Appeal No.	 EAT/329/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 6 May 1998

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MS B SWITZER
PROFESSOR P D WICKENS OBE

MS F EWANSIHA-ONI	APPELLANT

GAYHURST INFANT SCHOOL	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR E KANDYA
(Legal Representative)
Nnyanei & Co
(Solicitors)
63 Loveridge Road
Kilburn
London
NW6 2DR	

	JUDGE PETER CLARK:	This is an appeal by Ms Ewansiha-Oni against a decision of the Stratford Industrial Tribunal, promulgated with extended reasons on 10th November 1997, dismissing her complaints of both unfair dismissal and unlawful race discrimination against her former employer, Gayhurst Infant School.

	The facts are recounted at length in those extended reasons. In short, the appellant who is black and of Nigerian racial origin, was employed as a teacher at the school from September 1992 until her dismissal on 21st October 1994. Complaints were received from parents about the appellant’s conduct in allegedly smacking children and dragging one child whilst screaming at her, leading to her suspension on disciplinary grounds by a letter dated 28th February 1994. An investigation was carried out, leading to a statement of complaint dated 20th May 1994, in slightly different terms to those in the suspension letter. Disciplinary proceedings were held on 23rd June 1994 before a panel of three school governors. That panel upheld two specific charges, one of dragging a child from the classroom, and a second of striking another child. That was gross misconduct. The appellant was summarily dismissed.

	The appeal came before a different body of school governors. The appeal was dismissed.

	The Industrial Tribunal considered the appellant’s complaint of racial discrimination against the school head teacher and rejected it on the facts. They further concluded that dismissal in all the circumstances was fair. At the Industrial Tribunal the appellant was represented by Mrs Graham of the National Union of Teachers. 

	On 19th December 1997 a Notice of Appeal was lodged by the appellant acting in person in which she simply asserts that the decision of the tribunal was perverse. She indicates that she will be seeking further legal advice. 

	On 12th March 1998 notice of this preliminary hearing was sent to the appellant who replied on 18th March 1998 stating that it was her attention to be present at this hearing. She is not here today, but is represented by Mr Eric Kandya whom she consulted last week. He has put before us what appears to be a letter from a doctor whose signature cannot be made out at the Lower Clapton Group Practice dated 5th May 1998 which reads as follows:

“To whom it may concern,
This is to confirm that the appellant is unwell and cannot attend court tomorrow.”

We have sought to elicit the nature of the appellant’s indisposition, but it is far from clear precisely what it is.

	Mr Kandya tells us that he has not received full instructions in this matter, but he seeks leave to amend the Notice of Appeal and seeks the Chairman’s Notes of Evidence given by the head teacher, Mrs Carr, before the Industrial Tribunal, and has given us a precise time estimate of 2½ hours for the further hearing of this case. He has indicated that his amended Notice of Appeal might raise a point of law. It is likely that the appellant was unfairly dismissed, and likely that there was racial discrimination in this case. He asks us to adjourn this hearing.

	We are not prepared to do so. It seems to us that this Industrial Tribunal took particular care in considering the issues raised after a hearing lasting a number of days between 17th-20th December 1996, 21st and 24th April 1997 and finally 8th September 1997. Having read the decision we can see no grounds for the suggestion that the tribunal has reached any perverse conclusions. The appellant has had sufficient opportunity and time to present grounds of appeal which require consideration by this Appeal Tribunal, but has not done so. In those circumstances, we shall dismiss this appeal.