent about which leg was involved, but that does not negate the account that he has given.  PGM, I find, lied about the incident, as she has about other things she has found difficult and I do find, sadly, that so has PU.  It may be that he felt too much was at stake to admit it, not only his position with regard to B, but also his position as pastor in his church.  I take into account that there has been no other reported incident of violence in respect of a child and that he has always appeared to be a loving and caring father and uncle.  
81.	Mr McDermott also raises within his submissions:
“Is one slap on the top of the leg over clothing that excessive in the circumstances of the situation where A was screaming, kicking and refusing to do as he was told?  It would at least have surprised him into compliance.  Again, whilst not condoning it, if it did indeed occur, the point must be made that PU really had nothing to gain by denying it.”  
I have already dealt with the latter point.
82.	At paragraph (p) within the submissions, Mr McDermott points out that:
“Somewhat bizarrely, the local authority concerns as regard the incident appear more to relate to PU’s refusal to admit what he has done rather than the seriousness of the actual incident.  Vanessa Hewitt commented that, ‘If he had accepted what he had done, then I would have done some work with him,’ which suggests that the placement plan with PU and Z might not have been abandoned if he had indeed admitted the matter.  Even though PU has not accepted the slap, Gateshead have done some very positive work with him and Z around strategies and boundaries, lending support to them both being able to work with the local authority in the future.”
The concern of the local authority and the court is not the magnitude of the slap in itself, but the evidence of loss of control in respect of fairly ordinary behaviour on the part of a 7-year-old child and the very fact that it occurred during supervised contact when PU would be aware, if he had considered it, that his actions would be reported.  It is also his refusal to admit it so some work could be undertaken.  
83.	There is also the fact that there had been an earlier report wherein loss of control or violence had been alleged.  There had been a report in respect of domestic violence between himself and Z, which both he and Z deny was, as they put it, “a big deal.”  There is also concern about their failure to admit previous social services’ involvement in respect of this incident.  Both give accounts in their statements to the court.  PU recalls that they had a heated argument.  Z tried to throw something at him.  He grabbed her arm to stop her from doing this.  There was some pushing and shoving.  He goes on to say:
“I did not slap or punch her.  I accept she must have caught her face somewhere somehow because she did have a mark, but not as a result of slapping or punching.  The argument was very out of the ordinary.”  
PU says they were visited by a social worker from Gateshead who spoke to them and gave them a leaflet and the incident was taken no further.  He said it was not disclosed to South Tyneside local authority because he did not realise that it was classed as social services’ involvement.  
84.	Z’s account is set out at 326 within the bundle.  She states:
“I cannot remember much about this incident, but I remember that, when I was pregnant with U, PU and I had an argument.  I do not remember what the argument was about, but I do remember that it escalated and it was an argument that was out of the ordinary.  PU hardly ever argues but, at the time, I was pregnant and I was moody.  I tried to throw a laptop at PU.  It missed him and there was some pushing and shoving, but there was certainly no punching or slapping.  Shortly after, I noticed red patches in the corner of my eyes.  I had one on each side.  
A few days after the argument, I had an appointment with the GP.  This was for a general check-up for my pregnancy.  The GP asked how I was getting on and asked if I was feeling well in myself.  I said I was, but that I was a little bit down because PU and I had had an argument and we do not usually argue.  I also said that I had the red patches on my eye and did not know what they were.  The GP seemed very worried when I started to talk about the argument.  I felt as though she was overreacting a bit because I certainly had not said that PU had been physically violent towards me.  I think she was worried because I was pregnant.  I told the GP that, other than being a bit down about the argument, everything was fine.  She mentioned social services, but I asked her not to make any kind of referral as it was not necessary.  The GP told me that she would not take it any further.”
85.	The records kept by Gateshead Social Services include reference to their involvement.  It is set out that:
“Within the parenting capacity child in need assessment, I asked about the most recent injury.  She reported that she was slapped across the face by PU during an argument.  I advised her that the referral stated she had been punched in the face.  Z reports that this is not the case.  My concern is that PU did however physically hit Z.  I asked if she had any injuries following this and she said no.  I queried then why she went to the GP to seek medical advice.  Z advised that her eyes were red, bloodshot.  Z reported that since this incident and PGM’s intervention that there had been no further concerns.  I asked Z why she thought the incident had occurred.  She stated they had been bickering constantly over minor issues.”
