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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Winsor v Pattinson [2025] EWCA Civ 344 (26 March 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/344.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Civ 344 |
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ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KINGS BENCH DIVISION
The Hon Mr Justice Linden
KB-2024-000256
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE ARNOLD
and
LORD JUSTICE EDIS
____________________
ROBERT IAN WINSOR |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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TIMOTHY HULL PATTINSON |
Respondent |
____________________
Harry Samuels (instructed by Paris Smith, Winchester) for the Respondent
Hearing dates : 25 March 2025
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Edis :
"Particulars of Harassment
The facts on which the Claimant relies are set out in his witness statement dated 1 February 2024.
The Claimant is the Defendant's brother-in-law and one of the executors of the Defendant's late mother's estate. The Claimant is a District Judge (Magistrates' Court). The Defendant has harassed the Claimant by sending numerous emails on various dates to recipients including the Claimant, the Claimant's wife and legal representatives, members of the HMCTS board and senior leadership team, the Chief Magistrate's Office (which emails are seen by the Claimant's direct colleagues), other District Judges and High Court Judges, Masters and staff. The emails in question contain, amongst other things, false and defamatory allegations that the Claimant has been involved in fraud, theft, forgery and other dishonest criminal offences and has abused his judicial office."
"Injunction
2. Until further order of the court, the Respondent must not:
a. Harass the Claimant;
b. Communicate directly with the Claimant whether by telephone, text message, email or any other means;
c. Publish, make, repeat or distribute by any means any allegation, statement or suggestion that the Claimant has (in connection with his role as executor of the estate of Ivy Emily Winsor deceased or otherwise) committed fraud or been engaged in money laundering or has committed theft or any other criminal offence or has done anything which would be regarded as misconduct if done by a member of the judiciary;
d. In particular, sending such allegations by email to the following email addresses or by any other means to the following organisations/persons/categories of person:
i. [an email address of those at the Chief Magistrate's Office who deploy DJ(MC)s];
ii.[Another email address at the Chief Magistrate's Office] ;
iii. The Chief Magistrate or any employee or officer of the Chief Magistrate's Office;
iv. District Judge Karen Doyle or any other District Judge or Deputy District Judge;
v.[an official];
vi.[a correspondence address at the Attorney General's Office];
vii. Nick Goodwin or any other member of the HMCTS board or senior leadership team [Nick Goodwin in the Chief Executive Officer of HM Courts and Tribunals' Service, "HMCTS"];
viii.[an email address at the Supreme Court];
ix. [an email address at the Civil Appeals Office];
x. Basingstoke Court Office;
xi. Judicial Conduct Investigations Office;
xii. West Mercia Police;
xiii. Any court officer or employee of HMCTS;
xiv.[the email address of Jesse Norman, a Member of Parliament].
3. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall prevent the Claimant from instructing legal representatives to act for him or to give him legal advice, and it shall not be a breach of this Order for the Claimant to repeat his allegations of the nature set out in paragraph 5(c) above as part of his instructions to his legal representatives."
The Grounds for Committal
"Schedule of breaches
The Defendant breached paragraph 2 of the injunction of 16 February 2024 in that he:
1. On 15 March 2024 at 11:36am emailed the Court of Appeal alleging that the Claimant was violating the CPR and Practice Directions by claiming £130,000 from 'a surplus bankruptcy'.
2. On 27 March 2024 at 11:58pm emailed the Court of Appeal and Jesse Norman MP alleging that the Claimant was unjustly enriching himself from a fraudulent bankruptcy.
3. On 8 April 2024 at 10:56am emailed the Court of Appeal alleging that the Claimant was unjustly enriching himself, had committed tax fraud, was money laundering, and had profited from the proceeds of crime.
4. On 9 April 2024 at 2:37pm emailed the Court of Appeal alleging that the Claimant was unjustly enriching himself, and was "aim[ing] to profit by £130,000 Proceeds of Crime".
