Appeal No.	EAT/1284/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 11 February 1999

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MRS J M MATTHIAS
MS B SWITZER

MR R A THOMAS	APPELLANT

LONDON GENERAL TRANSPORT SERVICES LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR D IBEKWE
Public Transport (Staff) Consortium
31b Mervan Road
Brixton
London SW2 1DP

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):	This is an Appeal in the case of Thomas v London General Transport Services Ltd.   The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is an arguable point of law in a Notice of Appeal which Mr Thomas wishes to make against the unanimous decision of an Employment Tribunal held at London South on two days in June 1998.

	The Tribunal’s decision was that the Applicant’s Originating Application be dismissed.   He had brought a complaint against his former employers, London General Transport Services Ltd, alleging that he had been unfairly dismissed and that they had broken his contract of employment.

	The critical issue raised in the Notice of Appeal was whether the employer’s guidelines on long term sickness had been incorporated into the contract of employment.   Mr Ibekwe, on the Appellant’s behalf, submitted that paragraph 10 of the conclusions of the Industrial Tribunal, which rejected that suggestion, were wrong in law.   Having looked at the guidelines ourselves, and the context in which they appear, it seems to us manifestly clear that the guidelines were, in fact, instructions by the employer to their senior managers as to how they should interpret a collective agreement which was recorded in a separate document, in writing and which sets out the terms and conditions of employment of employees which are incorporated into their contracts of employment.   The wording of the guidelines themselves indicates that these are steps which the employer requires its managers to take and do not represent the contractual terms themselves.   Accordingly it seems to us that that argument was unsustainable.

	The second ground of appeal was that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in their approach to the way that the employers dealt with the appeal which Mr Thomas made against the original decision to dismiss.   It appears that his appeal was adjourned and was never reconvened.   The Tribunal said this:

“We were concerned that the appeal proceedings were never concluded.   Having been adjourned it should have been brought to a conclusion in some way, instead of being left in abeyance.    This failing however does not, in our view, affect the fairness of the decision to dismiss.   Overall the Respondent acted reasonably in all the circumstances.”

	Whilst we can understand that many Industrial Tribunals would have come to the conclusion that depriving an employee of his contractual right to an appeal hearing might render the dismissal unfair through procedural unfairness we cannot, in this case, say that the conclusion of the Industrial Tribunal was one to which no reasonable Tribunal could arrive, properly directing itself as to the law.   They have addressed the very issue which Mr Ibekwe, on the Appellant’s behalf, has raised.   We think that they were entitled to arrive at the conclusion which they did, although nothing that we say in this judgment should in any way be taken to imply that the appeal process, which is provided for in the contractual documents, is to be treated as other than extremely important.   Again, it does not seem to us that there is any merit in that argument.   This is not an Appeal on a question of law; it is, rather, an Appeal on a question of fact.   Accordingly, we are satisfied that the appeal should be dismissed.