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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Winsor v Pattinson [2025] EWCA Civ 344 (26 March 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/344.html
Cite as: [2025] EWCA Civ 344

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Civ 344
Case No: CA-2024-002559

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KINGS BENCH DIVISION
The Hon Mr Justice Linden
KB-2024-000256

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
26/03/2025

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE SINGH
LORD JUSTICE ARNOLD
and
LORD JUSTICE EDIS

____________________

Between:
ROBERT IAN WINSOR
Appellant
- and -

TIMOTHY HULL PATTINSON
Respondent

____________________

The appellant in person, his request to attend by landline having been granted by the court
Harry Samuels (instructed by Paris Smith, Winchester) for the Respondent

Hearing dates : 25 March 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 26 March 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

    Lord Justice Edis :

  1. This is an appeal by Mr. Winsor against an order made by Linden J on 4 November 2024 when he made a suspended committal order against him. At an earlier hearing the judge had found that Mr. Winsor had breached the terms of an injunction made in these proceedings by Steyn J ("the Steyn injunction") in 17 respects set out in the committal application. The trial of these allegations took place on 11 September 2024. The Steyn injunction was granted on 16 February 2024, following a without notice injunction which had been granted on 2 February 2024. The injunction was part of a longer order containing various provisions, including a penal notice and a recital of undertakings given by Mr. Pattison, as claimant in these proceedings. Mr. Winsor appeared before Steyn J in person, on the telephone, on 16 February 2024, at his own request. The order was also served on him personally on 20 February 2024 by a process server, Mr Nicholas Elt. The injunction was clearly binding on him from that date. The earliest of the 17 breaches occurred on 15 March 2024.
  2. The proceedings themselves were issued on 1 February 2024 claiming an injunction to retrain harassment and costs. The particulars on the claim form are in these terms:-
  3. "Particulars of Harassment
    The facts on which the Claimant relies are set out in his witness statement dated 1 February 2024.
    The Claimant is the Defendant's brother-in-law and one of the executors of the Defendant's late mother's estate. The Claimant is a District Judge (Magistrates' Court). The Defendant has harassed the Claimant by sending numerous emails on various dates to recipients including the Claimant, the Claimant's wife and legal representatives, members of the HMCTS board and senior leadership team, the Chief Magistrate's Office (which emails are seen by the Claimant's direct colleagues), other District Judges and High Court Judges, Masters and staff. The emails in question contain, amongst other things, false and defamatory allegations that the Claimant has been involved in fraud, theft, forgery and other dishonest criminal offences and has abused his judicial office."
  4. The injunction granted on 16 February 2024 was in these terms, leaving out parts of the Order which are not material to this appeal. I have removed email addresses from paragraph 2(d) and substituted words to explain something about the email addresses which appear in the Order.
  5. "Injunction
    2. Until further order of the court, the Respondent must not:
    a. Harass the Claimant;
    b. Communicate directly with the Claimant whether by telephone, text message, email or any other means;
    c. Publish, make, repeat or distribute by any means any allegation, statement or suggestion that the Claimant has (in connection with his role as executor of the estate of Ivy Emily Winsor deceased or otherwise) committed fraud or been engaged in money laundering or has committed theft or any other criminal offence or has done anything which would be regarded as misconduct if done by a member of the judiciary;
    d. In particular, sending such allegations by email to the following email addresses or by any other means to the following organisations/persons/categories of person:
    i. [an email address of those at the Chief Magistrate's Office who deploy DJ(MC)s];
    ii.[Another email address at the Chief Magistrate's Office] ;
    iii. The Chief Magistrate or any employee or officer of the Chief Magistrate's Office;
    iv. District Judge Karen Doyle or any other District Judge or Deputy District Judge;
    v.[an official];
    vi.[a correspondence address at the Attorney General's Office];
    vii. Nick Goodwin or any other member of the HMCTS board or senior leadership team [Nick Goodwin in the Chief Executive Officer of HM Courts and Tribunals' Service, "HMCTS"];
    viii.[an email address at the Supreme Court];
    ix. [an email address at the Civil Appeals Office];
    x. Basingstoke Court Office;
    xi. Judicial Conduct Investigations Office;
    xii. West Mercia Police;
    xiii. Any court officer or employee of HMCTS;
    xiv.[the email address of Jesse Norman, a Member of Parliament].
    3. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall prevent the Claimant from instructing legal representatives to act for him or to give him legal advice, and it shall not be a breach of this Order for the Claimant to repeat his allegations of the nature set out in paragraph 5(c) above as part of his instructions to his legal representatives."
  6. The injunction application was supported by a witness statement of Mr. Pattinson, referred to in the Steyn Injunction. It is referred to as being dated 1 February 2024 in the Particulars of Claim and the 31st January 2024 in the Injunction order.
  7. The Grounds for Committal