5. On 15 April 2024 at 10:42pm emailed the Court of Appeal, Claire Manning, DJ Doyle and Jesse Norman MP alleging that the Claimant was obtaining funds by the use of fraudulent documents, is guilty of procedural impropriety, of ignoring document tampering, and making a "fraudulent submission to court".
6. On 24 April 2024 at 5:00pm emailed the Court of Appeal, Jesse Norman MP, Claire Manning and DJ Doyle alleging that the Claimant had engaged in money laundering.
7. On 26 April 2024 at 6:21pm emailed Jesse Norman MP, Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, alleging that the Claimant is part of an "unlawful means conspiracy" and had drafted the deceased's will as "an instrument for the purposes of fraud".
8. On 29 April 2024 at 12:51am emailed Jesse Norman MP, Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging that the Claimant engaged in money laundering, fraudulent calumny, procedural impropriety, misleading the court, and benefitting from the proceeds of crime.
9. On 29 April 2024 at 7:40pm emailed Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging that the Claimant misled the court, dealing with the proceeds of crime, profiting from an unlawful means conspiracy, and engaging in money laundering.
10. On 1 May 2024 at 5:53pm emailed the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging the Claimant has committed tax fraud and engaged in unlawful means conspiracy.
11. On 1 May 2024 at 9:07pm emailed Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging the Claimant has engaged in money laundering, fraud, unlawful means conspiracy, and document tampering.
12. On 2 May 2024 at 2:21am emailed Claire Manning, DJ Doyle, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging the Claimant has benefitted from the proceeds of crime and 'cheat[ed] the system'.
13. On 8 May 2024 at 4:42pm emailed the EHRC, the EASS and Jesse Norman MP alleging that the Claimant has interfered with the administration of justice, committed fraud, fraudulently created the will of the deceased, and participated in a conspiracy.
14. On 11 May 2024 at 10:55am emailed the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alleging that the Claimant has participated in an unlawful means conspiracy.
15. On 12 May 2024 at 3:53pm emailed the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, DJ Doyle, the DDJ Deployment email address and the EHRC alleging that the Claimant 'concealed' estate funds amounting to an allegation of money laundering.
16. On 13 May 2024 at 2:30pm emailed the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the EHRC, DJ Doyle, and the DDJ Deployment address, alleging the Claimant has engaged in laundering the proceeds of crime, theft and fraud.
17. On 14 May 2024 at 11:49am emailed the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the EHRC, DJ Doyle, the DDJ Deployment address and Nick Goodwin, alleging the Claimant has committed fraud, money laundering, and contempt of court.
"In a judgment which was handed down on 24 July 2024 Mr Adrian Eardley KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, has since granted the claimant's application for summary judgment on the claim, holding that the defendant persistently breached the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 by the publication of baseless allegations about the claimant to third parties. Mr Eardley made a final injunction order in substantially the same terms as the Steyn J injunction. His reasons for doing so are to be found at [2024] EWHC 1910 (KB) ("the Eardley judgment")."
The liability hearing before Linden J
"7) The background to the present dispute consists of two courses of litigation involving the Defendant:
i) The Will proceedings in 2023; and
ii) The Defendant's litigation against a third party between 2020 and 2012, resulting in his bankruptcy and civil restraint orders being entered against him.
8) The Defendant's mother died on 28 December 2022 ('the Deceased'). She left a will dated 7 April 2022 ('the Will') which appointed her daughter ('Juliet'; the Claimant's wife and the Defendant's sister) and the Claimant as executors ('the Executors'). The Claimant is not a beneficiary of the Will. In summary, it provides that: Juliet should receive certain chattels, and be able to select other chattels; the Defendant should receive the remaining chattels; Juliet should receive a gift of £100,000; the Defendant should receive a life interest in the property of the Deceased; and the residuary estate to be split equally between Juliet and the Defendant.
