THE HIGH COURT
									1995 No. 2899p
BETWEEN
DAVID EWINS
									PLAINTIFF
AND
CARLTON U.K. TELEVISION LIMITED AND
ULSTER TELEVISION PLC.
									DEFENDANTS

AND
									1995 No. 6175p

MICHAEL COLLINS
									PLAINTIFF
AND
CARLTON TELEVISION LIMITED AND
ULSTER TELEVISION PLC.
									DEFENDANTS

AND
									1995 No. 2935p

CIARAN McBRIDE
									PLAINTIFF
AND
CARLTON TELEVISION PLC.
									DEFENDANT

Judgment delivered the 3rd day of March, 1997 by Mr. Justice Barr.
	The actions named in the title hereof are similar and the same preliminary issue is raised by the defendants in the each of them.  Conditional appearances challenging the jurisdiction of this court have been entered by the defendants to the plenary summonses in all of the actions.
	The first defendant (Carlton) is a limited liability company established under the laws of the United Kingdom and its registered office is in London.  It carries on, inter alia, the business of making, producing, publishing and broadcasting television documentaries.  The second defendant (Ulster Television) is a limited liability company established under the laws of the United Kingdom having its registered office in Belfast.  It carries on, inter alia, the business of television broadcasting.  Both defendants are members of the Independent Television Network of Companies (I.T.N.) which publish and broadcast television programmes for the benefit of viewers in the United Kingdom and in this jurisdiction.
	In each of the actions the respective plaintiffs claim damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, for libel arising out of a television documentary entitled "Confessions" made and published by Carlton and disseminated to the public by I.T.N., including Carlton and Ulster Television, on 18th April, 1995.  The subject matter of the television broadcast was a purported account by Eamonn Collins of his activities and experiences as a member of the Provisional I.R.A., an unlawful organisation within the meaning of Part 3 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, and it contained matters allegedly defamatory of the plaintiffs.
	Having entered conditional appearances in each action, the defendants have sought, inter alia, the following relief by notices of motion:-

1.	An order setting aside service of the proceedings.
2.	An order declining jurisdiction.
3.	An order striking out the plaintiff's proceedings for want of jurisdiction.
4.	An order staying the plaintiff's proceedings.
5.	An order providing for directions.

In the grounding affidavit in each case, Michael Kealey, the defendants' solicitor, has set out the basis for the relief sought by the defendants as follows:-

	"12.	I say that the plaintiff in these proceedings purports to claim damages on a world-wide basis in the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.  
	13.	I say and believe and am advised that the special jurisdiction provisions of Article 5(3) of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1968 does not permit a plaintiff, in the circumstances of this case, to maintain a world-wide claim for damages before this Honourable Court.
	14.	I say and believe that the courts of the United Kingdom are the appropriate forum for the claim made by the plaintiff against the defendants in the proceedings herein.
	15.	I say and believe and am advised that the plaintiff herein may, pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention maintain an action for damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, before the courts of the United Kingdom.
	16.	I say and believe that were the plaintiff to institute proceedings before the courts of the United Kingdom, then a claim for damages for libel in respect of the plaintiff's world-wide reputation may properly be made.
	17.	I say and believe that this Honourable Court may properly consider exercising its discretion to stay the proceedings herein by reason of, inter alia, the facts following, namely:-

		(a)	proceedings before the courts of the United Kingdom would avoid a multiplicity of proceedings in relation to the claim made by the Plaintiff in the proceedings herein;
		(b)	the defendants to the proceedings herein are domiciled in the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom;
		(c)	the actions and/or conduct, which are denied, said to constitute the basis of the claim made by the plaintiff herein occurred within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom;
		(d)	the plaintiff herein would suffer no injustice by reason of this Honourable Court exercising its jurisdiction to stay the proceedings herein....."