  8. The 17 breaches set out in a schedule to the committal application issued on 20 May 2024 are as follows:-
  9. "Schedule of breaches
    The Defendant breached paragraph 2 of the injunction of 16 February 2024 in that he:
    1. On 15 March 2024 at 11:36am emailed the Court of Appeal alleging that the Claimant was violating the CPR and Practice Directions by claiming £130,000 from 'a surplus bankruptcy'.
    2. On 27 March 2024 at 11:58pm emailed the Court of Appeal and Jesse Norman MP alleging that the Claimant was unjustly enriching himself from a fraudulent bankruptcy.
    3. On 8 April 2024 at 10:56am emailed the Court of Appeal alleging that the Claimant was unjustly enriching himself, had committed tax fraud, was money laundering, and had profited from the proceeds of crime.
    4. On 9 April 2024 at 2:37pm emailed the Court of Appeal alleging that the Claimant was unjustly enriching himself, and was "aim[ing] to profit by £130,000 Proceeds of Crime".
    5. On 15 April 2024 at 10:42pm emailed the Court of Appeal, Claire Manning, DJ Doyle and Jesse Norman MP alleging that the Claimant was obtaining funds by the use of fraudulent documents, is guilty of procedural impropriety, of ignoring document tampering, and making a "fraudulent submission to court".
    6. On 24 April 2024 at 5:00pm emailed the Court of Appeal, Jesse Norman MP, Claire Manning and DJ Doyle alleging that the Claimant had engaged in money laundering.
    7. On 26 April 2024 at 6:21pm emailed Jesse Norman MP, Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, alleging that the Claimant is part of an "unlawful means conspiracy" and had drafted the deceased's will as "an instrument for the purposes of fraud".
    8. On 29 April 2024 at 12:51am emailed Jesse Norman MP, Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging that the Claimant engaged in money laundering, fraudulent calumny, procedural impropriety, misleading the court, and benefitting from the proceeds of crime.
    9. On 29 April 2024 at 7:40pm emailed Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging that the Claimant misled the court, dealing with the proceeds of crime, profiting from an unlawful means conspiracy, and engaging in money laundering.
    10. On 1 May 2024 at 5:53pm emailed the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging the Claimant has committed tax fraud and engaged in unlawful means conspiracy.
    11. On 1 May 2024 at 9:07pm emailed Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging the Claimant has engaged in money laundering, fraud, unlawful means conspiracy, and document tampering.
    12. On 2 May 2024 at 2:21am emailed Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging the Claimant has benefitted from the proceeds of crime and 'cheat[ed] the system'.
    13. On 8 May 2024 at 4:42pm emailed the EHRC, the EASS and Jesse Norman MP alleging that the Claimant has interfered with the administration of justice, committed fraud, fraudulently created the will of the deceased, and participated in a conspiracy.
    14. On 11 May 2024 at 10:55am emailed the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging that the Claimant has participated in an unlawful means conspiracy.
    15. On 12 May 2024 at 3:53pm emailed the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, DJ Doyle, the DDJ Deployment email address and the EHRC alleging that the Claimant 'concealed' estate funds amounting to an allegation of money laundering.
    16. On 13 May 2024 at 2:30pm emailed the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the EHRC, DJ Doyle, and the DDJ Deployment address, alleging the Claimant has engaged in laundering the proceeds of crime, theft and fraud.
    17. On 14 May 2024 at 11:49am emailed the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the EHRC, DJ Doyle, the DDJ Deployment address and Nick Goodwin, alleging the Claimant has committed fraud, money laundering, and contempt of court.
  10. It will be apparent that each of the allegations relates to a timed and dated email, sent by Mr. Winsor. There was little scope, therefore, for any dispute as to whether Mr. Winsor had breached the terms of the Steyn Injunction.
  11. Linden J in his judgment on "liability" on 11 September 2024 described what happened after the committal application was issued:-
  12. "In a judgment which was handed down on 24 July 2024 Mr Adrian Eardley KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, has since granted the claimant's application for summary judgment on the claim, holding that the defendant persistently breached the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 by the publication of baseless allegations about the claimant to third parties. Mr Eardley made a final injunction order in substantially the same terms as the Steyn J injunction. His reasons for doing so are to be found at [2024] EWHC 1910 (KB) ("the Eardley judgment")."
  13. Mr Eardley found that the defendant's communications were targeted at the claimant and that generally they were copied to the claimant's solicitors so as to ensure that they would come to his attention. They were "Obviously persistent, deliberate, oppressive … baseless" and indicative of "a conscious decision to cause the claimant as much embarrassment, alarm and distress as possible … even after having been told in a letter of claim why his conduct amounted to harassment." Mr Eardley also found that this conduct was causing the claimant considerable distress, because the allegations were published to professional colleagues, leadership judges and others with whom he works. He awarded costs on an indemnity basis in the light of the defendant's conduct of the litigation.
  14. An injunction is effective unless and until it is set aside, and the breaches occurred during the currency of the Steyn injunction, because it came to an end only when replaced by the permanent injunction made by Mr. Eardley on examining the evidence and granting summary judgment. No issue arises before us about whether the injunction was correctly made and whether it was an appropriate measure to protect Mr. Pattinson from harassment. There has been no appeal against the Steyn injunction, which has been vindicated by Mr. Eardley's decision, and there is no appeal against his decision either.
  15. The liability hearing before Linden J