9) The Defendant lodged a caveat and challenged the validity of the Will. On 5 May 2023, the Executors began proceedings in the Chancery Division of the High Court, seeking a declaration as to the Will's validity and a grant of probate in solemn form (claim PT-2023-000360). The Defendant defended the probate claim, alleging that the Will had been procured through fraudulent calumny and undue influence on the party of the Executors. He also filed an application to remove the Claimant as an executor, as well as various applications to adjourn the trial.
10) The Will was upheld as valid on 6 November 2023 by Master Pester in Pattinson v Winsor [2023] EWHC 3169 (Ch). In his judgement, Master Pester dismissed all allegations by the Defendant that the Will had been procured through any fraudulent calumny or undue influence, as well as the application to remove the Claimant as an executor. Master Pester ordered that the Defendant pay the Executors' costs on the indemnity basis, to reflect the Defendant's unreasonable conduct. Master Pester also made a limited civil restraint order against the Defendant in circumstances where the Defendant had made two applications in the Will proceedings which had been certified as totally without merit.
11) The Defendant did not attend the trial on 6 November 2023, although Master Pester had permitted him to attend remotely, to accommodate his health issues. Master Pester proceeded in his absence in circumstances where the Defendant had applied to vacate the trial on medical grounds, without providing independent medical evidence.
(…)
13) In the course of the Will proceedings the Defendant sought to re-litigate matters which had led to his bankruptcy in 2013. The Claimant has made clear the basis and limits of his knowledge about the matter. In short, in 2004, the Deceased funded the purchase of a flat in Pimlico for the Defendant. The Defendant lived in London for many years with his partner, Veronica Vale. Sadly, she died in 2010. She died intestate and the Defendant began proceedings under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Those proceedings began in 2010 and were dismissed with costs in 2012.
14) In 2013, the Defendant was made bankrupt for failing to pay the costs order in relation to the 1975 Act claim. The Defendant pursued appeals to the High Court and the Court of Appeal. An extended civil restraint order was imposed upon the Defendant by Peter Smith J on 23 October 2013, continued by Henderson J on 27 January 2014, and permission to appeal in respect of that continuation was refused by Arden LJ on 22 January 2015.
15) After the Defendant's bankruptcy, his mother made representations to the trustee in bankruptcy, and successfully recovered £130,000 from the Defendant's bankruptcy estate in respect of the Pimlico flat. That was a matter between the Deceased and the trustee in bankruptcy. The Claimant was not involved in the process.
16) Central to this application for an interim injunction is the barrage of correspondence that the Defendant has sent to the Claimant, his wife, and a wide array of third parties, particularly the Claimant's leadership judges and colleagues. In this correspondence, the Defendant fixates on his belief that there was fraudulent conduct in respect of the Defendant's bankruptcy. The Defendant appears to claim that the transfer of £130,000 from his estate in bankruptcy to his mother was fraudulent, somehow involving the Claimant –despite that transaction having been a matter between the trustee in bankruptcy and the deceased, in which the Claimant had no involvement – and that any subsequent dealings with that money constituted dealings with the proceeds of crime. The Defendant also states that he views the Will as being an instrument of fraud designed by the Claimant to 'steal' and then 'launder' the £130,000."
"31. At a directions hearing on 28 June 2024, which the defendant attended by MS Teams, Julian Knowles J directed that the defendant should serve any evidence on which he intended to rely by no later than 4.00 pm on 12 July 2024 and that any witness statement should be verified by statement of truth in the form set out in CPR Practice Direction 22, at paragraph 2.2. The defendant did not serve evidence which complied with this direction. Although the directions made by Knowles J specifically stated that skeleton arguments should be limited to 15 pages, the defendant submitted a 75 page document together with a furthermore than 80 pages comprising what he described as "a defence" and various enclosures. He also failed to cooperate with the process of preparing the bundle, to which the claimant's side responded by including all of the materials which he has submitted in the course of these proceedings. These run to around 2000 pages.