	The Convention of 1968, the Brussels Convention, is part of Irish domestic law on foot of the Jurisdiction of Courts and Enforcement of Judgments (European Communities) Act, 1988.  The object of the Convention, to which Ireland and the United Kingdom are subscribers, is to provide for the allocation of jurisdictions and the enforcement of judgments in actions which have an inter-state dimension and thus avoid multiplicity of proceedings and the risk of inconsistent judgments in member states.  Provisions therein relevant to the matter under review are as follows:-

	"Article 2
	Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.......

	Article 5
	A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued:......
	3.	in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred;........"

	The fundamental rule of the Convention is that a defendant shall be sued in the courts of his/her domicile.  However, there are a number of exceptions to that precept, including that in Article 5(3).  The essence of the problem raised on these motions is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain their actions against the defendants in this jurisdiction on the ground that the "harmful event" relating to the tort complained of occurred in this State.  The onus is on the plaintiffs to establish that the circumstances of the case bring them within the exception relied upon.
	It is not in dispute that the documentary programme in question was devised, published and broadcast by Carlton.  The range of its broadcasts is confined to mainland Britain, primarily in the greater London area.  However, it also supplies programmes for broadcast by other companies in the United Kingdom which are members of I.T.N..  The documentary "Confessions" was duly supplied by Carlton to Ulster Television which, simultaneously with Carlton, transmitted the programme on its network to viewers in Northern Ireland and in this State.  It was received in the latter jurisdiction in one of three ways:-

(i)	by unavoidable spillage of signal in border areas;
(ii)	by extension in other areas by deliberate tuning of aerials to intercept signals broadcast in Northern Ireland or Wales; and
(iii)	by lawful distribution by cable companies and deflector systems.

	The number of viewers in this jurisdiction who watched the programme is estimated by Radio Telefis Eireann to have been 111,000 as calculated by its television measurement system.  Ulster Television also derive advertising revenue from this State.  It is reasonable to assume that the prices charged for such advertising are based upon the total extent of I.T.N. viewing in this jurisdiction whether transmissions are received through regular authorised sources or otherwise.  It follows that Ulster Television, as a constituent part of I.T.N., has an interest in broadcasting to as many people as possible in this State whether "official" or "unofficial" viewers.
	The European Court of Justice considered the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Convention in the context of an alleged newspaper libel in Shevill and Others -v- Presse Alliance S.A., [1995] All E.R. E.C. 289.  The facts were that the first plaintiff, a United Kingdom national resident in Yorkshire, complained that she had been libelled in an article in the newspaper "France-Soir" which was published by the defendant company.  It is mainly distributed in France where sales amount to more than 237,000 copies daily and only 230 copies were sold in England at the time of publication.  It was argued on behalf of the defendant that under Article 2 of the Convention, the French courts had jurisdiction in the dispute and that the English courts did not have jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of the Convention since the "place where the harmful event occurred" within the meaning of that provision was in France and no harmful event had occurred in England.  The House of Lords referred the case to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on questions relating to the proper interpretation of Article 5(3).  It was held by the latter Court that:

	"1. 	On a proper construction of the expression 'place where the harmful event occurred' in Article 5(3) of the Convention.......... the victim of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States may bring an action for damages against the publisher either before the courts of the Contracting State of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which have jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused by the defamation, or before the courts of each Contracting State in which the publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the State of the court seised.
	2.	The criteria for assessing whether the event in question is harmful and the evidence required of the existence and extent of the harm alleged by the victim of the defamation are not governed by the Convention but by the substantive law determined by the national conflict of laws rules of the court seised, provided that the effectiveness of the Convention is not thereby impaired."