  16. Mr. Winsor attended before Linden J remotely and unrepresented. He said that he had tried to secure legal representation but despite making many efforts, he had not identified any lawyers who would act for him. Linden J also asked questions about Mr. Winsor's health. Mr. Winsor contended that he was too unwell to travel from Hereford, where he lives, to London for a hearing and asked for the hearing to be adjourned. He said that he thought he would be fit by the end of October when a heart condition would have been investigated and addressed. He complained of shortness of breath which restricted his ability to walk. Linden J noted that a number of judges on previous occasions had emphasised to Mr. Winsor that he was entitled to legal aid and that he should secure representation for this case. The judge concluded that there was no reason to think that an adjournment would change the position as far as either the representation question or the health question was concerned and he would therefore continue with the liability hearing and review the matter after that.
  17. Subsequent events have shown that Linden J was right to conclude that the passage of time would not result either in Mr. Winsor being represented or in his accepting that he is well enough to attend hearings. He continues to this day to be unrepresented, and he has sought to adjourn this hearing also on health grounds, relying on the same medical evidence. That application was refused last week, and is dealt with in more detail below.
  18. Steyn J summarised the background to these proceedings in her judgment when granting the judgment. It is helpful to set it out here in order to supply the context for some of the things Mr. Winsor has said on this appeal. She set it out in this way:-
  19. "7) The background to the present dispute consists of two courses of litigation involving the Defendant:
    i) The Will proceedings in 2023; and
    ii) The Defendant's litigation against a third party between 2020 and 2012, resulting in his bankruptcy and civil restraint orders being entered against him.
    8) The Defendant's mother died on 28 December 2022 ('the Deceased'). She left a will dated 7 April 2022 ('the Will') which appointed her daughter ('Juliet'; the Claimant's wife and the Defendant's sister) and the Claimant as executors ('the Executors'). The Claimant is not a beneficiary of the Will. In summary, it provides that: Juliet should receive certain chattels, and be able to select other chattels; the Defendant should receive the remaining chattels; Juliet should receive a gift of £100,000; the Defendant should receive a life interest in the property of the Deceased; and the residuary estate to be split equally between Juliet and the Defendant.
    9) The Defendant lodged a caveat and challenged the validity of the Will. On 5 May 2023, the Executors began proceedings in the Chancery Division of the High Court, seeking a declaration as to the Will's validity and a grant of probate in solemn form (claim PT-2023-000360). The Defendant defended the probate claim, alleging that the Will had been procured through fraudulent calumny and undue influence on the party of the Executors. He also filed an application to remove the Claimant as an executor, as well as various applications to adjourn the trial.
    10) The Will was upheld as valid on 6 November 2023 by Master Pester in Pattinson v Winsor [2023] EWHC 3169 (Ch). In his judgement, Master Pester dismissed all allegations by the Defendant that the Will had been procured through any fraudulent calumny or undue influence, as well as the application to remove the Claimant as an executor. Master Pester ordered that the Defendant pay the Executors' costs on the indemnity basis, to reflect the Defendant's unreasonable conduct. Master Pester also made a limited civil restraint order against the Defendant in circumstances where the Defendant had made two applications in the Will proceedings which had been certified as totally without merit.
    11) The Defendant did not attend the trial on 6 November 2023, although Master Pester had permitted him to attend remotely, to accommodate his health issues. Master Pester proceeded in his absence in circumstances where the Defendant had applied to vacate the trial on medical grounds, without providing independent medical evidence.
    (…)
    13) In the course of the Will proceedings the Defendant sought to re-litigate matters which had led to his bankruptcy in 2013. The Claimant has made clear the basis and limits of his knowledge about the matter. In short, in 2004, the Deceased funded the purchase of a flat in Pimlico for the Defendant. The Defendant lived in London for many years with his partner, Veronica Vale. Sadly, she died in 2010. She died intestate and the Defendant began proceedings under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Those proceedings began in 2010 and were dismissed with costs in 2012.
    14) In 2013, the Defendant was made bankrupt for failing to pay the costs order in relation to the 1975 Act claim. The Defendant pursued appeals to the High Court and the Court of Appeal. An extended civil restraint order was imposed upon the Defendant by Peter Smith J on 23 October 2013, continued by Henderson J on 27 January 2014, and permission to appeal in respect of that continuation was refused by Arden LJ on 22 January 2015.
    15) After the Defendant's bankruptcy, his mother made representations to the trustee in bankruptcy, and successfully recovered £130,000 from the Defendant's bankruptcy estate in respect of the Pimlico flat. That was a matter between the Deceased and the trustee in bankruptcy. The Claimant was not involved in the process.
    16) Central to this application for an interim injunction is the barrage of correspondence that the Defendant has sent to the Claimant, his wife, and a wide array of third parties, particularly the Claimant's leadership judges and colleagues. In this correspondence, the Defendant fixates on his belief that there was fraudulent conduct in respect of the Defendant's bankruptcy. The Defendant appears to claim that the transfer of £130,000 from his estate in bankruptcy to his mother was fraudulent, somehow involving the Claimant –despite that transaction having been a matter between the trustee in bankruptcy and the deceased, in which the Claimant had no involvement – and that any subsequent dealings with that money constituted dealings with the proceeds of crime. The Defendant also states that he views the Will as being an instrument of fraud designed by the Claimant to 'steal' and then 'launder' the £130,000."
  20. Mr. Winsor sought to appeal against the decision of Master Pester and was unsuccessful. He continues to complain about Master Pester in his Notice of Appeal and Skeleton Argument for this appeal, although it has nothing to do with Master Pester at all.
  21. The judge referred to an affidavit by Mr. Pattinson dated 20 May 2024 in support of the committal application and to his earlier witness statement mentioned above. These documents set out the background and the affidavit proves the 17 emails.
  22. The judge summarised Mr. Winsor's written case in answer to the committal application in this way:-
  23. "31. At a directions hearing on 28 June 2024, which the defendant attended by MS Teams, Julian Knowles J directed that the defendant should serve any evidence on which he intended to rely by no later than 4.00 pm on 12 July 2024 and that any witness statement should be verified by statement of truth in the form set out in CPR Practice Direction 22, at paragraph 2.2. The defendant did not serve evidence which complied with this direction. Although the directions made by Knowles J specifically stated that skeleton arguments should be limited to 15 pages, the defendant submitted a 75 page document together with a furthermore than 80 pages comprising what he described as "a defence" and various enclosures. He also failed to cooperate with the process of preparing the bundle, to which the claimant's side responded by including all of the materials which he has submitted in the course of these proceedings. These run to around 2000 pages.
    32. In these documents, the defendant continued a pattern which is clear from his litigation activities over the years. This is to provide voluminous documentation which lacks coherence and is largely irrelevant to the issues at hand. The documents which he submitted for the purposes of the contempt application do not in fact address the case against him in the contempt application other than to indicate that it would be wrong to send him to prison and, in this connection, that he has health issues. Instead, the defendant's documents revisit all of his old themes connected with the bankruptcy litigation and the £130,000 as well as making more wide-ranging general allegations about fraud and malpractice."