32. In these documents, the defendant continued a pattern which is clear from his litigation activities over the years. This is to provide voluminous documentation which lacks coherence and is largely irrelevant to the issues at hand. The documents which he submitted for the purposes of the contempt application do not in fact address the case against him in the contempt application other than to indicate that it would be wrong to send him to prison and, in this connection, that he has health issues. Instead, the defendant's documents revisit all of his old themes connected with the bankruptcy litigation and the £130,000 as well as making more wide-ranging general allegations about fraud and malpractice."
"35. He justified his conduct in sending the 17 emails on the basis that what he was saying was true, that it was in the public interest for him to act as he had been acting, and that he was merely passing information to the relevant authorities.
36. In relation to the legal question, whether at all material times he had knowledge of all of the facts which would make the sending of the 17 emails contrary to the Steyn injunction, he said that he did not have knowledge. I asked him what fact or facts he was unaware of. He said that he was unaware that Steyn J was unable to make orders which were contrary to law. His overall submission, notwithstanding the admissions that he made, was that he was not guilty of contempt of court."
An attempt to appeal against this finding
"1. Mr Winsor was found guilty of contempt of court by Linden J in a decision dated 11 September 2024. Sentence was adjourned and is to be considered on 4 November 2024.
2. The main application (no 002084) seeks permission to appeal against Linden J's finding. There is in my view no conceivable ground on which such an appeal could succeed. Linden J was entitled to proceed on the basis that the injunctions granted by Steyn J were valid and had to be complied with. It was beyond dispute that Mr Winsor had repeatedly and knowingly breached those orders. He was accordingly rightly found to be in contempt of court.
3. The same application notice seeks a stay of execution. It is not entirely clear to me which order is sought to be stayed. There is no reason to stay the finding of contempt by Linden J since the application for committal has yet to take place. There are no grounds on which the injunction granted by Steyn J should be "stayed" or "voided". The reference to some previous order of this court (CA-2024-022733A according to Mr Winsor) is unintelligible.
4. The next application, also contained in the separate application notice CA-2024-002084A, is a request for me to "disclose" the costs order of £176,000 from McFarlane LJ. The papers before me include an order of McFarlane LJ dated 12 November 2012 transferring an appeal for hearing by a judge of the Family Division sitting in the Court of Protection. There is also an order of the same Lord Justice dated 25 March 2014 upholding the decision of a deputy master dismissing an appeal in bankruptcy proceedings. What that order made ten years ago has to do with the injunction granted by Steyn J or the finding of contempt made by Linden J is beyond my comprehension. It is also beyond my comprehension why, if indeed McFarlane LJ did at some point in the distant past make an order for costs against Mr Winsor for £176,000 or in any other amount, that has any relevance to the decisions of Steyn J and Linden J this year.
5. Application 002084B applies for an "adjournment to a contested hearing with oral evidence and cross-examination. A large number of reasons are put forward. There is reference to "statutory law", personal grievances and Mr Winsor's medical history. None of these is a valid ground of appeal against a very straightforward finding by Linden J that Mr Winsor has been in contempt of the injunctions granted by Steyn J. I do not understand the repeated allegation that the Claimant has "refused all CPR 1.3 Orders" or as "required to agree with the list of issues for disclosure". The fact remains that the injunctions granted by Steyn J had to be obeyed until and unless they were set aside by a higher court.
6. The final application notice asks that " if strike-out is not granted the hearing on 4 November should be postponed to enable Mr Winsor to have a CT scan and an echocardiogram and, more importantly, to give time for DJ Pattinson and HMCTS to individually assess the exhibits from my statement to police and the forensic examination of beneficiary of economic crime CPR 1.3". There is then a long series of allegations that the Claimant and Steyn J have been "blanketing over" HMCTS fraud. Insofar as any of this makes sense it appears to be an attempt to challenge the validity of the injunctions granted by Steyn J. I am not prepared to make any order postponing the committal hearing. It will be a matter for Linden J to consider such an application if it is made to him. If he rejects the application to postpone and proceeds to make an order of committal then, as Mr Winsor has already been advised, an appeal against the order of committal may be made to this court without leave.