	The same problem in the context of television broadcasting was considered by Carswell L.J. (as he then was) in Turkington and Others practising as McCartan Turkington Breen -v- Baron St. Oswald and British Broadcasting Corporation, [6th May, 1996] unreported.  The facts were that the plaintiffs are a firm of solicitors who carry on practice in Belfast.  They acted on behalf of Private Lee Clegg who was prosecuted for murder in Belfast Crown Court and they also acted for him in his unsuccessful appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal.  Lord St. Oswald was chairman of a committee formed to press for the release of Private Clegg.  A press conference was held at Lord St. Oswald's home in Yorkshire at which reporters, including television reporters, were present at his invitation.  It was alleged by the plaintiffs in their statement of claim that in the course of the press conference he made an observation about the conduct of the defence of Private Clegg which was defamatory of the plaintiffs' firm.  Lord St. Oswald's remarks were recorded at the time and were broadcast in a television programme by the B.B.C..  Other words were spoken in course of the programme which the plaintiffs claim were also defamatory of them.  It was pleaded in the statement of claim that the programme was received by television viewers throughout the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland and that the words complained of constitute the tort of defamation under the laws of England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  A writ of summons claiming damages for libel was served on the first defendant together with a statement of claim.  Solicitors acting for him entered a conditional appearance and brought an application seeking an order that the court should set aside the service of the writ of summons upon the first defendant.  The Master found in favour of Lord St. Oswald and the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court by notice of motion.  The judgment of Carswell L.J. contains the following passage:-

	"The case was put forward on behalf of the first defendant in this court on the ground that he is domiciled in England and the exception in Article 5(3) does not apply, since the 'harmful event' was his speaking the words in Yorkshire.  It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs, on the other hand, that Lord St. Oswald committed two torts, that of slander, when he spoke the words to the reporters in England, and that of libel, when the words were published in Northern Ireland and other jurisdictions.  Mr. Lavery for the plaintiffs pointed to the rule of domestic law that the tort of liable is committed on every occasion when and in every place where the words are published: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 8th Ed., para. 261.  Under the rule in Speight -v- Gospay, [1891] 60 L.J.Q.B. 231, the original publisher of a defamatory statement is liable for its republication by another person where, inter alia, the repetition or republication of the words to a third person was the natural and probable result of the original publication: Gatley, ob cit, paras. 266 et seq..  Mr. Lavery submitted that the obvious object of holding a press conference was to obtain publicity for the statement made by Lord St. Oswald and that accordingly this condition was satisfied.

	In my opinion the plaintiffs have established a prima facie case against the first defendant in their claim for libel, on the basis that the republication of the words by the B.B.C. in Northern Ireland was the natural and probable result of their original publication at the press conference at Nostell Priory [in Yorkshire].  The object of a press conference is to obtain publicity for what the holder wishes to say, and he would ordinarily expect, and probably hope, that his statements would be given publicity, and the wider the better.  The plaintiffs have only to establish a prima facie or arguable case for the purposes of resisting the present application, and it is not necessary for them to go further or for me to express a more definitive opinion.

	If the matter were governed solely by domestic law, accordingly, the plaintiffs would be on solid ground in contending that the tort of libel was committed by the first defendant in Northern Ireland when the words were published there, and that the harmful event occurred in this jurisdiction.  Mr. Deeny for the first defendant submitted, however, that the court should not judge the matter by reference to domestic law, but should apply the principles to be derived from Community law, as the majority of the Court of Appeal held in Kleinwort Benson Limited -v- Glasgow City Council, [1996] 2 All E.R. 257.  He pointed to the principle laid down by the European Court of Justice in Shevill -v- Presse Alliance S.A., (Case C - 68/93) [1995] 2 A.C. 18, that where a libel has been published in several contracting states the plaintiff has a choice: he can bring an action for damages in the courts of the contracting state of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which have jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused by the defamation; or he can bring proceedings before the courts of each contracting state in which the publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the state of the court seised.
	