  24. The judge summarised Mr. Winsor's case in the end in this way:-
  25. "35. He justified his conduct in sending the 17 emails on the basis that what he was saying was true, that it was in the public interest for him to act as he had been acting, and that he was merely passing information to the relevant authorities.
    36. In relation to the legal question, whether at all material times he had knowledge of all of the facts which would make the sending of the 17 emails contrary to the Steyn injunction, he said that he did not have knowledge. I asked him what fact or facts he was unaware of. He said that he was unaware that Steyn J was unable to make orders which were contrary to law. His overall submission, notwithstanding the admissions that he made, was that he was not guilty of contempt of court."
  26. Unsurprisingly, the judge found that Mr. Winsor was in contempt of court and that all 17 breaches were proved.
  27. The judge decided to postpone sentencing to give Mr. Winsor a further opportunity to arrange representation, to see whether any further medical evidence emerged, to enable Mr. Winsor to file evidence of means to pay any fine, and to enable Mr Pattinson's lawyers to consider whether to take further proceedings in relation communications following the 20 May 2024 of which there were said to be many.
  28. An attempt to appeal against this finding

  29. On 1 November 2014, Bean LJ dealt with a permission to appeal application in relation to Linden J's September decision. It is enough to set out his Order made that day:-
  30. "1. Mr Winsor was found guilty of contempt of court by Linden J in a decision dated 11 September 2024. Sentence was adjourned and is to be considered on 4 November 2024.
    2. The main application (no 002084) seeks permission to appeal against Linden J's finding. There is in my view no conceivable ground on which such an appeal could succeed. Linden J was entitled to proceed on the basis that the injunctions granted by Steyn J were valid and had to be complied with. It was beyond dispute that Mr Winsor had repeatedly and knowingly breached those orders. He was accordingly rightly found to be in contempt of court.
    3. The same application notice seeks a stay of execution. It is not entirely clear to me which order is sought to be stayed. There is no reason to stay the finding of contempt by Linden J since the application for committal has yet to take place. There are no grounds on which the injunction granted by Steyn J should be "stayed" or "voided". The reference to some previous order of this court (CA-2024-022733A according to Mr Winsor) is unintelligible.
    4. The next application, also contained in the separate application notice CA-2024-002084A, is a request for me to "disclose" the costs order of £176,000 from McFarlane LJ. The papers before me include an order of McFarlane LJ dated 12 November 2012 transferring an appeal for hearing by a judge of the Family Division sitting in the Court of Protection. There is also an order of the same Lord Justice dated 25 March 2014 upholding the decision of a deputy master dismissing an appeal in bankruptcy proceedings. What that order made ten years ago has to do with the injunction granted by Steyn J or the finding of contempt made by Linden J is beyond my comprehension. It is also beyond my comprehension why, if indeed McFarlane LJ did at some point in the distant past make an order for costs against Mr Winsor for £176,000 or in any other amount, that has any relevance to the decisions of Steyn J and Linden J this year.
    5. Application 002084B applies for an "adjournment to a contested hearing with oral evidence and cross-examination. A large number of reasons are put forward. There is reference to "statutory law", personal grievances and Mr Winsor's medical history. None of these is a valid ground of appeal against a very straightforward finding by Linden J that Mr Winsor has been in contempt of the injunctions granted by Steyn J. I do not understand the repeated allegation that the Claimant has "refused all CPR 1.3 Orders" or as "required to agree with the list of issues for disclosure". The fact remains that the injunctions granted by Steyn J had to be obeyed until and unless they were set aside by a higher court.
    6. The final application notice asks that " if strike-out is not granted the hearing on 4 November should be postponed to enable Mr Winsor to have a CT scan and an echocardiogram and, more importantly, to give time for DJ Pattinson and HMCTS to individually assess the exhibits from my statement to police and the forensic examination of beneficiary of economic crime CPR 1.3". There is then a long series of allegations that the Claimant and Steyn J have been "blanketing over" HMCTS fraud. Insofar as any of this makes sense it appears to be an attempt to challenge the validity of the injunctions granted by Steyn J. I am not prepared to make any order postponing the committal hearing. It will be a matter for Linden J to consider such an application if it is made to him. If he rejects the application to postpone and proceeds to make an order of committal then, as Mr Winsor has already been advised, an appeal against the order of committal may be made to this court without leave.
    7. I certify the present applications as being totally without merit."
  31. These orders are final orders disposing of the appeal and other applications considered by Bean LJ, see CPR 52.5 and section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The appeal challenged the finding of contempt by Linden J in his September judgment and that was dismissed. The procedural position was considered authoritatively by this court in Nambiar v. Solitaire Limited [2022] EWCA Civ1135. Permission to appeal was required to challenge the finding of contempt because it was not a "committal order", which is the only relevant exception to the general requirement of permission. The November order was a committal order and an appeal lies against that as of right. In Nambiar in broadly similar circumstances the challenge to the finding of contempt following a refusal of permission to appeal by a single Lord Justice on the papers was an abuse of process and struck out.
  32. In this case, the appeal cannot be struck out because Mr. Winsor does wish to challenge the committal order made in November. He says, in a very general way, that it was wrong to commit him to prison even where that order was suspended. However, the complaints which he makes about the September judgment have been determined against him by Lord Justice Bean. I shall return to the consequence of this at the end of this judgment.
  33. The sentencing hearing 4 November 2024