7. I certify the present applications as being totally without merit."
The sentencing hearing 4 November 2024
IT IS ORDERED AND DECLARED that:
1. The Defendant's Application is dismissed, and is certified as being totally without merit.
2. For each of the 17 breaches listed in the Committal Application, and subject to paragraph 3 below, the Defendant be committed to prison for a period of four months, the sentence on each count to run concurrently (the "Committal Order").
3. Execution of the Committal Order shall be suspended for a period of 2 years from 4 November 2024 on condition that, subject to (a)-(d) below, the Defendant complies with the Order of Mr. Aidan Eardley KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated 18 July 2024 (the "Eardley Injunction"):
a. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Court of Appeal in exercising his right of appeal against this Order or in connection with such appeal, or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
b. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Solicitors' Regulation Authority or the Bar Standards Board in relation to the Defendant's existing complaints to those bodies or any further complaint to those bodies arising out of the conduct of the Contempt Application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
c. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to a public authority in response to any express request for further information by that public authority arising out of his correspondence with such authority prior to 4 November 2024 shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
d. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the courts in any appeal against the Extended Civil Restraint Order made on 4 November 2024 (the "ECRO") or in seeking permission pursuant to the ECRO or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal or application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.
4. Any application for the Committal Order to be executed and a warrant of committal issued will be made on notice and is reserved to Mr Justice Linden.
5. The Defendant will pay the Claimant's costs of the Contempt Application summarily assessed on the indemnity basis in the sum of £12,500 (inclusive of VAT) by 4pm on 18 November 2024.
"The defendant made lengthy and robust submissions. He referred to the situation with his health, which I have very much taken into account. Much of his argument was, however, bound up with the past. He insisted on rehearsing the circumstances in which, as he sees it, he was the victim of fraud. He also submitted, not for the first time in these proceedings, that Steyn J's order was an abuse of power. He maintained that it was right for him to continue to raise the allegations that he makes against the claimant, that it was in the public interest, that it was important that he should be in a position to draw these allegations to the attention of the police, to various other bodies which are responsible for enforcement, to HMRC, to the Ministry of Justice and so on.
His objection to the Injunction was that its effect was to seek to prevent him from doing so, and his strong and repeated argument was that he should not be committed to prison for doing so; he was acting entirely in the public interest in exposing what alleges is fraudulent conduct."
"I accept that there is much to be said for imposing an immediate custodial term and I also accept that there is at least a strong likelihood that the defendant will simply breach the conditions which I will in a moment impose on him. I have, however, concluded that the defendant should be given a final chance. I do so bearing in mind the possibility that he will finally see sense now that he is under imminent threat of an immediate custodial sentence, and taking into account, of course, the issues in relation to his health."
Mr. Winsor's appeal to this court
"SKELETON ARGUMENT. THE FIRST GILHAM VICTIM CASE OF AUSTERITY ECONOMICS
"Erasmus Law Review: Austerity's Effects on English Civil Justice"
57 I am a victim of DJ Gilham v MoJ. I became a victim in the same year, 2014, that Lord Lytton described to Parliament how he had seen documents faked at every stage of proceedings and yet the Government of the day and the new administration resort to fraud to keep the proceeds of the 2014 crimes - be it in BEIS Administration fees; VAT or other taxes.
58. Interference with Administration of Justice by HMCTS as to steal the deeds and sell a second property to make me homeless again.
59 HHJ Linden confirmed permission to appeal the trespass of LJ Bean on Sir Andrew McFarlane. LJ Bean also granted me permission to appeal his decision to trespass on Sir Andrew McFarlane.
"To contact the Justice Minister and the Head of the Civil Service regarding the 2014 DJ Gilham v MoJ frauds; and the 2024 fraudulent dismissal of the EASS and NFIB-assessed proof that I am one of the DJ Gilham v MoJ victims."