86.	The safeguarding referral sets out the concern of the GP:
“At the time of booking with the midwife, 28th February of ‘14, she did not disclose any history of domestic violence.  However, she went to see her GP, T at Surgery A to ask for her eyes to be checked after being punched in the face from PU on 18th March 2014.  She disclosed to the GP that this was the second time that PU had assaulted her in the past month.  She denied any previous domestic violence and wasn’t keen for the GP to refer into social services following this assault.  Z hasn’t been answering her telephone to go back to see T to discuss further.  Her midwife, S, has also been unable to get in contact by telephone and left a voice message asking her to get in touch.  As yet, Z hasn’t responded.  This was followed up by an unsuccessful home visit.  A letter has been sent to Z advising her of the need to refer in due to the threat of domestic violence to both herself and her unborn baby.”
87.	In oral evidence, PU maintained that, for him, one visit from social services was not involvement and the records were incorrect.  Z in her oral evidence described her relationship with PU as very loving and peaceful, with only occasional disagreement over little things as normal couples would.  She maintains that she did not tell the doctor that she had been punched in the face on either one or two occasions.  However, the general practitioner was concerned enough to report the incident that Z had described to her when she attended at the GP’s to social services.  The GP recorded that she was told it had happened on two occasions and that Z had said she had attended because she had been punched in the face, her eyes were bloodshot and she wanted them checked.  
88.	It is highly unlikely that the GP completely misunderstood what was being said to her or that she referred to social services a description of an incident which did not give rise to concern.  I am satisfied on the evidence before me, including the oral evidence of both PU and Z, that there was domestic violence perpetrated by PU.  Z came across in oral evidence as reluctant to admit that the account given by PU that a mark was caused to her face during the argument was in fact correct.  She said that the mark was not caused in the altercation, but appeared for an unknown reason and she wanted her eyes checked by the doctor.  There are two separate records held by social services which I accept will refer to each other in respect of this matter.  I have not heard from the authors of these records, but they are consistent and when taken with the account given by Z in oral evidence that she struggled to remember the incident and that it was no big thing, despite it being on her account a very unusual occurrence between them and noting the differences in account between PU and Z, I am satisfied that on the balance of probability on all the evidence before me that it was a significant incident of domestic violence.  Both PU and Z knew it was relevant, but sought initially to hide it and subsequently downplay it.  This finding raises concerns not just about the veracity of PU and Z, but also about the capacity of PU to resort to violence in situations when he is angry or frustrated.
89.	The guardian had concerns about the placement of B within the household of PU and Z on a number of levels and it was not just the domestic violence which the local authority knew about at the time that they proposed placement of B with PU and Z, but there then followed the allegation of physical assault on A, which PU has continued to deny.  The guardian’s additional concern was and is that B’s needs would be lost within the busy household with two very young children in addition to B.  At the time of the positive assessment, the local authority were unaware that Z was expecting another baby.  
90.	The local authority view both children and particularly B as requiring an enhanced level of parenting.  Miss Moulder sets out the evidence to support this within her submissions:
“(a)	The disrupted early lives experienced by both children.  There is no mention by the family of care by their respective mothers, who apparently left the family when each child was born.  By 2012 and ’13, when PA went to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the children were being cared for together by their respective fathers and sometime after September 2013, B’s father left the country, thus depriving B of her main caregiver or one of her main caregivers.
(b)	In 2014, probably towards the end of 2014, the children were uprooted from everything and everyone they knew, brought by strangers to the UK and handed over to a virtual stranger, a person they knew only by telephone and Skype conversations.  A was aged 4 and B 3.  
(c)	Their presentation on arrival in the UK was of frightened, anxious children who found it hard to settle.  The children are not able to make any sense of their history in the circumstances in which they came to live in the UK.  Those adults who are able to fill in some of the gaps decline to do so.
(d)	A was sexually abused in the Democratic Republic of Congo and is likely to have sexually abused B when they were both living in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
(e)	A has sexually abused B whilst living in the UK in circumstances where he is likely to have known it was wrong.
(f)	A’s behaviours are such that the only inference which can be made is that he has experienced incidents of serious violence and trauma.  He was violent and abusive towards B and dominated her.  A’s violent and aggressive behaviours were repeated at school.  Moreover, A has recounted to his present foster carer, Y, very worrying incidents which he has witnessed and the court will recall that Y confirmed the accuracy of this account.  She also recalled A’s demeanour at the time when he told her.  ‘He was frightened when he told me.  He had a frightened expression, like he was recounting something he would rather not recount.’