  34. As I have said above, the sentencing hearing resulted in a suspended committal order. Mr. Winsor had, again, attended remotely. The order which was made, so far as material, is in these terms:-
  35. IT IS ORDERED AND DECLARED that:
    1. The Defendant's Application is dismissed, and is certified as being totally without merit.
    2. For each of the 17 breaches listed in the Committal Application, and subject to paragraph 3 below, the Defendant be committed to prison for a period of four months, the sentence on each count to run concurrently (the "Committal Order").
    3. Execution of the Committal Order shall be suspended for a period of 2 years from 4 November 2024 on condition that, subject to (a)-(d) below, the Defendant complies with the Order of Mr. Aidan Eardley KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated 18 July 2024 (the "Eardley Injunction"):
    a. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Court of Appeal in exercising his right of appeal against this Order or in connection with such appeal, or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
    b. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Solicitors' Regulation Authority or the Bar Standards Board in relation to the Defendant's existing complaints to those bodies or any further complaint to those bodies arising out of the conduct of the Contempt Application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
    c. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to a public authority in response to any express request for further information by that public authority arising out of his correspondence with such authority prior to 4 November 2024 shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
    d. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the courts in any appeal against the Extended Civil Restraint Order made on 4 November 2024 (the "ECRO") or in seeking permission pursuant to the ECRO or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal or application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
    4. Any application for the Committal Order to be executed and a warrant of committal issued will be made on notice and is reserved to Mr Justice Linden.
    5. The Defendant will pay the Claimant's costs of the Contempt Application summarily assessed on the indemnity basis in the sum of £12,500 (inclusive of VAT) by 4pm on 18 November 2024.
  36. Mr. Winsor again wanted the hearing adjourned for the usual reasons. He was still unrepresented, but it had become clear to the judge that "he would have been able to secure representation were it not for his insistence that any legal representative deals with the background or, as he describes them, the underlying issues, rather than focus on the issues in the contempt application. There is no reason, in my judgment, to think that the position would change in terms of legal representation for the defendant if I were to postpone this hearing." No lawyer would accept instructions on the basis that they were not allowed to conduct the case properly, and it is clear that for as long as this remains Mr. Winsor's attitude, he will be unrepresented.
  37. Mr. Winsor had supplied some further medical evidence. This showed that he could attend a remote hearing, as he was doing.
  38. The judge noted that it was important to make progress for a number of reasons, including the fact that Mr. Winsor was continuing to send prohibited communications and considered that he had every right to do so. The judge decided to continue.
  39. Mr. Winsor had made some form of "strike out" application which the judge dismissed.
  40. The judge then set out the rival contentions about whether an order committing Mr. Winsor to prison should be immediate or suspended. Mr. Winsor set out his case with great clarity, explaining why he had committed contempt of court and why he had bene right do so.
  41. "The defendant made lengthy and robust submissions. He referred to the situation with his health, which I have very much taken into account. Much of his argument was, however, bound up with the past. He insisted on rehearsing the circumstances in which, as he sees it, he was the victim of fraud. He also submitted, not for the first time in these proceedings, that Steyn J's order was an abuse of power. He maintained that it was right for him to continue to raise the allegations that he makes against the claimant, that it was in the public interest, that it was important that he should be in a position to draw these allegations to the attention of the police, to various other bodies which are responsible for enforcement, to HMRC, to the Ministry of Justice and so on.
    His objection to the Injunction was that its effect was to seek to prevent him from doing so, and his strong and repeated argument was that he should not be committed to prison for doing so; he was acting entirely in the public interest in exposing what alleges is fraudulent conduct."
  42. The judge balanced the culpability of Mr. Winsor's behaviour, and the harm it caused. The culpability was high. The judge explained that although the conduct will have caused distress to Mr. Pattinson, the harm caused by the incoherent ramblings published by Mr. Winsor must have been limited by the fact that no rational person would take them seriously.
  43. The judge came to the conclusion that the order should be suspended for these reasons:-
  44. "I accept that there is much to be said for imposing an immediate custodial term and I also accept that there is at least a strong likelihood that the defendant will simply breach the conditions which I will in a moment impose on him. I have, however, concluded that the defendant should be given a final chance. I do so bearing in mind the possibility that he will finally see sense now that he is under imminent threat of an immediate custodial sentence, and taking into account, of course, the issues in relation to his health."
  45. It is clear that the judge had Mr. Winsor's age (60) and health firmly in mind when making the merciful order he did. It does appear that Mr. Winsor suffers from a number of chronic conditions, worsened according to his GP by alcohol abuse. Prison is always a last resort in contempt cases, and in a case where the contemnor is in poor health that is a highly relevant factor.
  46. Mr. Winsor's appeal to this court

  47. There is a skeleton argument by Mr. Winsor. I assume it is in support of this appeal, but very little about it supports that assumption. The heading is:-
  48. "SKELETON ARGUMENT. THE FIRST GILHAM VICTIM CASE OF AUSTERITY ECONOMICS
    "Erasmus Law Review: Austerity's Effects on English Civil Justice"
  49. This introduces a passage which complains that the Civil Justice system in England and Wales does not deal as well it should with unrepresented parties. It draws on a wide variety of sources. Although it is long, nothing further by way of meaning can be extracted from any of it. It contains repeated complaints about the £130,000 which was extracted from his bankrupt estate many years ago. There is no evidence at all that Mr. Pattinson ever had anything to do with this, but allegations of fraud against him are repeated nonetheless.
  50. A quotation from the end of this passage will perhaps illustrate the difficulty I have with making any sense of this.
  51. 57 I am a victim of DJ Gilham v MoJ. I became a victim in the same year, 2014, that Lord Lytton described to Parliament how he had seen documents faked at every stage of proceedings and yet the Government of the day and the new administration resort to fraud to keep the proceeds of the 2014 crimes - be it in BEIS Administration fees; VAT or other taxes.
    58. Interference with Administration of Justice by HMCTS as to steal the deeds and sell a second property to make me homeless again.
    59 HHJ Linden confirmed permission to appeal the trespass of LJ Bean on Sir Andrew McFarlane. LJ Bean also granted me permission to appeal his decision to trespass on Sir Andrew McFarlane.
  52. Sir Andrew McFarlane (as McFarlane LJ) appears to have made a costs order in the sum of £176,000 many years ago in other proceedings.
  53. The next lengthy passage concerns allegations of fraud against HMCTS and appears to relate to the conduct of the proceedings concerning the will of Mr. Winsor's late mother before Master Pester.
  54. With some frequency during this document, Mr. Winsor refers to (I think) a series of decisions from 2021 and 2022 in Ocado Group plc, Ocado Central Services Limited v Mr Raymond McKeeve [2021] EWHC 3542 (Ch), [2022] EWHC 1663 (Ch), [2022] EWHC 2079 (Ch) and [2022] EWHC 2478 (Ch). He never explains why he thinks they may help. He also often mentions Gilham v, Ministry of Justice [2019] UKSC 44, including in the passage cited above at [33]. For example, at one point he says this:-
  55. "To contact the Justice Minister and the Head of the Civil Service regarding the 2014 DJ Gilham v MoJ frauds; and the 2024 fraudulent dismissal of the EASS and NFIB-assessed proof that I am one of the DJ Gilham v MoJ victims."
  56. I can make no sense of this, but it clearly is no defence to his harassment of Mr. Pattinson.
  57. What Mr. Winsor never does is to make any submission either that he was wrongly found to have been in contempt of court or that the suspended committal order was too severe or in some other way flawed.
  58. The hearing of this appeal