The hearing of this appeal
i) On 19 March 2025 Singh LJ dealt with an application to adjourn the hearing of this appeal on medical grounds. This was refused because the evidence suggested that Mr. Winsor could attend the hearing remotely, and this would be fair to him whether or not he was able to obtained representation through an organisation called Advocate, which is the Bar's national pro bono charity. The court had put him in touch with Advocate because Mr. Winsor had said in correspondence and to Master Meacher, see below, that he had been unable to secure representation despite being entitled to legal aid and despite having contacted, he told us, 127 lawyers.
ii) Singh LJ was asked to reconsider that order by Mr. Winsor and did so in a further order dated 21 March 2025. This refused to change the earlier order saying:-
1. I can see no good reason to take a different view on the application for an adjournment of the hearing on 25 March 2025.
2. I have considered the various points made by the Appellant in his latest correspondence but many of them are either repetitive or irrelevant to the issue of an adjournment.
3. I do not accept that the Appellant has only been given three days in which to obtain legal representation. The Civil Appeals Office wrote to him on 9 December 2024 to inform him that he was entitled to a representation order and that he should seek legal representation. More recently, the Office has sought to assist the Appellant by contacting Advocate. Despite that, the Office has been informed by Advocate that the Appellant has asked them not to look for a barrister for the hearing and, without his consent, they cannot proceed. Accordingly, the Appellant has had a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation.
4. In any event, as mentioned in my order of 19 March 2025, I have taken into account the possibility that the Appellant will not have legal representation at the hearing but I remain of the view that a fair hearing is possible, as the Appellant can act for himself and can appear remotely.
iii) At the start of the hearing this morning the court acceded to an application by Mr. Samuels on behalf of Mr. Pattison to rely on unagreed bundles. Two such bundles had been lodged containing necessary documents and the court agreed to use them.
"..legal arguments from P's legal team claimed to be TWM by LJ Warby. The 2nd column of the 'Dobbs' document shows actions taken by politicised judges, ie everything in the first column is TWM as to conceal P from all court proceedings"
"ii) Proceedings for committal are a criminal charge for the purposes of article 6 (see Re K (Contact: Committal Order) 2003 1 FLR 277 at para 21 p 282). Thus the defendant to such proceedings has the right enshrined in article 6(3)(c) :—
'to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.'
That right is reinforced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in recognising that the interests of justice, in principle, call for legal representation when deprivation of liberty is at stake (Benham v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 293 at 324). Such a right exists even where a defendant has parted company with one set of lawyers (see Re K per Hale LJ para 23) and see also Butler-Sloss P in Re: G (Contempt Committal) [2003] 2 FLR 58 at para 22 p 65). The obligation to afford a defendant representation imposed by virtue of article 6(3)(c) is not, however, unlimited. A defendant's intransigence in unreasonably failing to co-operate with whatever legal assistance is offered, or in refusing it, may make it impossible for legal assistance to be continued (see Re K per Mance LJ para 34). But absent such unreasonable behaviour, both article 6 and the decisions of this court make it plain that a defendant is entitled to be represented. If he is unrepresented then an adjournment should, save in circumstances of extreme urgency, be granted so that representation may be obtained."
The history of the failure of Mr. Winsor to secure legal representation
"Your rights
You have the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings.
You are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test."
"I asked the defendant whether he had taken steps to obtain legal representation. It was clear from what he said that he understood that he was eligible for legal aid. But he told me that he had made extensive but unsuccessful efforts to obtain legal representation. He told me that he had contacted several law firms. He mentioned that there had been in the order of 17. He told me that he had also contacted various barristers. He said that the lawyers that he had asked to represent him were mainly in London. He explained that he would call their offices to ask whether they might be willing to represent him. He had then sent through the documents showing the issues and, in particular, "the background" as he described it: a background which I will describe in the course of this judgment. The lawyers would then indicate that they were not willing to represent him. He had therefore been quite unable to secure legal representation despite his eligibility for legal aid."
