Appeal No.	 EAT/654/00

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 6 June 2000

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J ALTMAN
MR J R CROSBY
SIR GAVIN LAIRD CBE

MR A WILLIAMS-KEY	APPELLANT

(1) ANITE SYSTEMS LTD (2) ANITE SYSTEMS HOLDINGS LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

INTERLOCUTORY

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT	
For the Respondents	MISS K GALLAFENT
(of Counsel)
Messrs Stevens & Bolton
Solicitors
1 The Billings
Walnut Tree Close
Guildford
Surrey
GU1 4YD	

	JUDGE ALTMAN:		 This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of Mr Tickle, the Regional Chairman of the Employment Tribunals in Bristol, notified by letter on 1st June 2000 in which he refused to adjourn the main hearing, listed for 7th, 8th and 9th June 2000, and ordered that interlocutory matters, in particular the application of the appellant for the Notice of Appearance to be struck out, would be heard at the outset of the main hearing.

1.	The brief history of the matter, so far as is relevant to the immediate issues, is that on 20th May 2000, by a letter at page 6 of our bundle, the appellant wrote to the Secretary of the Employment Tribunals at Bristol asking for an interlocutory hearing so that he could apply for the striking out of the Notice of Appearance because he alleges that certain items requested for disclosure were being deliberately withheld by the respondents. He also wished to apply for an order from the Tribunal that he should not have to disclose documents, which he had been asked to disclose. He also asked for confirmation that the full hearing would be postponed for that purpose. Be it said that that letter was written only 18 days before the main hearing was due to take place.

2.	On 23rd May 2000 the Employment Tribunal replied conveying a decision of a Chairman of the Employment Tribunals which stated:

“… that the case would be listed for an Interlocutory Hearing, formal notification will follow shortly. Your application for a postponement will be considered at the hearing.”

3.	It appears that through administrative error that hearing was not listed and the appellant chased up the position on 29th May 2000 and renewed his application for an interlocutory hearing and a postponement.

4.	The response of the respondents to that application was received the following day and the matter was then placed before the Regional Chairman whose decision was communicated, I am told, on 31st May 2000 by telephone to the appellant and confirmed in the letter of 1st June 2000, to which I have referred.

5.	The letter set out the history of the matter and then concluded with these words:

“The Regional Chairman concluded that an Interlocutory hearing and postponement of the full hearing was unnecessary …”

	A number of reasons were then set out.

6.	The complaint of the appellant, essentially, is that, in the words of his skeleton argument:

“… the appellant will be denied unambiguously fair hearing on the interlocutory matters if the full hearing is not confirmed as postponed before the interlocutory matters are considered.”

	He refers to the judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Pinochet case in which he quotes the well-known dictum:

 “that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

	And he says in paragraph 17 of his skeleton argument that he feels that:

“the Tribunal will be under pressure to reach a decision on the interlocutory matters that does not result in a postponement of the full hearing. As a result, their judicial options will be restricted, possibly to the detriment of the appellant. The suspicion could therefore arise that the Tribunal had, consciously or unconsciously, failed to be impartial.”

	The appellant cites matters in relation to an earlier striking out in support of the matter. He suggests that if at the hearing on the question of disclosure at the outset of the main hearing it is realised that these documents are relevant, it will not be practical to adjourn to get them because of the pressure to carry on with the main hearing. He refers to the resulting psychological influences that the tribunal members themselves would be unaware of but that would influence their decision.

7.	We can understand the anxiety of a litigant in person feeling that matters are not being taken at the pace that he would feel comfortable with, but we make the following findings.

8.	We reject the proposition that the Employment Tribunal is not able impartially to assess applications for disclosure of documents simply because there is a full hearing listed to follow on from them. Sometimes, in our experience, cases are adjourned, sometimes adjournments are refused, and the decision as to whether or not to grant an adjournment in relation to disclosure of documents at a main hearing will be based upon the fine balancing of all relevant considerations. There is nothing inherently difficult about that exercise which could give rise to a view that the tribunal was not able to approach the matter impartially. Accordingly, there is no error of law on the face of the decision of the tribunal. 

9.	Were that not the case, there would be a general proposition that it would wrong to take at the beginning of a main hearing any points of procedure relating to the discovery of documents which might lead to the adjournment of that hearing because a tribunal could not fairly deal with it. That sort of proposition is unsustainable. Tribunal are well experienced in dealing with the very sort of matters which they will have to deal with here. We find no error of law.

10.	It seems to us that the Regional Chairman has carefully considered all the relevant issues and has reached a decision upon them, to which he is entitled to come in directing the proper procedures to be taken. 

11.	Accordingly, there being no issue of law arising from that decision, the appeal must be dismissed and the hearing should proceed as directed in the letter of 1st June 2000.

12.	At the conclusion of the hearing Counsel for the respondents asked for the costs of this hearing to be awarded to them. The appellant has not attended today, he has written a letter to the Employment Appeal Tribunal from his home in Bristol, explaining his disability and his difficulty in getting here. We are told that yesterday he was put on notice of this application. Clearly and whilst there is no criticism of the lateness of that notice, bearing in mind the very short time-scale there has been, it appears that the appellant cannot be understood to have had an opportunity of putting forward any arguments as to why he should not pay the costs. We have therefore decided to remit this application for costs to the Employment Tribunal dealing with the hearing on 7th, 8th and 9th June 2000 when it can be dealt with in the light of any submissions and, indeed, possibly in the light of more knowledge as to the important elements to take into account.