  59. Mr. Winsor appeared by telephone, by permission of the court. He was invited to say whatever he wished to say in support of his appeal, but instead repeatedly complained that the court had failed to provide him with representation. After hearing what he wanted to say about that, and repeatedly attempting to elicit any submissions he wanted to make to show why the suspended committal order should not have been made in November 2024, the court decided that continuing the hearing would be of no value and announced that it would reserve its judgments on the appeal.
  60. Mr. Winsor had begun his submissions by asking for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. This was declined. It was not entirely clear what order of this court he wished to appeal, but by that stage this court had made three orders:-
  61. i) On 19 March 2025 Singh LJ dealt with an application to adjourn the hearing of this appeal on medical grounds. This was refused because the evidence suggested that Mr. Winsor could attend the hearing remotely, and this would be fair to him whether or not he was able to obtained representation through an organisation called Advocate, which is the Bar's national pro bono charity. The court had put him in touch with Advocate because Mr. Winsor had said in correspondence and to Master Meacher, see below, that he had been unable to secure representation despite being entitled to legal aid and despite having contacted, he told us, 127 lawyers.

    ii) Singh LJ was asked to reconsider that order by Mr. Winsor and did so in a further order dated 21 March 2025. This refused to change the earlier order saying:-

    1. I can see no good reason to take a different view on the application for an adjournment of the hearing on 25 March 2025.
    2. I have considered the various points made by the Appellant in his latest correspondence but many of them are either repetitive or irrelevant to the issue of an adjournment.
    3. I do not accept that the Appellant has only been given three days in which to obtain legal representation. The Civil Appeals Office wrote to him on 9 December 2024 to inform him that he was entitled to a representation order and that he should seek legal representation. More recently, the Office has sought to assist the Appellant by contacting Advocate. Despite that, the Office has been informed by Advocate that the Appellant has asked them not to look for a barrister for the hearing and, without his consent, they cannot proceed. Accordingly, the Appellant has had a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation.
    4. In any event, as mentioned in my order of 19 March 2025, I have taken into account the possibility that the Appellant will not have legal representation at the hearing but I remain of the view that a fair hearing is possible, as the Appellant can act for himself and can appear remotely.

    iii) At the start of the hearing this morning the court acceded to an application by Mr. Samuels on behalf of Mr. Pattison to rely on unagreed bundles. Two such bundles had been lodged containing necessary documents and the court agreed to use them.

  62. When asked whether he wished to say anything in support of his appeal, Mr. Winsor repeatedly asked whether the court had refused to provide him with representation so that he could appeal to the Supreme Court. It was not possible to move him beyond that position.
  63. On the morning of the hearing, the court received three further documents from Mr. Winsor accompanied by an email. The longest document is one written by him, and is 33 pages long. Among other things he now seeks to rely on three decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, Ibrahim v. the UK [2015] 61 EHRR 9, and Hammerton v. the UK [2016] 63 EHRR 23. The third is referred to as JT v UK Call to Service. Embezzlement. It has not been possible to identify a reference for this case, but what is said about it suggests that it is unlikely to be of assistance. Mr. Winsor's document says this immediately after referring to the case by that name:-
  64. "..legal arguments from P's legal team claimed to be TWM by LJ Warby. The 2nd column of the 'Dobbs' document shows actions taken by politicised judges, ie everything in the first column is TWM as to conceal P from all court proceedings"
  65. The "Dobbs" document is another 30 page document received this morning. There is also a document called "Hobbs" received this morning which is 8 pages long. These documents recite Mr. Winsor's complaints without in any way advancing his appeal against the order of Linden J made in November 2024.
  66. Ibrahim is said by Mr. Winsor to require the state to provide lawyers for unrepresented parties. It does not.
  67. Hammerton is relied on for the same proposition, and is at least a case about contempt of court. The Court of Appeal, at [2007] EWCA Civ 248, had quashed a committal order in part because the court which made it had not enquired at all about why the contemnor was not represented before it. The only potentially relevant issue before the European Court of Human Rights was whether the state ought to have compensated the contemnor because there had been a finding that he had been detained for longer than he would have been if he had been represented. In the Court of Appeal, Moses LJ at paragraph 9 said:-
  68. "ii)  Proceedings for committal are a criminal charge for the purposes of article 6 (see Re K (Contact: Committal Order) 2003 1 FLR 277 at para 21 p 282). Thus the defendant to such proceedings has the right enshrined in article 6(3)(c) :—
    'to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.'
    That right is reinforced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in recognising that the interests of justice, in principle, call for legal representation when deprivation of liberty is at stake (Benham v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 293 at 324). Such a right exists even where a defendant has parted company with one set of lawyers (see Re K per Hale LJ para 23) and see also Butler-Sloss P in Re: G (Contempt Committal) [2003] 2 FLR 58 at para 22 p 65). The obligation to afford a defendant representation imposed by virtue of article 6(3)(c) is not, however, unlimited. A defendant's intransigence in unreasonably failing to co-operate with whatever legal assistance is offered, or in refusing it, may make it impossible for legal assistance to be continued (see Re K per Mance LJ para 34). But absent such unreasonable behaviour, both article 6 and the decisions of this court make it plain that a defendant is entitled to be represented. If he is unrepresented then an adjournment should, save in circumstances of extreme urgency, be granted so that representation may be obtained."
  69. In that case Mr. Hammerton's legal aid had been withdrawn and was to be reconsidered by a review panel in the near future. It was obvious that the right thing to do, once the judge was or ought to have been aware of this, was to adjourn the hearing, and the Court of Appeal so held.
  70. The history of the failure of Mr. Winsor to secure legal representation