(g)	If B always lived with A, it is reasonable to infer that she too witnessed or experienced incidents of serious violence and trauma which she has yet to disclose.  Concern has been expressed by a number of professionals that B was exceptionally quiet and compliant when she was placed with A and her previous foster carer comments that she appeared happier and more relaxed when she and A were separated.  It is correct that her present behaviour is causing some concern.
(h)	Finally, the court is referred to the views of the professionals involved with the children as to their individual needs for enhanced levels of parenting.  Dawn Hodgson, Vanessa Hewitt, Dr Massey and the children’s guardian all express this view and expressed this view when they gave their oral evidence to the court.”
I am satisfied that those matters set out by Miss Moulder were evidenced in the statements and oral evidence before me and that these children do need an enhanced level of parenting.  PA has demonstrated that she is able to understand the necessity for this.  
91.	The realistic options for B at her age are a family placement or adoption.  There are advantages of a family placement, to which I have already referred, and those advantages should not be dismissed.  PU and his wife have shown they are capable of meeting the needs of their own children and have shown commitment by way of attendance at contact in respect of B.  They have to some extent cooperated with the local authority and have shown some insight into B’s particular needs and are willing to consider that she has probably been sexually abused by A.  The very real benefit of them being able to meet B’s cultural, religious and identity needs are a significant advantage.  However, such advantage does not override other welfare and safeguarding issues.  It must be considered alongside the child’s other physical and emotional needs.  
92.	The importance of tradition and culture must be taken into account and a child has the right to enjoy their own culture and practice their own religion and language.  This is recognised.  It is profoundly disappointing that A and B did not receive more opportunity to maintain their language.  The balance will be restored for A.  It is unlikely, unless placed in the family, that it will be for B.  It will represent a significant loss to her, which I do not ignore.  
93.	There are disadvantages of placement of B with PU or in a family placement.  By reason of the acceptance of the threshold, the family accept B’s needs were not met adequately prior to the children’s removal.  B has particular vulnerabilities and needs as a result of her childhood experiences.  She requires, as I have just referred to, an enhanced level of parenting.  In recent months, she has demonstrated extreme behaviours within the home, which her professional carers have found difficult to manage.  A’s behaviour to B has been abusive, both sexually and physically, and B is likely to require therapeutic intervention in the future.  If placed with PU, B will be the oldest child in a sibling group of three, the other children being aged 2 years and 2 months.  As such, B’s particular needs are likely to be overlooked.  
94.	PGM and PU have been lacking in openness and honesty.  In relation to PU, this appears to extend to his account to the professionals in respect of the domestic abuse within his relationship and includes the recent incidents of violence to A in contact on 23rd May 2016.  PU’s lack of candour in this regard represents a risk to B which cannot be managed.  Furthermore, PU appears resentful of professional interference in his and his family’s life.  The court cannot be satisfied that PU will cooperate with professionals now and in the foreseeable future.  I accept that these submissions made by Mr Donnelly are accurate upon the evidence which I have heard and, particularly, I am concerned that the dynamic between PU and PGM is such that neither appears to understand or accept the need for boundaries or restrictions in relation to PGM’s involvement with the children.  Throughout his oral evidence, PU sought to deflect, defend, justify or minimise his mother’s stance.  
95.	The alternative of adoption also brings with it advantages and disadvantages and such advantages and disadvantages must be very carefully considered.  In relation to the advantages, prospective adopters will have undergone rigorous and comprehensive assessment before they are approved to care for a child.  It is reasonable therefore to assume that they will provide a high standard of parenting.  The child will have been matched specifically with them and they will be approved as being able to meet the child’s particular needs.  In all probability, they will protect the child from physical and emotional harm and be able to provide them with a secure and stable childhood.  The child will have a permanent home and be part of a permanent family.  It is an order which is made for the future and for all time.  