	It is not necessary for me in this application to decide whether the principle laid down in Shevill -v- Presse Alliance S.A. applies in actions brought in one part of the United Kingdom in which damages are claimed for a defamatory statement published in two or more parts of the United Kingdom.  If the principle does apply, it does not in my view conclude the matter in favour of the first defendant.  The European Court of Justice held in Handelswekerij G.J. Bier B.V. -v- Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., (Case 21/76) [1978] Q.B. 708, that on the proper construction of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention a plaintiff claiming damages for a tort has an option enabling him to sue the defendant before the court where either the damage or the event giving rise to it occurred.  This decision was followed and applied in Shevill -v- Presse Alliance S.A. where it was held, as I have set out, that the plaintiff in a case of defamation could sue the publisher in the country where it was established or in each of the countries in which the publication was distributed.  Mr. Deeny cited Marinari -v- Lloyds Bank plc., (Case C - 364/93) [1995] T.L.R. 524, but I do not consider that it affects the validity of the principle contained in the Bier case.  If one has regard to this principle in determining the construction of Article 5(3)....... the conclusion follows that the exception in Article 5(3) applies and the plaintiffs are entitled to sue the first defendant in respect of the publication of the words in Northern Ireland.  I accordingly hold that the first defendant is not entitled to an order setting aside service of the writ of summons upon him." 

	I adopt the reasoning of Carswell L.J. as expressed in the foregoing passage.  I am satisfied that in terms of a television or radio broadcast there is no distinction between publication and distribution where both happen simultaneously.  In the circumstances of the actions which have given rise to the motions before me, it would be flying in the face of reality to avoid a conclusion that Carlton as a member of the I.T.N. group of broadcasters would be well aware, or ought to have been aware, that any programme provided by it for re-distribution by Ulster Television would be received also by viewers in this State.  The rule in Speight -v- Gospay applies in this jurisdiction as it does in England and Wales, i.e., the original publisher of a defamatory statement is liable for its republication by another person where, inter alia, the repetition or republication of the words to a third person was the natural and probable result of the original publication.  The natural and probable consequence of providing the programme complained of to Ulster Television for re-distribution on its network was that it would reach a significant number of viewers in this jurisdiction and, accordingly, harm (if there was harm) would be done in this State within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention.  It follows that the plaintiffs are, prima facie, entitled to maintain their actions against both defendants in this jurisdiction.
	The next question is whether the court has discretion to stay the plaintiffs' actions on the ground of forum non-conveniens and should do so.  Articles 21 to 23 of the Convention deal with problems arising in connection with actions pending in different Contracting States but they are not relevant to the matter under review.  In the context of the Convention, it appears that if the plaintiffs can establish that they are within the ambit of the exception contained in Article 5(3) to the general rule as to jurisdiction, then the court has no power to refuse jurisdiction on the ground of forum non-conveniens.  However, there is a substantial argument in favour of the proposition that, not withstanding the absence of any specific provision in the Convention or in the enabling Act, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings to prevent injustice, e.g., where there is evidence that a plaintiff is improperly using the proceedings and terms of the Convention to oppress the defendant, or is guilty of unconscionable conduct.  The contra argument is that the motivation of a plaintiff in choosing a particular Contracting State for his action is not a matter which the court has jurisdiction to investigate and that, whatever the motivation of a plaintiff may be, the chosen court cannot refuse jurisdiction in the absence of specific authority in the Convention and is obliged to give effect to its provisions.  I do not have to resolve that issue as the defendants have not advanced evidence to suggest that in electing to sue them in this jurisdiction, the plaintiffs have been guilty of oppression or unconscionable conduct.  Having a choice of jurisdictions, they were entitled to select that which they perceived to be most advantageous for them.  Any consequential disadvantages there may be for the defendants are very far from constituting a denial of justice for them.  
	The remaining issue is that of a possible world-wide claim.  It does not arise in the actions brought by Michael Collins and Ciaran McBride.  They are not claiming damages on a world-wide basis but only compensation for injury done to their credit and reputation within this jurisdiction.  Whether David Ewins is claiming world-wide damages is not presently clear.  However, having regard to the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Shevill -v- Presse Alliance S.A. to which I have already referred, there is no doubt that a world-wide claim for damages may be maintained only in an action for libel brought before the courts of the Contracting State where the publisher is established and that, having elected to sue in this jurisdiction, the plaintiffs' claim for damages is limited to harm done to them in this State on foot of the libel alleged.  David Ewins is not entitled to maintain a claim for damages on a world-wide basis in the present action.