  71. In these circumstances it is necessary in this judgment to set out in more detail the way in which the court has dealt with the fact that Mr. Winsor has failed to secure legal representation, despite having been told repeatedly that funding for that purpose is available. The relevant material is derived from the proceedings at first instance and these appeal proceedings.
  72. The issue of representation arose in the High Court in that the committal application issued on 20 May 2024 says:-
  73. "Your rights
    You have the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings.
    You are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test."
  74. When Steyn J and Julian Knowles J gave directions in the High Court they both informed Mr. Winsor that he was entitled to representation.
  75. Paragraph 5 of Linden J's September judgment says this:-
  76. "I asked the defendant whether he had taken steps to obtain legal representation. It was clear from what he said that he understood that he was eligible for legal aid. But he told me that he had made extensive but unsuccessful efforts to obtain legal representation. He told me that he had contacted several law firms. He mentioned that there had been in the order of 17. He told me that he had also contacted various barristers. He said that the lawyers that he had asked to represent him were mainly in London. He explained that he would call their offices to ask whether they might be willing to represent him. He had then sent through the documents showing the issues and, in particular, "the background" as he described it: a background which I will describe in the course of this judgment. The lawyers would then indicate that they were not willing to represent him. He had therefore been quite unable to secure legal representation despite his eligibility for legal aid."
  77. Linden J decided to proceed, made the finding of contempt, and said at paragraph 46 that he would adjourn the question of sanction to a further hearing, saying:-
  78. "My reasons are that, firstly, I remain concerned about the fact that the defendant does not have legal representation. I am reluctantly persuaded that he should have a final opportunity to obtain such representation. As I pointed out to Mr Samuels, the position is materially different now to the position at the beginning of this hearing in that the defendant will be armed with my judgment on the contempt application which identifies very clearly the situation which he is in, and the purpose of the forthcoming hearing. I will also indicate in due course the sort of information which may be of assistance at that hearing. That may well cause lawyers who appear, from the defendant's account, to have been asked to deal with all of the wider issues going back into the past, to see that they are simply being asked to focus on the issue of sentence arising out of the contempt application and to appreciate that there is eligibility for legal aid in relation to the hearing. My impression was also that the defendant's efforts would be better spent focusing on local firms of solicitors or, at least firms, that are more local than the London lawyers with whom he said he had been in contact. I am not so naive as to think that it is impossible that I will find myself in the same situation at the sentencing hearing as I found myself in at the beginning of this hearing. But there does seem to me to be a chance that that position will change. Bearing in mind that the defendant is at risk of an immediate custodial sentence, it does seem to me that he should be given that final chance, albeit I emphasise that it is a final chance."
  79. At the start of the November judgment, Linden J recorded the updated position as to representation at paragraph 5:-
  80. "However, he did touch briefly on matters which were of relevance to the question of whether the hearing should go ahead today. The defendant told me that he had not been able to secure legal representation. He said that he had been in contact with a Mr Adam Tear but unfortunately Mr Tear was not prepared to look at the underlying issues, as the defendant described them, although Mr Tear was, I was told, willing to ask for a postponement of this hearing."
  81. At paragraph 10 Linden J stated his finding on the reason why Mr. Winsor appeared before him unrepresented:-
  82. "The defendant still does not have legal representation, but as I noted in my previous judgment he has repeatedly been told that he should seek legal advice and representation and that he may be eligible for legal aid, and he had ample opportunity to instruct a representative before the last hearing. Since then he has had a further nearly eight weeks to do so. It appears he would have been able to secure representation were it not for his insistence that any legal representative deals with the background or, as he describes them, the underlying issues, rather than focus on the issues in the contempt application. There is no reason, in my judgment, to think that the position would change in terms of legal representation for the defendant if I were to postpone this hearing."
  83. Mr. Justice Linden therefore concluded, having heard Mr. Winsor on the subject at length, that a principal obstacle to his being represented was his insistence that any legal representative deals with the background or, as he describes them, the underlying issues, rather than focus on the issues in the contempt application. My own reading of the materials which were before Linden J and which have come into existence since supports this conclusion. At the hearing of this appeal Mr. Winsor's main complaint about lack of representation related to a time when he said he had been arrested in connection with his bankruptcy proceedings over 6 years ago. In his documents, and at the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Winsor has been very keen to speak about many things, but quite reticent, or even obstructive, when asked to explain why he says Linden J should not have made a suspended committal order in November 2024. But it is that order which is the subject of the appeal before this Court now.
  84. Mr. Winsor then issued his grounds of appeal and skeleton argument. That was in November 2024, and the case was eventually listed for 25 March 2025. On 9 December 2024 the court wrote the letter to Mr. Winsor referred to at paragraph 3 of the order of Singh LJ at [40(ii)] above.
  85. It appears that his efforts to secure representation may have continued, but without success. Master Meacher made an order about this on 5 March 2025 in these terms:-
  86. "You have filed an application notice seeking to 'discharge the committal order under CPR 81.10' and 'to provide representation after 127 lawyers have refused the Legal Aid contract'.
    You are already appealing the committal order (in CA-2024-002559) and therefore an application to this court to discharge the committal order is misconceived.
    Your application to provide representation is also misconceived.  This court cannot order a solicitor or barrister (who work in private practice) to act for you.  You were sent the following directions on 09 December 2024 about representation:
    You are entitled to a Legal Representation Order. A Legal Representation Order is a court order which authorises payment of legal aid for your legal representatives in these appeal proceedings. You are   automatically entitled to this legal aid because you are appealing a suspended committal order.
    When you are approaching solicitors to act on your behalf you should inform them that you are asking them to act under a legal representation order. You can provide a copy of this email to any solicitors that you approach if that assists.
    In order to make the order the court needs to know the name of the solicitor who will act and the name of the junior advocate who will act".
    If you inform the court of a solicitor and barrister who are willing to act for you, the court will immediately make a Representation Order to cover their costs under legal aid.
    In the above circumstances, your application notice will not be issued."