96.	There are, however, significant disadvantages.  If B is adopted, she will lose her relationship with her adult family members and A.  The likelihood in relation to considering and finding an adoptive placement for B is made even greater when considering the additional needs of B and the wish to identify an appropriate cultural match.  The court accepts that it will not be easy for the local authority to identify an adoptive placement, although the evidence I have heard from the local authority would indicate that they are optimistic that they will be able to do so, but it is unlikely that it will be a cultural match for B.  Given the considerable needs and experiences of B, there is a greater risk of adoption breakdown and adoption can never be viewed as a panacea and isolated from the ordinary life experiences that are encountered by other parents in caring for children, but with the added complication that B would not be their birth child.  
97.	B’s welfare throughout her life is my paramount concern.  B’s particular needs are significant given her experiences to date.  She has additional needs in that she has been uprooted from her country, she has been sexually and in all likelihood physically abused and is likely to require therapeutic intervention in the future.  She has now started to demonstrate extreme behaviour within the home, which the foster carers, experienced foster carers, have found difficult to manage.  She needs a safe, stable and nurturing environment and the delay in these proceedings has not assisted her.  She also needs to have an honest narrative as to her identity, history and background.  
98.	If she is adopted, she will cease to be a member of her birth family, which it is recognised will cause emotional difficulty for B, but it is likely that she will be protected from any harm which may arise from the circumstances within her birth family.  B’s needs have thus far not been met and she suffered significant harm prior to her removal into foster care.  PGM is unlikely to be able to meet her emotional needs now or in the future.  She does not demonstrate any insight into the emotional needs of the children or how their experiences have impacted upon both children.  The situation is exacerbated by PGM’s resistance to professional support and involvement and her inability to be open and honest.  She has been very clear in her evidence that she believes B has lied to gain attention.  She intends to question the children to establish what has happened to them.  I am satisfied that PGM cannot meet their needs.  
99.	Sadly, I also have to find that B’s emotional needs are unlikely to be met by placement with PU and Z.  PU does demonstrate some insight into the emotional needs of the children and it seems the local authority, as I have mentioned, have struggled with the recommendations which they make to the court in respect of the placement of B with PU.  There has been a special guardianship report prepared which concluded that PU could meet B’s needs at a time when the domestic violence was known about and it is accepted that there has been no evidence of any repetition.  However, the court cannot disregard the continued untruthfulness and minimisation displayed by both PU and Z.  The incident on 23rd May does mean that there is a risk of physical harm to B.  It does represent a single incident of physical chastisement, but seen in the circumstances of supervised contact and the continuing denial and attempting to shift the blame by wrongly accusing Katie Galloway, the local authority were required to reconsider all issues.  The problem with this incident is that, even if it is just a one off in an overall background of positive contact, it does demonstrate that PU is a person who is capable of losing control and resorting to violence without warning, which I am satisfied occurred with his relationship with Z.  It is likely parenting of B will be demanding and there is no indication that PU will be likely to seek assistance.  He has been quick to blame professionals and there must be doubt set against the attitude he has displayed in respect of professional involvement that he will accept or disclose to the professionals any difficulties that he may have in parenting B.  
100.	The lack of openness and honesty in respect of both PGM and PU represents a risk that is difficult to manage, particularly bearing in mind their reluctance to engage or be truthful with social services and professionals.  PU minimised the failings within the family and downplayed or dismissed the problems the children had experienced.  Both PGM and PU appeared unwilling to accept the quality or appropriateness of the care the children have received in foster care, suggesting that the foster carer had contributed to the difficulties in the children’s presentation and that things had been made up.  PU has not demonstrated that he is prepared to put any distance between his own family and PGM and he seemed not to recognise the need to restrict PGM’s involvement with B in any way.  He seemed unable to say or do anything that may represent disloyalty to his mother and a disability and disinclination to control her actions in any way.  PGM made it clear that her intention was to be fully involved with her grandchildren and, consequently, the arrangements for B if she resided in PU’s household.  It seems PGM continues to be a powerful influence in his life and while one respects his loyalty to his mother, in the circumstances we are considering it is unhelpful and raises concern.  On the other hand, PA, not least because of the distance, seemed to be more willing to consider placing some boundaries and distance in respect of PGM.  
101.	PU maintained his stance that, if B could not be placed with him and Z, she ought to be placed with paternal grandmother and, despite having been present throughout the evidence, he was clear that B would be safe with PGM and her needs would be met.  Whilst I do not doubt the genuine concern and genuine desire to provide a good home for B and the undoubted love that PU can offer, I find they would be unable to provide the emotional care B requires and the harm that B has already suffered would not be adequately addressed if she was placed in the care of either PGM or PU.  Thus, the only realistic placement which will meet B’s needs is an adoptive placement.  