"My reasons are that, firstly, I remain concerned about the fact that the defendant does not have legal representation. I am reluctantly persuaded that he should have a final opportunity to obtain such representation. As I pointed out to Mr Samuels, the position is materially different now to the position at the beginning of this hearing in that the defendant will be armed with my judgment on the contempt application which identifies very clearly the situation which he is in, and the purpose of the forthcoming hearing. I will also indicate in due course the sort of information which may be of assistance at that hearing. That may well cause lawyers who appear, from the defendant's account, to have been asked to deal with all of the wider issues going back into the past, to see that they are simply being asked to focus on the issue of sentence arising out of the contempt application and to appreciate that there is eligibility for legal aid in relation to the hearing. My impression was also that the defendant's efforts would be better spent focusing on local firms of solicitors or, at least firms, that are more local than the London lawyers with whom he said he had been in contact. I am not so naive as to think that it is impossible that I will find myself in the same situation at the sentencing hearing as I found myself in at the beginning of this hearing. But there does seem to me to be a chance that that position will change. Bearing in mind that the defendant is at risk of an immediate custodial sentence, it does seem to me that he should be given that final chance, albeit I emphasise that it is a final chance."
"However, he did touch briefly on matters which were of relevance to the question of whether the hearing should go ahead today. The defendant told me that he had not been able to secure legal representation. He said that he had been in contact with a Mr Adam Tear but unfortunately Mr Tear was not prepared to look at the underlying issues, as the defendant described them, although Mr Tear was, I was told, willing to ask for a postponement of this hearing."
"The defendant still does not have legal representation, but as I noted in my previous judgment he has repeatedly been told that he should seek legal advice and representation and that he may be eligible for legal aid, and he had ample opportunity to instruct a representative before the last hearing. Since then he has had a further nearly eight weeks to do so. It appears he would have been able to secure representation were it not for his insistence that any legal representative deals with the background or, as he describes them, the underlying issues, rather than focus on the issues in the contempt application. There is no reason, in my judgment, to think that the position would change in terms of legal representation for the defendant if I were to postpone this hearing."
"You have filed an application notice seeking to 'discharge the committal order under CPR 81.10' and 'to provide representation after 127 lawyers have refused the Legal Aid contract'.
You are already appealing the committal order (in CA-2024-002559) and therefore an application to this court to discharge the committal order is misconceived.
Your application to provide representation is also misconceived. This court cannot order a solicitor or barrister (who work in private practice) to act for you. You were sent the following directions on 09 December 2024 about representation:
You are entitled to a Legal Representation Order. A Legal Representation Order is a court order which authorises payment of legal aid for your legal representatives in these appeal proceedings. You are automatically entitled to this legal aid because you are appealing a suspended committal order.
When you are approaching solicitors to act on your behalf you should inform them that you are asking them to act under a legal representation order. You can provide a copy of this email to any solicitors that you approach if that assists.
In order to make the order the court needs to know the name of the solicitor who will act and the name of the junior advocate who will act".
If you inform the court of a solicitor and barrister who are willing to act for you, the court will immediately make a Representation Order to cover their costs under legal aid.
In the above circumstances, your application notice will not be issued."
Discussion and decision
From: robert winsor
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2024 8:26:06 AM
To: MOJcounterfraud@justice.gov.uk; HMCTScounterfraud ; SCCO scco@Justice.gov.uk>; Jesse Norman MP <**** @****.uk>; Ford, Hazel <**** @****.uk>
Subject: Lord Hamer, Scandal 800+ victims of HMCTS Two years no trial or representation DJ Pattinson v Winsor re Lord Lytton
"I admit I broke the injunction but on the grounds that I am reporting independently assessed economic crime."
Conclusion and directions
i) Any application for permission to appeal.
ii) Whether a further Civil Restraint Order should be made by this court.
iii) Costs.
Lord Justice Arnold:
Lord Justice Singh: