Appeal No.	 EAT/22/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 13 January 1999

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE C SMITH QC
MR P A L PARKER CBE
MR G H WRIGHT MBE

UTILUX (UK) LTD	APPELLANTS

MRS A HENNINGTON	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	NEITHER PRESENT
NOR REPRESENTED	
For the Respondent	NEITHER PRESENT
NOR REPRESENTED	

	JUDGE C SMITH:	This is an interlocutory appeal by a company called Utilux (UK) Ltd who are the Respondents to proceedings brought against them for unfair dismissal by Mrs Anne Hennington.   We have considered the nature of her claim for unfair dismissal, based on her case that it was not a redundancy dismissal but a summary dismissal by way of an unfair dismissal due, apart from anything else, to the lack of any consultation or proper process being followed with regard to any possible redundancy situation.   We have also considered the response to that in the Notice of Appearance by the Respondent, where they claim that they did handle the matter properly and fairly and that it was a redundancy situation properly dealt with by them.   So that is a summary of the issues.

	The decision that was made by the Chairman is set out in his letter to the Appellants, dated 7 January 1999 - obviously as a result of an application that the Appellants had made to him, by their letter of 18 December 1998, for the postponement of the one day hearing which had been fixed for 14 January.   It was dealt with by the Chairman, Mr Mitchell, in this way:

“Your request for postponement is refused.   This case is to take place on one day only.  [That is to say, Thursday 14 January.]   It relates to the redundancy of a supervisor.   It is unlikely that all of the senior management of the company need to attend.   The applicant objects to a postponement.   The 2-3 day visit of a senior director is not a sufficient reason to postpone.”

	That was the way in which the Chairman directed himself and that is the way he exercised his discretion.   We have carefully considered the Notice of Appeal and, in particular, the attached letter amplifying paragraph 6 of the Notice and referring, in particular, to the imminent and important visit of the chairman and/or owner of the company, who is going to visit the UK company over the period Tuesday - that is to say, yesterday - through till Friday, 15 January, and the suggestion that is made is to the effect that all of the executives will have to be present, so it said, particularly on Thursday, 14 January, when there is an all day presentation and discussion on a 3 year plan in Bungay (Bungay being the place in Suffolk from where the company operates).   The submission is made that it is therefore not possible, or practicable, for witnesses who may be required to give evidence at the Industrial Tribunal to be released from that business obligation.   Accordingly it is submitted, since any other dates would be acceptable to the Appellants, that we should review and revoke the decision of the Chairman on this appeal.

	However, in our judgment, that is not the legal position.   It is quite clear that this Employment Appeal Tribunal only has a very narrow jurisdiction:   namely, where there has been an error of law by the Chairman in arriving at the decision that he has made.   With regard to such a matter as this, which is essentially within the province of a Chairman of Tribunals, namely, when Tribunal hearings should be held and the fixing of dates for such hearings, in our judgment it is only if it can be demonstrated that the decision which has been reached is a perverse decision or one where the Chairman has either taken into account an irrelevant factor or failed to take into account a relevant factor by way of Wednesbury  unreasonableness that we can possibly interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Chairman, whatever our own views may be about the matter.

	In our judgment, here, the Chairman, in fact, had ample grounds for concluding that, in all the circumstances, having regard to the issues between the parties and, indeed, for the reasons he himself expressed in the manner that he did, that the application to postpone the hearing should properly be refused.   We can see no error of law in the approach that he took.   We certainly could not in any way characterise his decision as perverse or even wrong in any way and, accordingly, for those reasons, the appeal will be dismissed.