102.	It is unlikely that adoption will meet all of B’s needs, but her emotional needs are so great that, even if her cultural needs may not be fully met, her future welfare requires parenting whereby the harm that she has suffered is recognised and professional assistance sought and accepted when necessary.  B requires enhanced parenting where her needs are not overlooked or lost within a busy family.  Without acknowledgement of such needs and cooperation with professionals, B will not be able to achieve her potential and overcome the significant harm which she has sustained thus far in her short life.  
103.	I am satisfied that the threshold as set out by the local authority has been met and I make the findings which the local authority seek.  I am satisfied that the local authority care plans for both children are realistic and are the only plans which will meet each of these children’s overall needs.  Therefore, I approve the local authority care plans and will deal with the placement application.  
THE 	JUDGE:  If the advocates wish me to do so, it may well be that they would welcome a break before I deal with the placement application.  I am happy to go along with however the advocates wish me to deal with this matter.  
MR	McDERMOTT:  Your honour, I will have an application as regards the court’s decision on the care application, but I think it is obvious bearing in mind your honour has made effectively the care order sought by the local authority that the placement order and dispensing with the parental consent has to follow.  I was not expecting your honour to be dealing with that matter in any great length so from my point of view I invite the court to deal with matters now in completion.
MR	TODD:  The same position.
MISS	MOULDER: Your honour, I just mention one matter briefly, which has been mentioned in submissions.  If you make the placement order in respect of B, as clearly you are going to do, will you make the direction under the Family Proceedings Rules as to B’s probable date and place of birth?
THE 	JUDGE:   Yes.
MISS MOULDER:  Thank you very much.
THE 	JUDGE:   Yes.
104.	The local authority seek a placement order in respect of B.  It follows from the judgment which I have just given that I have considered B’s welfare throughout her life as required by the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the provisions of which I must have in mind and follow in considering whether or not to make a placement order.  There has been no consent for obvious reasons and I have dealt with the court’s approach within the body of the care judgment.  I am satisfied that B’s welfare requires that consent is dispensed with, but I am also satisfied that her parents cannot be found to give that consent.  
105.	I have considered very carefully the needs of B, physical and emotional, and I have considered that it is likely that B, if asked, would say she would like to be within her family.  It is of course a significant loss to her that she ceases to be a member of her birth family even though her position within her birth family may not be completely clear.  It is appropriate to regard PGM, PA and PU as her birth family and I have regard to the loss which she will sustain.  
106.	I have articulated at length the reasons for approval of the plans of the local authority within the care judgment and the same findings and arguments and considerations apply within the placement application.  I am satisfied that the only realistic option, having considered all the options which are available, is to make a placement order and that in B’s case, recognising it as a last resort, I am satisfied that nothing else will meet her welfare.  I therefore make the placement order and the direction that Miss Moulder seeks under the Family Law Rules.
THE 	JUDGE:   Now, are there any matters within the judgment which need clarification or any submissions that I have made factual errors within the judgment which I have just given?  All right, well, in those circumstances, are there any other applications which any of the advocates would seek to make?
MR	McDERMOTT:  Your honour, with the greatest of respect to the court’s decision, I would seek permission to appeal on behalf of PU.  The thrust of that position is notwithstanding your honour’s findings that the plan of adoption is disproportionate against the benefits of a placement with him.  I fully accept that your honour has dealt with those issues in the judgment and would not propose expanding on that application at the present time.
107.	Mr McDermott, on behalf of PU, seeks permission to appeal.  This court can only give permission to appeal if there are real prospects of success or some other compelling reason why permission should be given.  Mr McDermott cites the basic proposition that the plan of adoption in this case is disproportionate in light of the facts that the court has considered and the findings which the court has made.  
108.	I have during the course of the judgment weighed up the alternative realistic options and for the reasons set out have found adoption to be the only option to meet B’s needs.  While it is recognised that this is distressing to the family, it is not disproportionate and in those circumstances it is difficult to see that there is a real prospect of success or any other compelling reason.  In those circumstances, I refuse permission to appeal, but no doubt Mr McDermott will consider on PU’s behalf any further applications which can be made.
[Judgment ends]