    Discussion and decision

  87. In my judgment the High Court has dealt with the representation issue impeccably. In Hammerton the Court of Appeal suggested that an adjournment should be granted where there was reason to believe that this would result in an alleged contemnor being represented at the hearing of a committal application. Linden J in September considered that with care and gave reasons for proceeding as far as the finding that Mr. Winsor had been in breach of the Steyn injunction by sending 17 emails which he has never denied sending. He did not think an adjournment would produce representation, and events have proved him right. He then did adjourn the question of sanction to give Mr. Winsor a further final chance to secure representation. In November, he made the findings set out above and proceeded to make the committal order.
  88. The application to this court to adjourn to enable Mr. Winsor to be represented was rejected against the background of what had taken place in the High Court and the order of Master Meacher on 5 March 2025. The position so far as representation was concerned had not changed despite the passage of a further 4 months since the committal order was made.
  89. There are no wider lessons or points of principle to be considered in this case. It has proved impossible to interpret Mr. Winsor's documents so that they advance an arguable appeal. The court will always attempt to understand the points which are being made by unrepresented parties and will not expect them to be perfectly articulated, but that is not the exercise required here. Mr. Winsor was told by Linden J in his two judgments that his documents are incomprehensible and for the most part obviously irrelevant, but he continues to create them in ever more disordered ways. He has simply failed to identify any possible argument which might actually address the decisions about which, in theory, he complains in this appeal. In fact, he is really complaining about a great many other things, but not those decisions.
  90. This is an appeal against the committal order as of right. If it required permission, permission would have been refused. It is, therefore, possible to deal with the purported grounds of appeal briefly.
  91. The first question is whether he was correctly found to have sent the 17 emails and thereby breached the terms of the Steyn injunction. It will be apparent from what I have said above is that in concluding that he was in breach as alleged, Linden J reached the only conclusion properly open to him on the evidence. Further, and in any event, Bean LJ refused permission to challenge this finding on the papers and permission is required because this finding is not a committal order. Bean LJ was plainly right in his decision. In fact, Mr. Winsor does not truly dispute the contempt finding. He has never denied sending the emails or asserted that he did not know that in doing so he was breaching the terms of the Steyn injunction. Mr. Samuels on behalf of Mr. Pattinson has relied upon one admission of this, although he tells us there are more. This admission is contained in a long email sent as follows:-
  92. From: robert winsor
    Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2024 8:26:06 AM
    To: MOJcounterfraud@justice.gov.uk ; HMCTScounterfraud ; SCCO scco@Justice.gov.uk>; Jesse Norman MP <**** @****.uk>; Ford, Hazel <**** @****.uk>
    Subject: Lord Hamer, Scandal 800+ victims of HMCTS Two years no trial or representation DJ Pattinson v Winsor re Lord Lytton
  93. It contains this sentence:-
  94. "I admit I broke the injunction but on the grounds that I am reporting independently assessed economic crime."
  95. The admission in that sentence is clear. The excuse is not a defence.
  96. The only question therefore which is properly before this court is whether a suspended committal order was wrong, in that it was outside the range properly open to Linden J when he came to consider what sanction should be imposed. The only possible alternative on the facts of this case was an immediate committal to prison. Mr. Winsor seems determined to get himself sent to prison. If he achieves that aim, he will have only himself to blame. This will be a matter of regret, because he is plainly not in the best of health and he appears to have a profoundly distorted view of the world. No-one wants to see a man like him in prison. It is also an undesirable outcome because of the scarcity of prison accommodation which is needed for other people. In the end, though, the court must secure compliance with its injunctive orders. That is necessary in order to protect Mr. Pattinson in this case, but also to promote public confidence in the civil justice system. Injunctive orders cannot be treated in a way which is contemptuous in every sense of that word. Linden J was merciful and fair to Mr. Winsor in the patient way in which he dealt with the case, and the order he made imposing a sanction in this case was unimpeachable.
  97. In order to assist in understanding this decision, it is right that I should say that I consider that if Linden J had decided to commit Mr. Winsor to prison immediately for 4 months in November, that also would have been within the range of decisions properly open to him. That is why I describe the decision as "merciful". A principal aim of imposing sanctions in contempt cases involving breaches of orders is securing future compliance with those orders. Mr. Winsor's conduct would have amply justified a finding that he is very unlikely to take any notice of any court order, and very likely to breach the Eardley injunction in the future. It would be rational to conclude that even immediate imprisonment may not succeed, but nothing less has any real prospect of success.
  98. Conclusion and directions

  99. For these reasons, this appeal is dismissed and certified as being totally without merit.
  100. The following issues should be addressed in writing and will be resolved by the court without a further hearing:-
  101. i) Any application for permission to appeal.

    ii) Whether a further Civil Restraint Order should be made by this court.

    iii) Costs.

  102. Those representing Mr. Pattinson may lodge written submissions on these issues by 4pm on 2 April 2025. Mr. Winsor may respond by 4pm on 9 April 2025.
  103. Lord Justice Arnold:

  104. I agree.
  105. Lord Justice Singh:

  106. I also agree.


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